From:        Commanding Officer

To:            Commanding Officer, 1^st Marines (-)(rein)

Subj:         Combat After Action Report (Operation DEAD END)

Ref:     (a)            RegtO 3120.3

Encl:    (1)            Overlay of the Operation

1. Type of Operation.  The operation consisted of searching for, clearing of and destroying the Viet Cong insurgents, his supplies and installations.
2. Duration. The duration of the operation was form 050100H to 051515H.
3. Location.  The operation was conducted on the Ky Khuong Peninsula (BT 4411) in Ly Tin District, Quang Tin Province, South Viet Nam.
4. Command Headquarters.  1^st Battalion (-) (rein), 4^th Marines (-) (rein), 3^rd Marine Division (rein), FMF.
5. Reporting Officer.  Lieutenant Colonel R. E. SULLIVAN.
6. Subordinate Unit Commanders.

(1)               1^st Lieutenant T. V. DRAUDE, Company M (-) (rein).

(2)               1^st Lieutenant J. A. ALBRECHT, Company D (rein).

6. Task Organization.

1^st Battalion (-) (rein), 4^th Marines        LtCol      SULLIVAN

      Command Group (-)

      Det, H&S Co

            Det, Comm Plat

      ARVN LnO

Company D (rein)                     1^st Lt.      ALBRECHT

      Company D

      Det, H&S Co

            Det, Comm Plat

            Det, Med Plat

      Det, Hq Btry, 1/11

      Interpreter

Company M (-)(rein)             1^st Lt.      DRAUDE

      Company M

      Det, H&S Co

            Det, Comm Plat

            Det, Med Plat

      Det, 81mm Mortar Plat

Interpreter

                  Battalion Reserve                              1^st Lt.            HENDERSON

                        Det, H&S Co

                                    Det, Comm Plat

                                    Det, Med Plat

7. Supporting Forces.
8. Battalion Artillery Group.
9. Company A (-), 1^st AmTrac Battalion.
10. Company B (-), 3^rd Anti-Tank Battalion.
11. Company C (-), 3^rd motor Transport Battalion.
12. Two Popular Force Platoons from Ly Tin District Headquarters.
13. Two Regional Force Platoons from Ly Tin District Headquarters.
14. Coastal Defense Fleet 15.
15. Intelligence.  The only material acquired of possible intelligence value was the packet of miscellaneous Vietnamese papers found in the hedgerow at (BT 442113) by Company M. The documents were turned into the Regimental S-2 Section.
16. Mission.  1^st Battalion (-) (rein), 4^th Marines (-) (rein) landed at H-hour on D-day with one rifle company (-) on Blue Beach, (BT 440120 to 459120) while the Battalion Headquarters and one additional rifle company moved by motor vehicle to the line of departure (BT 434105 to 450088).  At H plus four hours the Battalion commenced its search and clear operation in order to seek out and destroy/apprehend the VC/VCS, confiscate all his supplies and destroy his installations and defenses located on the Peninsula.
17. Concept of the Operation.
18. See enclosure (1).
19. At H-hour on D-day, two rifle companies (-) (rein) landed, as follows: one rifle company moved via LVT through the inland waterways to Blue Beach and established a blocking force along the northern shore (BT 440120 to 459120) of the Peninsula; the remaining company moved along National Route #1 and established a blocking position along the highway from (BT 454105 to 450088).  One RF Company provided a blocking force along the Tien Xuan (4) Hamlet area from (BT 430110 to 435114 to 433117).  The second RF Force provided a blocking force (BT 450089 to 457094).  Coastal Defense Fleet 15 provided a motorized junk blocking patrol along the eastern portion of the peninsula from (BT 454124 to 455095).  Prior to crossing the Line of Departure (Route #1), two popular force platoons were attached to the company located on the Line of Departure to assist in the search and clear mission.  Initially one company swept from the LD, in a north/northeast direction to link with the blocking company on the northern shore.  Upon link up, the company initially in the blocking position moved to the northwestern sector of the peninsula, while the sweeping company consolidated its forces and prepared to resweep on a parallel axis in the southeastern sector of the peninsula.  During the sweep operation, thorough detailed search of terrain, for tunnels, caves, caches, and weapons was conducted. Upon completion of the operation, and on order, the Battalion conducted a tactical withdrawal from vicinity (BT 441099) to its command post at the Hill 69 complex (BT 463072).
20. Attached units as shown in paragraph six above moved with the individual assault companies.  The reserve platoon was not employed.
21. Supporting units operated as follows:
22. The Artillery Battalion Group provided on call artillery support as requested.
23. Company A, 1^st AmTrac Battalion provided four LVTP-5’s to transport Company M (-) (rein) to Blue Beach.
24. Company B, 3^rd Anti-Tank Battalion provided eight (8) Ontos as convoy escort vehicles for the motor march to the Line of Departure.  Upon completion of the convoy escort assignment, the vehicles with one platoon of infantry, established a blocking force along Route #1 from (BT 434105 to 450088).  The Ontos returned as support vehicles for the Battalion during the tactical withdrawal.
25. Company C, 7^th Motor Transport Battalion provided six (6) 6×6 trucks for troop movement to the objective area.
26. The two RF platoons occupied blocking positions vicinity (BT 434119) and (BT 452090).
27. The two PF platoons were integrated into the two rifle companies to assist in enemy identification and search of local houses.
28. Execution.  The operation was conceived on the 1^st of February 1966 and planning commenced immediately.  The operation order, 005-66, was published and disseminated on 3 February with the planning conference for all units conducted at 1400H on 4 February 1966.  D-day was set at 5 February, with H-hour at 0300H.

At 1900H the 6×6 vehicles and the Ontos were prestaged in the Battalion’s motor pool area in March column formation as follows:  Two Ontos as lead elements then alternating one 6×6 and one Ontos, with two Ontos as rear element vehicles.  At 0100H, Company M (-) (rein) commenced its foot march to the LVT Splash Point (BT 522120).  Once embarked, the LVT’s departed the splash point at 0135H enroute to Blue Beach.  At 0215H, Company D moved off its defensive positions on the Hill 69 complex and commenced loading the trucks for the motor march to the line of departure.  While moving off the hill complex, four carbine shots and a ringing bell were heard from the vicinity of (BT 468075).  It was assumed that these were elements of an insurgent warning system indicating Marine movement.  By this time, Company M, aboard the LVT’s, had reached checkpoint at (BT 450120).  Company D’s loading was completed silently and expeditiously by 0230H.  Fifteen minutes later the convoy commenced its move to the objective area.  The vehicles were spaced 150 meters apart to facilitate prepositioned debarking stations along the line of departure.  By 0258H lead elements of the LVT’s and Company M reached checkpoint R (BT 450120) and began debarking the blocking force Marines.  Company D and the Battalion Command Group arrived at the preassigned debark points and deployed along the northern side of Route #1 at 0300H.  While debarking, four more carbine shots were heard from vicinity (BT 437097), once again thought to be a Viet Cong warning system.  By 0303H, all elements had debarked and by 0308H had linked with the RF blocking forces to the north and south.  The Ontos were in their assigned blocking positions approximately 300 meters apart, with one platoon of Marines interspersed between the vehicles.  Once in the blocking positions, the Battalion maintained a defensive posture until 0700H.  During the interim period, at 0420H, Company M apprehended thirty-six females and two males as curfew violators in the vicinity of (BT 455120).  However, upon proper identification disclosure, they were released and instructed to return to their homes.  The males were retained and tagged as VCS as per order of the District Chief.  At 0555H, the two PF platoons arrived and were assigned to the two platoons of Company D to assist in the conduct of the search.  At 0700H, the Battalion (-) crossed the line of departure and commenced its search and clear operation.  At 0710H, Company M apprehended two female VCS at (BT 445120).  Twenty-eight minutes later five additional female VCS and four male VCS were apprehended at the same coordinates.  All possessed proper identification but were held as suspects for further interrogation by District officials.  Two male VCS were apprehended by Company D at 0815H at (BT 448092).  Although possessing identification cards, the Vietnamese interpreter accompanying the unit recommended they be retained for further interrogation by District Officials.  PL White was crossed at 0909H and contact with Company M was established.  At this time instructions from the District Chief resulted in the releasing of the seven female VCS having proper identification.  The six male VCS were retained by the apprehending units.  By 1009H, the companies had exchanged PF units and realigned themselves, with Company M on the north and Company D on the south.  Following the realignment of units, the detailed sweep phase commenced.  Moving southwest at 1205H at (BT 442113) elements of Company M discovered what was thought to be a Viet Cong tax journal and other miscellaneous journals.  These items were turned over to the Battalion S-2 upon completion of the operation.  Both companies crossed PL Red at 1230H.  At 1248H, vicinity (BT 438103) Company M discovered a Viet Cong, booby trap.  The trap appeared to be a homemade grenade and was subsequently detonated in place by using an M-26 grenade.  By 1325H both elements had reached PL Pink and deployed in preparation for the tactical retraction.  Defensive positions were assumed on both sides of Route #1.  One platoon was dispatched at 1330H to (BT 445123) to act as security for a LVT reported as mired in the tidelands.  1205H saw the commencement of the tactical withdrawal, with all units —- the 69 complex at 1515H.The security platoon for the LVT’s returned with the LVT’s at 2124H.

No enemy contact was made at any time during the operation.  No fire was received, none was returned.

12. Results.
13.             Friendly casualties – None.
14.             Enemy casualties – none.

(1)       8 male VCS turned into District Headquarters at the request of the District Chief.  All VCS had proper identification.  1 booby trap, type unknown blown in place.

13. Administrative Matters.  None.
14. Special Techniques.
15. The only special technique employed was, the conduct of the search itself.  The forces were deployed initially to cordon the entire peninsula, which they did.  The search elements conducted a thorough saturation sweep with both companies online and approximately ten to fifteen meters between men.
16. Although extremely difficult, control wise, this method allows for excellent area coverage by searching elements.  Had there been insurgents attempting to evade the search forces, they would have been found.

15            Command Analysis.

1. The extensiveness of the blocking forces involved during this operation have normally precluded the escape of any VC insurgents.  However, in any combined operation, experience has shown that disclosure of plans to local forces normally results in negative enemy contact, yet, in this area, notification must be provided because District authorized and laying of mines along Route #1.  Although specifically unfounded by fact, this absence of enemy forces in combined operations is commonplace and possible indicates security leaks within Vietnamese channels.
2. The concept of the operation was sound, based on valid intelligence, and executed in a professional manner.  Infantry elements moved aggressively and in proper formation.  Area coverage of the objective was complete.
3. Failure to engage the enemy was primarily due to his typical evasive action when faced with superior forces, and refusal to engage Marine forces unless all elements, viz (visual), surprise, terrain, and strength are in his favor.