From: Commanding Officer To; Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division (rein), FMF
Via: (1) Commanding Officer, 1st Marines (-) (rein)
(2) ADC Command Group, Chu Lai
Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report
Ref: (a) BnOpOrder 006-66
(b) BnOpOrder 222-65
- Code Name: OLD HAT.
- Dates of Operation. 230400H – 231600H
- Location. Tinh, Quang Tin Province, Hoa Xuan Island (BT 4315).
- Command Headquarters. 1st Bn (-) (rein), 4th Marines (-) (rein), 3rd Marine Division (rein), FMF.
a. Reporting Officer: Lt/Col R. E. SULLIVAN
b. Subordinate Unit Commanders:
1. Capt J. L. DUNN, H&S Co (-)
2. Capt R. E. ALEXANDER, Co B (-) (rein)
3. 1st Lt. J. A. ALBRECHT, Co D (-) (rein)
4. Capt CLEMENTS, Co I, 3/7 (-) (rein)
- Task Organization.
1st Battalion (-) (rein), 4th Marines (-) (rein) LtCol SULLIVAN
H&S Co
FAC Team
Det, Comm Plat
Det, Intel Sect
Company B (-) (rein) Capt ALEXANDER
Co B
Det, H&S Co
FO Team, G Btry 3/11
Det, Med Plat
Det, Comm Plat
Interpreter
Det, Co, 1st Engr Bn
Company D (-) (rein) Lt ALBRECHT
Co D
Det, H&S Co
FO Team, G Btry 3/11
Det, Med Plat
Det, Comm Plat
Interpreter
Det, Co A, 1st Engr Bn
Company I/3/7 (-) (rein) Capt Clements
Co I
Det, H&S Co
FO Team, G Btry 3/11
Det, Med Plat
Det, Comm Plat
Interpreter
Det, Co A, 1st Engr Bn
- Supporting Forces.
a. Battalion Artillery Group, G Btry, 3/11.
b. Medical evacuation was provided by MAG-36 on three separated occasions during the operation. All requests were initiated through the Battalion TAC Net. In one instance the FAC net was utilized in evacuating a casualty from the LZ in the vicinity of the Battalion Command Group. All requests were immediate and reaction time from the initial request until actual evacuation was a maximum of 40 minutes. Helicopters had no problem locating marked LZs.
c. Co A, 1st AmTrac Battalion provided LVT’s for the landing of Co I and the Command Group. Upon termination of the operation Cos I, D and Battalion Command Group were extracted by the LVT’s from Hoa Xuan Island to their positions within the TAOR.
d. Co A, 1st Engr Bn provided demolition and mine clearing teams with each company. They destroyed in excess of 56 punji stake pits, of which seventy were further mined with hand grenades. This was also the first instance of steel punji stakes being reported on the island.
- Intelligence.
a. Characteristics of the area of operations.
(1) Weather.
(a) Temp. Range: 60 min, 80 mean, 100 max.
(b) Winds: Variable, light to moderate – E-SE
(c) Cloud Cover: Early morning cover in hilly area west of Route #1.
(d). Traffic ability: Vehicular traffic is limited to movement on trails with light vehicles or tracked vehicles having good to fair traffic ability in sand areas. Foot traffic is not hindered in any area but may be channelized in rice paddies. Thick brush on low hills will cause foot troops to use existing paths and foot trails.
(2) Terrain. The terrain in the objective area varies greatly in configuration, surface materials and vegetation. The eastern portion has heavy vegetation and central portion is a completely barren sand area. The remainder of the island is comprised of rice paddies with some hedgerows. Most coastal paddy fields have approximately four feet of water and mud during the winter season. Inhabited areas are generally all around the edge of the open areas, mostly in three areas (Northern Hoa Xuan), Southeastern (Phu Vinh) and Southern (Dong Thanh). The shorelines are generally open except for the Southeastern portion, which is completely covered with weeds, brush, mud bogs and shallow water. The most prominent terrain features on the island are Hill 10, Hill 11, (BT 4315) and the lake at (BT 426140). Visibility is restricted in most areas except the central barren sand area and some of the rice paddies.
(3) Hydrographic. Inland waterway consisting of the Son Tam Ky River (BT 4118), Truong Giang River (BT 4615), Song Cho River (BT 4415) offer shallow craft water traffic ability. Tidal changes are slight on inland waters except for three-foot changes in the southern waters of the Song Cho and Truong Giang River.
b. Enemy Situation.
(1) Composition.
(a) Primarily local guerrillas with a general ration of one platoon (30) for three hamlets. The A/19 and A/21 local force companies operate continually throughout the island.
(b) Strength and combat efficiency. The average strength of local force guerrilla platoon is 30 men. Each local force company has approximately 100 men. Most of the men are highly trained cadres as well as infantry.
(c) Estimated enemy strengths: One platoon local force guerrilla.
(d) Actual enemy strength: Unknown.
(e) Enemy Observations. Various spottings have been recorded on all portions of the island with the greatest number of spotting centered around Phu Vinh Hamlet (BT 4314). Size of units observed ranged from two-man teams to squad and platoon size with one company size unit being spotted on 17 February by a Ly Tin Agent.
c. Primary Sources of Intelligence.
(1) Ly Tin District Agents.
(2) Patrol reports.
(3) Scout/Sniper teams.
(4) Vietnamese pro-American.
(5) Hamlet and village chiefs.
d. Attitudes of Population.
(1) The island of Hoa Xuan is 100% VC controlled with the population consisting of VC sympathizers, families whose relatives are VC and therefore they are likewise VC, not necessarily because of being politically oriented towards Communism but because of family ties.
e. Intelligence Learned.
(1) Some of the VC occupying the island speaks the Northern dialect, indicating they are from either North Viet Nam or Northern South Viet Nam (this info from captured VCS on 25 September 1965).
(2) The village (BT 432143 to BT 438152) is protected by barbed wire fence and a heavy hedgerow on SE side. Barbed wire fence and punji stakes on NW side running from (BT 435151) to approximately (BT 430143). Trench 15 meters long 3 feet deep (BT 428138). Throughout the Dong Thanh and Phu Vinh, Binh An areas there are many mines and booby traps, also various mantraps scattered throughout, especially the Hill 10 (BT 4315) area.
- Mission. 1st Bn (-) (rein), 4th Marines (-) (rein) landed at H-hour on D-day with three (3) rifle companies (-) (rein) on Hoa Xuan Island vicinity (BT 4315) and conducted S&D operation to destroy/apprehend all VC supplies, destroy VC installations and defenses located thereon.
- Execution.
a. At 221530H, D-day minus one, a sniper team was inserted in the peninsula to the north of Hoa Xuan Island known as the Cigar, harboring vicinity (BT 471146) until 230400H when they moved to vicinity (BT 441166) with one squad simultaneously sweeping the area vicinity (BT 445170) on the Cigar to create a diversion for insertion of the sniper team. At 221645H, D-day minus one, a squad with engineers attached conducted a sweep of the island of Binh An (2) vicinity (BT 457143) to clear the area of mines and booby traps for the operation on the 23rd. At 230400H, Company B moved by foot from their positions on Ky Hoa Island vicinity (BT 4714) landed on southern finger of Hoa Xuan Island (BT 456142) and commenced sweep of the villages of Binh An (1), vicinity (BT 445143) and Phu Vinh, vicinity (BT 435146). At 230600H, Company D moved from their positions on Hill 69 vicinity (BT 468068) by motor convoy arriving at Ky Chanh Market Place, vicinity (BT 427121) crossing to Hoa Xuan Island vicinity (BT 427121) by Vietnamese fishing boats at 230700H sweeping north through the villages of Dong Thanh (1) vicinity (BT 423128) and Dong Thanh (2) vicinity (BT 424137). At 230730H, Company I moved by LVT’s from Ky Ha Peninsula vicinity (BT 519117) to Ky Hoa Island vicinity (BT 5013) to the Cigar vicinity (BT 4416). The company crossed the Troung Giang River to Hoa Xuan Island at 230800H vicinity (BT 440160) sweeping the northwestern portion of Hoa Xuan through the villages of Hoa Xuan (1) and (2). At 230650H, Company B, vicinity (BT435144), heard 3 rounds fired from Phu Vinh Hamlet vicinity (BT 435146. It was believed to have been a warning signal. At 230740H, Company D vicinity (BT 421126) received 2 rounds S/A fire from vicinity (BT 412140). Because of distance, no fire was returned but area was swept and searched thoroughly with negative results. At230735H, Company B platoon vicinity (BT 437156) received heavy A/W and S/A fire vicinity (BT 433144). Marines deployed and assaulted the VC position. The VC broke contact before the Marine assault reached its objective. One Marine WIA sustained vicinity (BT 432142). Marine was evacuated by helicopter at 230823H. At 230815H, a platoon from Company setting in defensive positions on Hill 10 vicinity (BT 439158) sustained one Marine KIA and one Marine WIA from what appeared to be a booby trapped 155mm round. Med evac was requested immediately and completed at 230840H. At 230905H, Company D vicinity (BT 421132) found numerous punji pits with steel spikes and a 200-meter-long trench line with fighting positions. The pits and trench line were destroyed. At 230930H, the engineers attached to Company I destroyed one 105mm dud vicinity (BT 429158) and destroyed a 10-foot extension of a tunnel vicinity (BT 424159). At 231010H, Company D apprehended one male and one female both of military age without ID cards. They were taken to the collection point. At 231030H, Company B found and destroyed two booby traps vicinity (BT 437152) and found 3 rounds of .30 cal. ammunition lying on the ground. At 231110H, Company D apprehended one male VCS of military age without ID card vicinity (BT 438154). At 231130H, Company B platoon apprehended two VCS vicinity (BT 438154). At 231220H, a patrol from Company B discovered and destroyed 15-20 punji pits vicinity (BT 439154).
This page last updated 21 August 2011