9 April 1967

From:        Commanding Officer

To:             Commander, Special Landing Force Bravo

Subj:          Combat After-Acton Report (Operation Beacon Hill I)

Ref:         (a)           Maps: Viet Nam, AMS Series L7014, 1:50,000, Sheets 6341 I, 6442 IV.

            CTG 79.5 Operation Plan 120A-67

Encl:    (1)           Overlay of Operation Beacon Hill I.

1. Operation Beacon Hill I.
2. Dates of Operation.
3. Operation Beacon Hill I 20 March to 1 April 1967
4. Location.  The Operation was conducted in Gio Linh District, Quang Tri Province, Republic of Viet Nam.
5. Task Organization.

            BLT 1/4              20 March to 28 March                        Lt Col             Jack Westerman

                                         28 March                                                  Lt Col             T.J.  Willis

            Company A (rein)                                                            Capt                Corcoran

                        Det, Btry G, 3^rd Bn 12^th Mar (FO Tm)

                        3^rd Sqd 4^th Plt Co B, 3^rd Engr Bn

                        Det H&S Co. (Corpsman)

                        Det H&S Co. (FAC Tm)

                        Det 1^st Plt, Co A, 3^rd SP Bn (LZCT)

                        1^st Sec 81mm Mortar Plt

                        Det Sniper Sqd, HQ Co RLT-26

            Company B (rein)                                                           Capt                Ramsey

                        Det, Btry G, 3^rd Bn, 12^th Mar (FO Tm)

                        2^nd Sqd 4^th Plt, Co B, 3^rd Engr Bn

                        Det H&S Co (Corpsman)

                        Det H&S Co (FAC Tm)

                        Det 1^st Plt, Co A, 3^rd SP Bn (LZCT)

                        2^nd Sec 81mm Mortar Plt.

                        Det Sniper Sqd, Hq Co RLT-26

            Company C (rein)                                                               Capt                Kelley

                        Det Btry G, 3^rd Bn 12^th Marines (FO Tm)

                        Det H&S Btry 3^rd Bn 12^th Marines (NG Spot Tm)

                        1^st Sqd, 4^th Plt Co B, 3^rd Engr Bn

                        Det H&S Co (81 FO Tm)

                        Det H&S Co (Corpsman)

                        Det H&S Co (FAC Tm)

                        Det Sniper Sqd, Hq Co, RLT-26

            Company D (rein)                                                               Capt                Juul

                        Det Btry G, 3^rd Bn 12^th Marines (FO Tm)

                        Det Sniper Sqd, Hq Co, RLT-26

                        Det H&S Co (Corpsman)

                        Det 4^th Plt Co B, 3^rd Engr Bn

                        4^th Sec 81mm Mortar Plt

            H&S Company (-)(rein)                                                  Capt                Morigeau

                        Det Hq Co 4^th Marines (Radio Relay)

                        Det Comm Spt Co, 9^th MAB (Radio Relay)

                        Det Hq Co, 3^rd Mar Div (Postal, Disbursing)

                        Det Hq Co, 9^th MAB (ISO)

                        Sniper Sqd, Hq Co, RLT-26

                        Det Btry G, 3^rd Bn 12^th Marines (Arty Ln Tm)

                        C&C Plt, Co D, 3^rd Med Bn

            Mortar Btry (rein) 3^rd Bn 12^th Marines                             Capt                Sikes

            4^th Plt, (rein) Co, 3^rd Engr Bn                                               Lt                     Elder

            2^nd Plt, Co A, 3^rd Recon Bn                                                    Gy/Sgt            Meyers

            4^th Plt (rein) Co B, 1^st AmTrac Bn                                      Lt.                    Sullivan

            2^nd Plt, Co D, 3^rd AT Bn                                                          Lt                     Richardson

            1^st Plt, Co A, 3^rd Tk Bn                                                            Lt                     Bernard

            Logistical Support Unit

                        Det, 3^rd Serv Bn (FLSG-B)                                       Lt                     Wood

                        1^st Plt, Co C, 3^rd MT Bn                                             Lt                     Dupre

            Shore Party Team

                        1^st Plt (-)(rein) 3^rd Sp Bn                                        Lt                     Summa

                        Det 3^rd Serv Bn

                        Det Beach Master Unit                 (Attached on landing)

5. Supporting Forces.
6. Air, Artillery, Naval Gunfire, Tanks and Engineers all played an integral part in BLT Operations during the period covered by this report.  Tanks were utilized in a defensive role and for convoy escort.  Engineer squads attached to the rifle companies were effectively and extensively utilized to destroy the numerous obstacles and fortifications encountered throughout the Operation.  Operation of the Fire Support Coordination Center was in accordance with current doctrine and no unusual problems were encountered.
7. Air Support.  On D-day 3 rifle companies, the 105mm Battery, the 107mm Battery and Headquarters elements were all helilifted ashore.  Initial helicopter support was provided by HMM-363 an embarked detachment of UH1E and CH-46 aircraft from First Marine Aircraft Wing.  Fixed wing, Close Air Support (CAS) was provided by the 1^st Marine Aircraft Wing.  It was readily accessible, responsive to the situation, and effective.  Control of Tactical Air was by Tactical Air Controller, (Airborne) in almost every case due to terrain factors limiting the observation of Forward Air Controllers.  Helicopter support was generally adequate although poor night-time and early morning weather throughout most of the operation limited its effectiveness.
8. Artillery.  During Beacon Hill I, BLT 1/4 was supported by Battery G and Mortar Battery 3^rd Battalion, 12^th Marines, Battery F, 2^nd Battery 12^th Marines, and the 175mm guns of the 74^th Army Artillery.

During this operation Sav-a-Plane were issued promptly in most instances and as a result critically needed fires were delivered rapidly.

During the early stages of the operation, communications between the forward observers and the firing batteries were poor, but FSCC relayed and only a short amount of time was lost between the initial fire request and the firing of the first rounds.

The batteries fired a heavy volume of counter-mortar fire and H&I concentrations.  Counter-mortar fires were effective in suppressing enemy mortar attacks.  This task was difficult because the enemy was using a number of weapons from different firing positions.  The H&I fires affectively limited the enemy’s capability to mass his troops and reduced his night movement.

On several occasions when rifle companies were surrounded by enemy forces, the artillery Forward Observer was able to control and adjust the fires of three separate firing batteries.  These fires were instrumental in keeping the enemy from achieving success.

Over 12,000 rounds of various caliber artillery were fired in support of the BLT during the operation.

1. Naval Gunfire Support.  Initial Naval Gunfire Support was provided by USS Edson (DD 946) and the USS White River (LSMR 536).  All D-day prep fires, and deep support targets were on-call missions.

At no time was the operation without support of Naval Gunfire.  Although the scheme of maneuver was such that elements of the Battalion were soon beyond the maximum effective range of the ships, the supporting ships were able to provide extensive H&I, deep support and counter-mortar fires in conjunction with artillery fires.

Coordination of Naval Gunfire was effective throughout the operation.  Communications posed no major problems and were routine.

The following ships supported Operation Beacon Hill I:

Ship                                                            Armament                            Dates

USS White River (LSMR 536)            5” SSR, 5”/38                20-23 March

USS Edson (DD 946)                             5”/54                                20-22 March

USS Waddell (DD 24)                            5”/54                                22-23, 25-29 March

USS Osbourne (DD 846)                      5”/38                                24-25 March

USS Brineley (DD 887)                        5”/38                                 29-31 March

USS Bigelon (DD 942)                          5”/54                                23-31 March

A total of 1210 5”/54, 237 5”/38, 643 5” SSR rounds were fired on 242 H&I missions; 5 district missions and 9 counter-mortar missions.

6. Intelligence
7. Enemy Situation and Capabilities – Prior to Operation Beacon Hill I

(1)               Enemy Situation.  Enemy ground units in the objective area were identified as the 5^th and 6^th Battalions, 812^th Regiment; 7^th and 8^th Battalion, 90^th Regiment; and the 1^st Battalion 31^st Regiment (All NVA).  In addition, there was also a guerrilla force of approximately 2000 men operating independently throughout Quang Tri Province.

(2)               Enemy Capabilities.  It was anticipated that the enemy could attack isolated units and outposts in Battalion strength, delay friendly forces, defend the operating area with forces locally available, and attack our HLZ’s with mines and AW/SA fire.

1. Enemy Situation and Tactics – During Operations Beacon Hill I.

(1)               Enemy Situation.  From the first contact with the enemy, it was apparent that he was regular NVA, armed with 82mm and 120mm mortars and an extensive armory of small arms, automatic weapons, and ordinance.

Captured weapons and equipment revealed that the enemy was also supplied with a standardized small arms weapons system (AK-47’s, RPD’s, SKS’s); wore definite recognizable uniforms, and carried combat field gear (packs, cartridge belts, gas masks, etc) in good condition; all of which was of North Vietnamese origin.

Captured documents definitely identified two of the enemy units; one as the 18^th Company 812^th Regiment, 324B NVA Division, and the other as K-9/3^rd Company, 9^th Battalion.

(2)       Enemy Tactics.  The enemy displayed those tactics usually ascribed to a well – trained regular force.  Enemy mortar attacks were conducted from varied and widely separated firing positions, sometimes preventing an immediate concentration of friendly fire upon the enemy’s positions.

Defensive positions constructed by the enemy were well built and reinforced, indicating that the enemy had been in the area for some time and or had unlimited facilities and personnel to use in improving his positions.

Offensively the enemy employed the use of mortar attacks followed by small arms and automatic weapons fire against friendly companies on the move.

In conclusion it can be said that the enemy was well armed, well equipped, and trained to a point well above that of the VC guerrilla.  He used conventional tactics modified to the point where he attempted to avoid massing his troops, thereby exposing them to concentrated friendly firepower.

1. Terrain and Weather.

(1)               Critical terrain features, Cover and concealment

(a)        Critical Terrain Features.  Two important terrain features were within the BLT’s AOA.  There were two ridge lines: one running from east to west from YD 219746 to YD 197747, and one running southwest to northeast from YD 161731 to YD 188747.  Both ridgelines were used by the enemy as hidden mortar positions for enfilade fire upon BLT CP and outlying companies.

            In the objective area friendly units encountered dense, thick undergrowth, which made movement, slow and observation poor.  In one instance the height of the trees reduced the capability of helicopters, providing concealment for the enemy who was able to deliver heavy fire against the helicopters as they maneuvered into the HLZ.

            National Route #1 ran through the BLT AOA offering an all-weather vehicle route for resupply and provided an alternate method to transportation when weather hampered air operations.

(b)       Cover and Concealment.  Concealment throughout the Battalion AOA was fair to excellent.  Excellent concealment was available in the form of thick, sub-tropical evergreen forest and spacious stands of 8-foot-high elephant grass.  Concealment was naturally lessened in the formerly cultivated open areas.

            Underground cover was the most feasible protection from small arms.

(2)               Observation.

(a)        Air Observation.  Aerial observation of the built-up and tilled areas was excellent when not hindered by poor weather condition, (See para 4).  Good observation in the outlying areas was marginal in that the thick foliage provided natural camouflage.

(b)       Ground Observation.  Ground observation was hindered by weather during the first 3 days of the operation.  During periods of clear weather, the areas around Objective 3 (vic YD 172722), Objective 4 (vic YD 140733), and Objective 5 (vic YD 133712) were excellent vantage point for observation in all directions.

            The denseness of the foliage had an adverse effect upon ground observation, causing on one occasion, a friendly ground unit difficulty in ascertaining its location while in contact with the enemy.

(3)               Avenues of Approach.  National Route #1, open and trafficable from the DMZ to Dong Ha, was a prime avenue of approach.  Other avenues of approach included two loose surface, dry-weather roads, one winding east to west from (YD 095704) to (YD 214727) and connecting with National Route #1; the other winding north to south from (YD 158740) at the DMZ to (YD 147603) at the Cam Lo River.

In addition to the road mentioned above, the terrain of the AOA was crisscrossed with footpaths and trails; of specific importance were those running south from the DMZ into the AOA.

(4)               Weather.  From the morning of the 21 March to late evening of 24 March, continuous low ceiling and heavy early morning and late evening fog severely restricted air operations.  Air observation was poor, close air support missions were reduced to a minimum, and helicopter operations involving resupply, and especially med-evacs, were hampered to the point where some WIA’s became DOW’s.  The execution of daily search and destroy operations by ground units was delayed until morning due to lack of air support or being burdened with WIA’s not lifted out by helicopters.

From 25 March to the termination of the operation, the weather was excellent for friendly operations with visibility from 7 to 10 miles with slight fog in early morning and evening.

Rainfall during the operation was very slight; temperatures ranged from 70 to 95 degrees.  Humidity averaged 80%.  Rainfall and temperature had no adverse effect upon friendly operations.

7. Psychological Warfare Efforts.
8. The Psychological Warfare Team attached to the BLT was not utilized during Beacon Hill I because the particular area of operations did not lend itself to such efforts.  Very few inhabitants remained in the AOA after D-day.
9. Mission.
10. Commencing at L-hour on D-day land three rifle companies by helicopter assault in landing zones Bluebird and Sparrow, at H-hour land one rifle company over Beach Blue; all companies consolidate positions for night defensive action.  Seize Objective 1, 2 and 3.  Be prepared to seize Objective 4 and 5 on order.
11. Concept of Operations.
12. The operation was planned to allow rapid build-up ashore by landing one company in landing zone Bluebird, and one company immediately following in landing zone Sparrow, seizing Objectives 2 and 3 respectively.
13. At H-hour one company was to land by amphibian tractor over Beach Blue and seize Objective 1.
14. The Recon platoon was to be inserted at landing zone Hawk, then move west along the southern edge of the DMZ to landing zone Bluebird.
15. The 105mm Howitzer and 107mm Mortar Batteries were to land by helo in LZ Bluebird; the 105mm Howitzer Battery in direct support of the BLT and the 107mm Mortar Battery providing reinforcing fires.
16. A Provisional Company was formed from H&S Company and attached units and retained aboard LPH-5 for possible employment.
17. After seizure of the landing force objectives, the BLT was to be prepared to conduct deliberate search and destroy operations throughout the area and was to be prepared to carry out any new missions.
18. Execution.

During the period 20 March 1967 to 1 April 1967, this Battalion conducted Search and Destroy operations in Gio Linh District, Quang Tri Province, and Republic of Viet Nam.

At 182145H advance parties arrived at Dong Ha to effect liaison for the Landing of BLT 1/4 on 19 March 1967.  Weather precluded the BLT from landing on the scheduled date, but it was successfully landed the following day, commencing at 201430H.  The BLT met no opposition upon landing.

By 201635H Companies A, B and C had completed landing in their respective zones.  Elements of the BLT headquarters arrived at 211210H.  At LZ Bluebird units set up night defensive positions and prepared to conduct Search and Destroy operations on 21 March 1967.

At 201915H the BLT units located in landing zone Bluebird began receiving heavy incoming mortar fire from the west.  Approximately 300 rounds of 82mm and 120mm were received until 202015H.  The 105’s and 107’s and 81mm positions returned a heavy volume of fire upon the suspected enemy mortar positions.  The BLT sustained 3 Fr/KIA’s and 12 WIA’s during this attack.

At 212220H additional incoming artillery fire was received and the 105mm and 107mm Batteries and the 81mm Platoon again returned heavy fire which resulted in one secondary explosion.

Company B at 220015H received 12 incoming mortar rounds from YD 202755.  Naval Gunfire along with small arms fire was returned.

Company I/3/4 requested assistance from 1/4 in an extraction of an ammunition convoy at YD 215720.  The convoy had been ambushed and pinned down.  Company B, 1^st Battalion 4^th Marines was assigned to assist the convoy.

At 210730H Company C began moving from Objective #1 to Landing Zone Sparrow and Company B continue search and destroy operations toward Objective #3.

At 211100H Company D reported seized Objective #2.

Company C reached Objective #3 at 211155H.

At 211115H Recon platoon began moving from landing zone Hawk toward landing zone Bluebird.

Company B at 211310H was directed to move to Hill 39, coordinates YD 153777, and conduct search and destroy operations in that area.

At 211316H Company B reported finding VC supplies and evidence of recent enemy dead.  10 VC/KIA (c).

At 211630H CTG 79.5 reported that control and coordination of supporting arms was passed ashore to BLT 1/4.

Company B at 211745H received estimated 1000 small arms rounds from a force of approximately 80 NVA.  Company B returned fire and called an air strike; 3 friendly WIA’s, 10 NVA/KIA (p) and captured ChiCom grenades and 3.5 rocket ammunition.

At 212030H Company B received 25 incoming 82mm mortar rounds.  Company B returned fire with mortars and small arms.  This action resulted in 3 friendly WIA’s, 2 NVA/KIA (c) and 4 NVA/KIA (p).  At 212040H a Frag Order from CTG 79.5 was received directing the BLT to conduct search and destroy operations and seize Objective 4 and 5.

During the evening of 21 March, the rifle companies conducted night activities and prepared for search and destroy operations on 22 March.

At 220730H CTG 79.5 reported that weather was hindering movement of serials that were called from the ships.

3^rd Marine Division (G-2) reported 7 NVA mortar positions at YD 168753 and Golf Battery 2/12 fired a mission with good target coverage reported by the AO.

At 221020H Company B reported capturing 3 VCS at YD 153719.  From 221025H to 222000H Company B received mortar rounds, 57mm rounds and numerous small arms fires from an NVA unit.

Company B, while securing an intermediate objective, captured enemy supplies, one AK-47 w/magazine, and small arms ammunition.  Company B returned the enemy supplies to S-2 by helicopter.  The results during the period were 16 NVA/KIA (c), 60 NVA/KIA (p).

Company D, while located at coordinates YD 173747, received incoming 82mm mortar rounds at 221215H.  A platoon of Company D spotted enemy gun positions and called a 105mm artillery mission and air strikes.

At 221600H Company C located at YD 174721 located 12 anti-tanks mines in the middle of the road. All were detonated in place by the attached engineer team.

Frag Order #3 from CTG 79.5 was received at 221746 indicating that a new grid reference code would be utilized commencing at 230800H.

Company B at 222230H took an unknown number of NVA under fire, 4 NVA/KIA (c).

The Battalion Command Post located at landing zone Bluebird received incoming mortar rounds at 230105H.  Golf Battery and the 81mm mortars were registered on enemy positions and caused large secondary explosions at YD 201749.

At 230345H Company B received incoming mortar rounds resulting in 5 friendly WIA’s.  Their return fire produced 10 NVA/KIA (c).

Company C at 230935H begins receiving incoming mortar fire and small arms fire from coordinates YD 165725.  Artillery and Naval Gunfire were called on the enemy positions with good target coverage.  Company C sustained 1 Friendly KIA and 5 friendly WIA’s.  The company continued to move and at 231000H while located at coordinates YD 170723, overran a NVA force consisting of approximately 30 NVA.  The action resulted in 1 carbine captured, 5 NVA/KIA (c) and 10 NVA/KIA (p).

At 231225H Company C located at coord YD 155719 captured NVA packs, rice, clothes, a gas mask, ammunition, and 2 ChiCom sub-machine guns.

At 231345H Company B located at YD 152714 received 400 rounds of small arms.  Company B called in artillery and returned heavy small arms fire which resulted in 9 NVA/KIA (c) and 5 NVA/KIA (p).

Company C at 231445H continuing movement encountered as estimated 40 NVA.  The enemy was driven off by small arms fire and Company C captured miscellaneous supplies, and two weapons.

A recently dug and camouflaged 82mm mortar pit was found at 231514H at coord YD 170730 by Company D.

Company C at 231550H shot one NVA while enroute to Objective 5 and captured 3 ChiCom grenades.

Company A at 231550H, while providing security for 2 downed helicopters, began receiving 82mm mortar and small arms fire.  Company A returned fire with artillery, 60mm mortars, and 50 caliber machine guns.  This action resulted in 13 friendly WIA’s from Company A.

At 232115H Company D received 30-40 rounds of incoming 82mm mortar and small caliber automatic weapons fire and 50 caliber machine gun fire from the north and west side of their perimeter.  Artillery fire was requested.  Company D sustained 21 friendly WIA’s, 10 were med-evaced.

At 232236H the Division Air Liaison Officer informed BLT 1/4 that due to a helicopter shortage, emergency re-supply was impossible at that time.

At 240750H BLT Frag Order directed that Company B return to the BLT Command Post and all other companies would continue their assigned mission.

A platoon from Company D reported at 240845H that they had discovered NVA in green uniforms moving a 7.62 machine gun into position at coord YD 162730.  The platoon took the NVA unit under fire and killed two NVA (conf), with one NVA/KIA (p).  The platoon from Company D captured one 7.62 machinegun mounted on wheels, with ammunition.

Company C made a final spot report at 241000H concerning a contact with estimated NVA Company at 240715H.  The enemy locations were YD 135619, 134720, 134720 and 135721.  Company C called in 60mm and 81mm mortars and the enemy was repulsed; while sweeping the area they discovered 18 weapons destroyed by artillery, 9 ChiCom grenades, 9 ChiCom carbines and 6 AK-47’s.  The action resulted in 4 friendly KIA’s, 15 friendly WIA’s and 38 NVA/KIA (c), 63 NVA/KIA (p).  Company D platoon at 241025H located at YD 162730 found NVA packs and personal equipment.  The number of NVA killed was 2 NVA/KIA (c) 3 NVA/KIA (P).

At 241145H recon platoon reported establishing an ambush between check points 2 and 3.

Company C reported at 241300H finding NVA equipment consisting of one Chinese sub-machine gun, 50 ChiCom grenades, 2-2.7 rocket rounds, 15 full packs, and miscellaneous items.

At 241240H EOD team reported finding one 105mm round with Chinese markings at coord YD 208734.  Round forwarded to Division G-2.

Company B at 241525H located at YD 169714 spotted 6 to 8 enemy NVA moving north at YD 168720.  Company B called in artillery resulting in 3 NVA/KIA (c) and 3 NVA/KIA (p).

Company B at 241300H located at YD 170707 encountered an undetermined size NVA force.  NVA broke contact after 15-minute firefight.  Company B called in artillery fire with good coverage.  After sweeping area the company found two Chinese machine guns, NVA equipment, and personnel items.  The company reported 10 NVA/KIA (c) and 20 NVA/KIA (p).

At 241535H Company D reported finding 23 NVA moving in trench line, an air strike was called and upon completion of air strike the Company investigated the area and found 4 NVA/KIA (c) evidence of 6 NVA/KIA (p).

At 250300H Company D located at YD 167729 received approximately 50 incoming 82mm mortar and moderate small arms rounds.  Company B returned fire with 81mm and 60mm mortars, artillery, and small arms.

Company D at 250830H located at YD 152734 reported an evaluation of their night defensive fires.  One surprise-firing device was found in front of their lines and was destroyed.  The result of the night engagement was 4 NVA/KIA (c), and 8 NVA/KIA (p).  Enemy equipment including packs, canteens and a mortar base plate was returned to S-2.

Company C reported seizing and moving through Objective #5 at 251040H.

At 251415H Company D reported that lead elements received heavy automatics weapons fire from their left and right front.  Company D called in artillery and air strikes on Objective #4 located at YD 251430.

Recon platoon reported reaching a checkpoint at coord YD 196737, and finding trench lines and fortified positions.

At 251545H Company D engaged an estimated NVA Battalion in trench lines and prepared positions extending from YD 147731 to YD 145737.  Air strikes were called.

At 251945H Company A located at YD 152715 received approximately 15 rounds of 60mm mortar in their perimeter.  Company A returned heavy mortar and small arms fire.  The result of this action was 6 friendly WIA’s, one NVA/KIA (c) and 3 NVA/KIA (p).

Company C at 251900H located near YD 725710 detonated a surprise-firing device causing 4 friendly WIA’s.

Company A at 251915H located at YD 715152 received incoming 60mm mortar and sporadic small arms fire.  They returned a heavy volume of mortar and small arms fire.  Results were 5 friendly WIA’s, 5 NVA/KIA (c) and 12 NVA/KIA (p).

At 252155H Company D reported firing mortars and small arms at a suspected enemy position.  Company D confirmed 6 NVA/KIA’s and 8 NVA/KIA (p).

During the early morning hours of 26 March 1967 all companies were in their assigned positions preparing to conduct search and destroy operations.

At 261044H Company A discovered 3 NVA/KIA (c) as results of artillery fire located YD 153716.

Battalion Landing Team 1/4 became under operational control of the 3^rd Marine Regiment at 260900H.

At 261415H Company C reported receiving sniper fire, at YD 124735, while their FAC team landed by helicopter.  The results of this encounter were 2 NVA/KIA (c) and 3 NVA/KIA (p).

Recon platoon departed BLT 1/4 CP at 161425H to search for downed aircraft in the vicinity of YD 153716.

Company D reported moving out at 261420H to search Objective #2.

Recon platoon located parts of aircraft in the vicinity of YD 157718.

At 261700H at coordinates YD 141732 Company D reported fortifications on Objective #4 were completely destroyed.  Company D found NVA equipment.

Company C reported at 262310 that while conducting assigned search and destroy mission, it received 82mm mortars and a heavy volume of small arms fire from the vicinity of YD 117721.  Helicopters were requested to take out med-evacs for Company C.  The results of this engagement were 6 friendly KIA’s, 28 friendly WIA’s, 7 NVA/KIA (c) and 10 NVA/KIA (p).

During the late evening and early morning of 26 to 27 March a ring of protective fire was registered around Company C.  No other action was reported.

Company C reported at 271018H the finding of 25 NVA/KIA (c) and evidence of 15 NVA/KIA (p), and numerous items of enemy equipment, including 3 AK-47’s after sweeping surrounding area.

  At 271206H Company A reported moving to a new location YD 145715.

Company D, continuing to search fortifications and trench lines of Objective 4 discovered 7 more NVA/KIA (c) at 271330H.

Company B reported at 271350H that their patrol was returning to the BLT CP.

Company A at 271910H reported searching the area in the vicinity of YD 149718 and finding 33 NVA/KIA (c).

During the late evening and early morning of 27 and 28 March night activities were initiated, and H&I fires conducted.  No contact was made with the enemy.

At 280850H a patrol of Company D at coordinates YD 141723 observed noise and activity in front of their positions.  The patrol called in artillery and 81mm mortars on the suspected area resulting in 8 NVA/KIA (c).

At 280945H the Recon platoon located 5 NVA located at YD 191757 and called in artillery fire with good results.

Company D at 280900H located at YD 141733 discovered large quantities of enemy equipment and a message book.  All items were forwarded to Division G-2.

Company C at 281145H reported being on the move to Objective #3.

Lt Col T.J. Willis assumed command of BLT 1/4 at 281245H.

Company A at 281500H, located near YD 156722, captured one VCS.

Company D reported that while blowing two friendly bombs at coord YD 141733 one Marine was hit by shrapnel and subsequently died at 291700H.

Company D reported reaching Objective #2 at 181715H.

The BLT came under the OPCON of the 3^rd Marines and received their warning order at 290010H to be prepared to conduct search and destroy operations in the vicinity of YD 225660.

Company D at 291500H located and destroyed extensive trench and mortar positions at YD 187742 and YD 186745.

Company D located a minefield at 291820H at YD 193731.

At 292310H received Frag Order from Regiment to continue mission in assigned AO.  Company A was ordered to move to YD 263739 to act as a blocking force for a sweep to be conducted by two ARVN Companies, from a point approx 5,000 yds east of LZ Bluebird to Objective #1.

At 300110H Company A was on the move to their objective.

Company C at 300335H received enemy mortar fire at coord YD 175722.  Company D assisted Company C in fire mission with good results.

Company A reported at 300415H reaching assigned blocking positions.

At 300550H one ARVN unit with liaison team attached reported encountering VC ambush at YD 253753.  The ARVN unit sustained 3 WIA’s med-evac.  Enemy casualties unknown.  No further contact occurred during this sweep.  Company A remained overnight in the general area of blocking positions Red (YD 263739).

At approx 302400H March the BLT received a warning order from the 3^rd Marine Regiment to standby for commitment into an area south of Con Thien.  The Battalion was placed on a 2-hour alert for movement by helo after first light.

At approx 310700H March the Battalion was placed on a 1-hour alert to move into blocking position along road running east and west, south of Con Thien, vicinity YD 119689 to YD 093686.  Helicopters would be utilized to lift the Battalion inside the perimeter of Con Thien.

Co A was lifted first from YD 267748 and the initial wave landed at Con Thien at approx YD 311012H.  Co A was followed by Co C from YD 188720H.  The CP group arrived at 311200H and Co D at 311215H.

At approximately 311315H the Battalion began moving to designated blocking position with Co A leading.  By 311530H all units were in position with Co A from YD 093686 to YD 105687 and Co C from YD 105687 to YD 118687.  Co D established a perimeter at YD 105687 and Co C from YD 105687 to YD 118687.  Co D established a perimeter at YD 117695 and the Battalion CP with H&S security at YD 117692.  3/4, 3/9 and 3/3 units were attacking north between grid lines 09 and 12.  The FCL was established as Grid Line 68.  The night of 31 March passed without incident.

At 010200H April BLT 1/4 was dissolved and became 1^st Bn 4^th Marines and chopped from the SLF.

At 010920H a message was received from 3^rd Marines to conduct search and destroy operations westward to the DMZ and include GS YD 0868, YD 0869, and YD 0870.  The Bn CO requested permission to do so.  Co D moved from their positions through Co C and A and conducted search and destroy operations in GS YD 0869 and YD 0870.  The 81mm mortar section from Co A and Co D was consolidated at Co C position to support both Companies.  Co A moved into GS YD 0868 and YD 0768 and conducted search and destroy operations.

Company D made no contact and returned to their original position via Con Thien.

Company A returned to its original position.

The night of 1 April passed without contact.  At 012200H a 3^rd Marines warning order directed 1/4 to change OPCON to 3^rd Mar Div (Fwd) effective 020800H, and to be prepared to be helo lifted to Dong Ha to assume mission as Base Defense Bn. The helo lift was delayed due to fog until 1030H.  The last elements of the Battalion reached Dong Ha at 1600H.

11. Results.
12. Friendly Losses.

(1)       The following is a recapitulation of friendly casualties sustained by the Battalion Landing Team 1/4 during Operation Beacon Hill I covering the period 20 March 1967 to 1 April 1967.

          USMC     KIA                    WIA                   MIA                DOW

                        Off/Enl             Off/Enl            Off/Enl            Off/Enl

                         2/34                  6/230                 0/0                   0/2

            USN     0/0                    0/11                   0/0                    0/0

(2)               There were no major items of equipment or material lost.

1. Recapitulation of enemy activity for ‘Beacon Hill I’ 20 March-1 April.
2. NVA initiated                                                    35
3. USMC initiated                                                39
4. Total incidents                                                 74
5. NVA/KIA (c)                                                      351
6. NVA/KIA (p)                                                     619
7. VCC                                                                      0
8. VCS                                                                      9
9. Weapons captured or destroyed                    51
10. Supplies destroyed                                                0
11. Fortifications destroyed (include bunkers)      22
12. Feet of trenches destroyed                                        550
13. NVA packs captured or destroyed                          43
14. It was not always possible to immediately search areas where air strikes and artillery missions were conducted.  The results of fires utilized in close support of friendly troops were always evaluated by area searches.  Harassing and deep supporting fires could not be evaluated.
15. No material, foodstuffs or medicines of U.S. origin were recovered.
16. Administrative Matters.  The administrative order proves to be adequate in all respects.  No difficulties were encountered with the serial assignment table and all items of equipment called for were delivered with a very short lead-time.
17. Supply techniques, combat loads, ammunitions and weapons carried by assault troops.

(1)       On D-1 ammunitions and rations were staged aboard assigned shipping and broken down by Companies, batteries and attachments.  These supplies were issued on D-day in accordance with authorized Basic Allowance (B/A).

(2)       Units landed by surface or airlift carried the prescribed load as directed by the administrative order and the Basic Allowance.  Resupply requests were submitted by the using units to the BLT S-4 one day prior to the required date of delivery.  Helicopters were ordered one-day prior to date of use, and the time of arrival was dictated by the tactical situation of each requesting unit.  Combat loads, weapons, and ammunition carried by troops proved to be adequate except in a few instances.  On the evening of D-day, the Battalion was subjected to heavy enemy mortar and artillery attacks. The 105-Howitzer Battery and the 81mm mortar platoon quickly expended their Basic Allowance firing counter mortar fires.  An emergency resupply request was ordered and delivered to the Battalion within two hours.  Ammunition was also received from an adjacent artillery battery to supplement the emergency resupply.  On D+8 two rifle companies encountered a built-up area consisting of enemy bunkers and trenches.  300 pounds of demolitions were requested by the companies and delivered to them.

(3)       While ashore, all units were resupplied from the LSA, Dong Ha Combat Base.  Helicopters from assigned shipping were used to deliver the supplies from the LSA to requesting units.

1. Maintenance.  Maintenance was performed by FLSG, Dong Ha.  Down items of equipment were delivered to FLSG by helicopter or vehicle.  Contact teams were available from the attached LSU of the BLT when needed.
2. Treatment of Casualties and Evacuations and Hospitalization.  First echelon medical care was performed in the field by hospital corpsmen attached to the various rifle companies and other units.  Following field first aid, those patients requiring further care were evacuated by helicopter to the nearest available medical facility.  The definitive treatment center of the SLF was the USS Princeton (LPH-5) where the SLF surgical team was augmented by the medical personnel of the ship, the personnel of the collecting and clearing platoon, and a complement of corpsmen for LBT 1/4.  In addition, a medical officer and 3 corpsmen accompanied H&S Company as a ‘Forward BAS’, but this unit was in no way utilized in the chain of evacuation and confined itself to treatment of wounds and diseases occurring in its own area of the TAOR.

The following system was utilized for processing casualties aboard the casualty evacuation ship:  the med-evac helicopter was met on the flight deck by medical personnel and the patient’s weapons were removed at this time.  Patients observed to have wounds requiring specialized skills not available aboard the casualty evac ship (Neurosurgery, Ophthalmology, Otolaryngology, Maxilla-facial surgery) were to be immediately evacuated to the nearest facility having this type of care (The need for this procedure did not arise during their operation).  The patients were then removed by elevator to the hanger deck where they were completely undressed, tetanus administered, the nature of their wounds determined, and an order of treatment established.  The patients were then lowered by hoist one deck below to the shock and resuscitation area where further examination including X-ray studies and blood work was accomplished and IV fluid therapy and other supportive measures initiated.  Here, the patients were also prepared for surgery and debridement and closure of minor wounds was accomplished.  The surgical suite, consisting of two operating rooms, was located one deck below the shock and resuscitation area; patients requiring surgery were removed to this area by hoist.

Total hospital beds were 160.  These were divided into four wards as follows:

Ward I – 4 beds used as sick officers’ quarters.

Ward II – (Intensive Care Unit) 36 beds for post operative patients following major, general and orthopedic surgical procedures requiring frequent surveillance and care.

Ward III & IV – 120 beds for ambulatory patients requiring routine care.  The daily census averaged 115 patients; at no time were all hospital beds filled.

Medical personnel were attached during the operation as follows.

1. Casualty Evac Ship USS Princeton LPH-5
2.             Surgical Team
3.             General Surgeon                   1
4.             Orthopedic Surgeon            1
5.             Anesthesiologist                  1
6.             General Medical Officer    1
7.             Navy enlisted                         20
8. Collecting and Clearing platoon
9. General Medical Officer                 3
10. Navy enlisted                                     23
11. Ships sick bay
12. General Medical Officer               2
13. Navy enlisted                                   15
14. Battalion 1/4 Medical Platoon
15. General Medical Officer              1
16. Navy enlisted                                  14

(Reduced to 10 as 4 men were sent to the field to replace injured line corpsman)

1. HMM 363
2. Flight Surgeon           1
3. Navy enlisted             3
4. Field
5.             Forward BAS
6. General Medical Officer    1
7. Navy enlisted                        3
8. Rifle companies
9. Navy enlisted                       28

(6-corpsman were lost as WIA’s, 1 corpsman departed on emergency leave; 4 replacements were sent to the field)

1.                       Attached units
2. Navy enlisted   8

Due to the frequent inclemency of the weather and the subsequent inability of the med evac helicopter to make contact with the ship, other medical facilities were utilized for evacuation purposes.  Casualties were distributed as follows.

                  LPH-5   Da Nang   Dong Ha   Phu Bai   USS Repose Total

KIA’s            3               0              30               0                 0                 33

WIA’s      131               6              10             41               12               200

DOW’s        0               2                0               0                  1                   3

NCI            27               0                0               0                  0                 27

Total        161*             8              40             41                13               263

*18 of these casualties was from commands other than BLT 1/ 4.  143 casualties were from BLT 1/4.

Significant medical entities encountered were limited to:

1. Heat exhaustion    10 cases
2. Battle fatigue           2 cases

No cases of Malaria, scrub typhus, dysentery or other significant infectious diseases were encountered.

Surgical procedures performed aboard the Hospital Ship were as follows:

1.           Total Orthopedic procedures                             26

                                    Major procedures                            4

                                    Minor procedures                          22

                                    Upper extremities                          17

                                    Lower extremities                          17

                                    Amputations (thumb)                    1

1.             General Surgical procedures

                                    Major procedures             8

                                    Minor procedures             1

                        By type of procedure:

                        Hepatic Lobotomy               1            Right Hemicolectomy        1

                        Enterectomy                          1            Diaphragm                              1

                        Urethroplasty                        1            Neck exploration                  1

                        Femoral Artery repair       1            Appendectomy                       1

I&S of abscess                     1

III.              Delayed primary closures               130

Whole blood utilization aboard the hospital ship:

Units on hand                                             157

Units drawn during operation           28

Units typed and cross-matched       105

Units utilized for patient care           40

Units destroyed                                       2

1. Transportation.  On D-day the Battalion air lifted the LIWC’s (mules) into the Command Group’s position.  Located at this position were H&S Company, 1 rifle company, 1-section 81mm mortars, and the 105mm Howitzer Battery.  The LIWC’s proved to be invaluable in moving supplies from the LZ to the using units, particularly the 105mm and 81mm ammunition.  On D+1 motor transport elements of the BLT Motor Transport Platoon and the 105mm Battery were moved by surface craft to Dong Ha.  These vehicles were used to resupply all the units located at Command Post area, greatly reducing the need for helicopter support in that area.  The medium helicopter squadron in direct support was the principle means of transportation used by the rifle companies.  They provided for med-evac, troops lifts and resupply of the rifle companies. Additional transportation was provided by CH-46 helicopters for lifting heavy external loads.
2. Communications.  Communications nets were activated at H-90 minutes on D-day, 20 March 1967, in support of Operation Beacon Hill I.  Communications was generally satisfactory during all phases of the operations.  Problems involving mutual interference between frequencies modulated (FM) radio nets, and between FM radio nets and radio relay circuits were encountered.  Interference was most severe during the early evening hours.  Both radio and radio relay circuits from the shore became marginal and brief outages were experienced as a result of unusable frequencies.  No outages were experienced on internal BLT radio nets.

(1)       Supporting arms radio nets were satisfactory.  Some difficulty was encountered initially in contacting gunfire support ships.  The specific cause of this was not determined, however, with subsequent frequency changes and the changing of supporting ships this problem was eliminated.

(2)        The shifting of control of Air from ship (TACC) to shore (DADC-Dong Ha) caused confusion in requesting and coordinating air support.

(3)       Planned ship-to-shore communications consisted of two radio nets.  LF TAC #1 (HF) and LF TAC #2 (FM), and one radio relay circuit utilizing the AN/MRC-62.  LF TAC #1 was activated very briefly during the initial phases of operations ashore.  This net was secured on D+1 and not activated again.  LF TAC #2 was operated on a continual basis until the BLT changed operational control to 3^rd Marine Regiment.  It was necessary to change frequency on this net on three separate occasions to maintain satisfactory communications.  Though, covered operations were planned for this net, it was not ordered, and the net remained uncovered.

(a)        The radio relay circuit was operational approximately 85 percent of the time.  Outages were caused primarily by unusable frequencies.  It becomes necessary to place this circuit on a scheduled basis (three hours up one hour down) due to downed generator equipment on 27 March 1967.  During this period one PE-75, organic to the AN/MRC-62, as well as the B attalion PU-197 was inoperative.  The following day a second PE-75 was borrowed, and the circuit resumed full time operation.  This circuit was secured on 31 March 1967 when the BLT CP displaced to the Con Thien area.

(4)        On 23 March 1967 radio relay communications was established with 3^rd MarDiv (Fwd) utilizing an AN/MRC-62 provided by that unit.  This circuit provided direct entry into the 3^rd MarDiv/III MAF telephone system, plus dedicated (Hot Line) circuits between the GLT COC and 3^rd MarDiv (Fwd) COC, and BLT FSCC and 3^rd MarDiv (Fwd) FSCC.  This circuit remained in operation until the BLT CP displaced to the Con Thien area on 31 March 1967 at which time the van was returned to Dong Ha.

(5)        Internal BLT radio nets were satisfactory during all phases of Beacon Hill I.  The employment of both, a BLT TAC net and Admin/Log net again proved most advantageous.  The availability of an Admin/Log net for administrative/logistic type traffic greatly alleviated traffic volume on the BLT TAC Net leaving this net free for purely tactical control.

(6)        Coincidently with the change of operational control of the BLT to 3^rd Marine Regiment, the LF TAC #2 was secured, and the BLT entered the 3^rd Marine Regiment TAC net.  No problems were encountered in this transition and continuous radio communications was maintained on this net until the BLT returned to Dong Ha on 2 April 1967.  Telephone communications with 3^rd Marine Regiment was available via radio relay.

(7)        Subsequent to 26 March 1967, radio communications with SLF were maintained via the BLT TAC Net and/or the 3^rd Marine Regiment TAC Net, both of which the SLF monitored.  As stated in paragraph (3) above radio relay was maintained with the SLF until 31 March 1967.

(8)        Normal internal telephone communications were provided within the BLT CP ashore.  One common user channel was provided for telephone communications with BLT elements afloat.  Two common user channels providing entry into 3^rd MarDiv/III MAF were also provided.  One external trunk line was installed to the Provisional Artillery unit located at Gio Linh.  No difficulties were encountered in the installation and operation of this telephone system.

1. The BLT Message Center remained on board the USS Princeton during the operation.  All message center functions were performed from that location. The message center moved ashore on 27 March 1967 and set up operations in Dong Ha.

(9)        Maintenance was also performed on board the USS Princeton during the operation.  Most equipment evacuated from the field was taken directly to the LSA in Dong Ha while some was evacuated to the ship.  At this writing some items of equipment remain unaccounted for.  On 25 March 1967 maintenance personnel were sent ashore to the LSA to recover equipment as it was evacuated.  Subsequent to this date gear requiring 3rd echelon maintenance was taken directly to FLSU #1.

(10)     Operation Beacon Hill I terminated at 0200H on 1 April 1967 upon movement of the BLT to Dong Ha on 1 April 1967 all radio nets were secured.

1. Medical Evaluation.

(1)        The frequent inability of the med-evac helicopters to find the USS Princeton due to inclement weather emphasized the need for alternative definitive medical treatment center (e.g., USS Repose, Company D 3^rd Med Bn, Dong Ha).

(2)        The combining of second and third echelon medical support (collecting and clearing platoon, SLF Surgical Team) proved less of an advantage than in previous operations due to the breakdown of the chain of evacuation between field and the casualty evac ship.  The potential availability of the C&C platoon should be remembered and utilized in future operations if practicable.

(3)               It is the opinion of the surgical team that the presence of a male nurse aboard the casualty evac ship would be an aid in improving patient care:

(4)               The medical facilities of the USS Princeton, while adequate, are far from optimal.  One difficulty encountered was the transportation of patients among the various areas and wards, all of which seemed to be located on different decks without direct access between areas for non-ambulatory patients, although the wards of the casualty evac ship were never filled.  Assuming the casualty evac ship had been the sole evacuation center, bed space would have been totally inadequate.

13. Special Equipment and Techniques.
14. Sniper employment:  Two-man sniper teams were employed with each rifle company.  During the operation they evidenced a marked improvement over their performance in earlier operations (DECKHOUSE VI).  They provided good close in and distant fire support to the units to which assigned.  Their excellent marksmanship accounted for a total of 24 NVA confirmed kills during Beacon Hill I.
15. Commanders Analysis.
16. Operation Beacon Hill I was entirely successful.  Collectively, enemy casualties exceeded that of a NVA Battalion.  Actually, three different NVA Battalions were reduced to virtual ineffectiveness as a result of Operation Beacon Hill I.

            The landing was conducted without incident into secure landing zones. The distances involved and weather were the problem areas.  The Concurrent landing of elements of the BLT by helicopter from three different ships illustrated once again the flexibility available in an amphibious operation. They allowed for rapid build-up ashore, extremely important since H-hour had been delayed due to bad weather.

            Worthy of note is the fact that one on the units was a 105mm Howitzer Battery embarked in a LSD.

1. The operations ashore consisted of the small unit engagements generally associated with guerrilla operations, consisting mainly of company size operations.

            The enemy, however, proved to be regular NVA, well equipped, and well organized.

            The fact that all units of the BLT ashore received extensive enemy mortar fire and on one occasion 105mm Howitzer fire, emphasized the continuing need for maximum dispersion of personnel and digging in; strict adherence to this policy undoubtedly held friendly casualties to a minimum.

            In counter-battery firing and, in all operations, the need for rapid fire support and detailed fire support coordination was confirmed.  The ability to concentrate the fires of three separate batteries allowed maximum fire to be delivered on lucrative enemy targets and provided protection to separated friendly units against numerically superior enemy forces.

1. The sparse civilian population in the area of operations, the dispersed employment of the companies, and savage continuing nature of the fighting, left no opportunity for implementing a Civil Affairs or Psychological Warfare Program.

This page last corrected 28 August 2011