After Action Report
Subject: After Action Report #14, Three-Company Operation 25 July 1965
Units Involved
Company A (rein)
Arty FO Team
81 FO Team
Company B (rein)
Arty FO Team
Detachment, PF’s
Interpreter
Company D (rein)
Arty FO Team
81 FO Team
Detachment, PF’s
ARVN liaison officer from 1st Bn 4th Marines
Forward Command Group
FAC Team
Battalion Collection Point, Forward
S-2 Detachment
Detachment, 3rd ITT
Detachment, 3rd CI Team
Company C (-)(rein)
1 Sqd of prisoner handlers
Michine gun sqd on LCM
Supporting Units
Detachment, Howtar Btry, 3/12 (D/S)
Composite platoon, Co A, 1st AmTrac Bn
H Btry, 3/12 (G/S)
Detachment, 8 inch How Plt, 3/12
1st Plt, Co B, 3rd Engr Bn
FMAW for air support, helos and CAS
Detachment, NBG-10 (One LCM-8)
Two battalions (-), 6th ARVN Regiment, conducting coordinated operations.
Two USMC Arty FO’s attached to 6th Regiment for liaison and conduct of Marine artillery fires.
Place; Ky Hoa Village
Casualties:
Friendly – none
Enemy – 1 VC KIA
1 VC WIA
Nature of Operation:
Search and destroy of target area, moving from NW to SE toward block; conducted simultaneously and in coordination with 6th ARVN Regiment’s search and destroy operation on adjacent island centered (BT 4512).
Narrative:
Planning – 1st Bn 4th Marines received verbal order tat a joint operation was to be conducted on 25 July. Details of the nature and location were not specified. Fourth Marines provided transportation to Headquarters, 6th ARVN Regiment at 230800H where planning conference with CO, 6th Regiment was held 230900H-231015H. Tentative plans for the operation were agreed to at this conference. Confirmation and coordination of details were accomplished at final meeting of CO, 1st Bn 4th Marines and CO, 6th Regiment on the latter’s visit to the formers’ CP at 241100H.
Command Relationships and Liaison – Neither commander involved assumed operational control of the others forces. Each provided his own fire support, however, the capability of Marine artillery to fire in support of the ARVN Regiment was planned for use if needed. Coordinated action was provided for by, (1) Specific delineation of the boundary between units of the two major forces and agreement that neither force would deliver fires into, fly aircraft over, or fire weapons whose trajectory passed over the head of the other without first obtaining concurrence. (2) Marines provided one artillery FO/liaison officer, whose radio was set on H/3/12 Conduct of Fire Net, to each of the two ARVN battalions. (3) Marines maintained a radio on the U.S. Advisors’ Tactical/Coordination Net. (4) Informing U.S. Advisory Team of the Battalion Tactical Net frequency so they could enter the net if necessary. (5) Coordination and mutual understanding of the times of each other’s commencement of operations and schemes of maneuver.
Operations – Floating dump cargo and scheduled resupply cargo were loaded respectively into LCH-8 and two LVT’s prior to dark on 24 July. These consisted of engineer explosives, water, and prisoner compound materials. Company D, Detachment, Company C and 1st Plt, B Engineers commenced embarkation into LCH at 250330H and departed causeway at 250455H. Company A immediately established assigned blocking position and provided security to the Howtar Plt as it went into firing positions. The Howtar Plt reported ‘all guns ready to fire’ at 250645H.
Two helicopters, with battalion command group embarked, departed LZ Firefly (BT 526092) at 250630H. No sign of the LCM-8 could be found. After searching for forty minutes for the LCM, the command group landed and began ascertaining location of the LCM by tenuous radio contact and adjusting plans. As the battalion commander decided to land the heliborne company (Company B), word was received that that company’s first wave had landed in landing zone at (BT 422185). This vital decision appears to have been made unilaterally by the commander of the helicopter unit. It resulted in this instance in a landing into an unprepared landing zone, which was successfully accomplished with no enemy resistance. On receipt of this information, the command group flew to the landing zone, landing at 250745H.
Company D, being unloaded in the LCM, could not meet its 250700H H-hour. The cause was a navigational error by boat crew which took the boat some fifteen to twenty miles off course.
Company B, the heli-lifted force, was not to be landed until Company D had secured its landing zone and then only on call of the battalion commander. As related about, Company B landed in unsecured and unprepared landing zone at 250720H.
Upon his arrival in the landing zone, the battalion commander ordered CO, Company B to assume the planned mission of Company D and to block by fire enemy movement into the open sand area at that location which marked the planned boundary between units.
Company B deployed in response to the new orders and commenced moving southeast at 250805H. The company had moved approximately 1000 meters when Company D landed vicinity (BT 434183) at 250850H. CO Company D was ordered to assume the planned mission and zone of Company B, to deploy immediately, and pass through the left blank element of Company B as soon as possible, establishing contact and moving with Company B. Contact and guide were right to left.
Both companies were on line and moving at 250857H. At 250923H Company B apprehended three VCS at (BT 427175). A packet of money containing 158,000 units of currency was dug up at (BT 428176). Caves were discovered vicinity (BT 431174). One VCS was shot and killed at 251059H when he was spotted fleeing at (BT439170). Warning shots had been fired but were ignored. At 251130H two VCS, one armed with a MASS-36 rifle, were apprehended by Company B at (BT 443165). Two VCS subsequently indicated the location of four shotguns upon interrogation by attached PF personnel.
Search and destroy continued to southeast end of peninsula with few contacts. Caves were discovered by Company D vicinity (BT 443170) and were destroyed by engineers at 251235H. One VCS was shot in foot while attempting to escape vicinity (BT 467150) at 251327H. At 251400H Company A captured four VCS in boat vicinity (BT 470143). Boat also contained large amount of currency.
A total of forty-one local nationals were detained during the operation. Upon screening and interrogation by ITT and CJ personnel, twelve were determined to be VCC and twenty VCS. Remaining nine were released.
Progress of the 6th Regiment’s operation was monitored at the ¼ CP in the field. No artillery missions were fired in support of either force after the ARVN landing zone preparatory fires needed at about 250700H. There was no infringement or friction between the two forces.