Intelligence Report

1. General.  (Period covered 2 April to 30 April 1967).  During the reporting period the Battalion was located at the Dong Ha Combat Base.  From 4 to 20 April, the Battalion was responsible for the security of the Dong Ha Combat Base.  During this period the Intelligence Section was actively engaged in Battalion COC Operations.  On 4 April, Captain J.M. Hargrove was assigned as the Battalion S-2 Officer.  On 18 April, Captain Hargrove left the Battalion on emergency leave.

On 20 April the Intelligence Section terminated its duties in the Dong Ha Perimeter COC, moved to the Battalion billeting area and supported the Battalion at work on the Gio Linh-Con Thien barrier strip.

1. Intelligence Information in the Battalion Operating Area.
2. Gio Linh-Con Thien
3. Enemy.  The enemy in this area of operations was determined to be NVA by two means; first by the proximity to the DMZ, second by the 3^rd MarDiv (Fwd) Order of Battle and Intelligence Reports which identified the following units as being in the area on the following dates.

                        803^rd NVA Regt – 16 Mar

                        302^nd NVA Bn – 19 Apr

                        318^th NVA Regt – 15 Mar

            Documents captured by Company D, identified the 2^nd Company, 1^st Battalion, 31^st NVA Regiment.  (See para-D. 1 below for more info on this enemy unit).

            The enemy was armed with 60mm and 82mm mortars, standardized semi-auto and automatic weapons, and NVA combat equipment.

1. Terrain.

(1)               Critical Terrain Features.  These included two ridgelines vic YD 219746 to YD 197747 and vic YD 161731 to YD 188747, which offered the enemy excellent mortar, positions for attack upon friendly troops.

(2)               Cover and Concealment.  Thick undergrowth and elephant grass provided good concealment.  Natural cover, however, was almost non-existent.

(3)               Avenues of Approach. These included National Route #1 and numerous trails and footpaths, some indicated on the 1:50,000 map (6442 IV), others located by 3^rd Recon Bn Patrol reports and photo interpretation.

1. Weather.  The weather in the Gio Linh-Con Thien area varied from periods of clear skies with unrestricted visibility and unhindered observation to periods of day-long heavy rain with severely restricted visibility.  Temperatures ranged from 72 to 95 degrees.

Early morning and late evening, ground fog was common; morning fog dissipated rapidly on sunny days. On occasion, night fog was sufficiently heavy to hamper helicopter employment (med-evacs).

2. Cua Viet River Area.
3. Enemy.  The enemy encountered in the Cua Viet area was the VC guerrilla type, both Main and Local Force, although the H-99^th Bn (NVA) was reported operating in GS 3463 on 13 April.  Intelligence sources also reported the 808^th Main force VC Bn operating in this area on 15 April; no confirmed contact was made with either unit.

            The enemy relied heavily upon the use of anti-vehicle mines in the area and during the period, initiated no direct ground contacts with troops.

1. Terrain.

(1)              Critical Terrain Features.  The mouth of the Cua Viet River was the critical terrain feature of the area; as any force occupying this area possesses control of river traffic inland.

(2)               Cover and concealment.  Tree lines approximately 300 meters inland from the shore on both sides of the river offered some concealment.  Heavy stands of trees around the villages also offered some concealment.  Natural cover was scarce to non-existent in the sandy beach areas.

(3)               Avenues of Approach.  These included the Cua Viet River and its tributaries.  A 300-meter-wide strip of sand, from the shore to the tree line, extending from the DMZ south to the river, could be considered as avenue of approach, both by foot and/or rough terrain vehicles.

1. Weather.  Weather in the Cua Viet River area differed little from the weather described in para B. 1. c. above, with the exception of heavier and more persistent ground fog in early morning hours.
2. Cam Lo Bridge Area.
3. Enemy.  No positive identifications of enemy units were made.  Contacts with the enemy identified them as VC, and various intelligence sources reported VC throughout the area in varying sized units (i.e., 30 VC at YD 122630- 12 Apr; 1 VC Co at YD 103626 – 10 Apr; 30 VC at YD 166615 – 8 Apr).  The VC in the area were expected to conduct terrorist activities, as opposed to direct contact with friendly forces.  No serious terrorist activities took place during the reporting period, although one 30-foot bridge at YD 103576 was blown and several mines were found along National Route #9.
4. Terrain

(1)               Critical Terrain Features.  The key terrain feature in this area was the Cam Lo Bridge at YD 148604.

(2)               Cover and Concealment.  Cover and Concealment along the Cam Lo River Valley was provided mostly by manmade objects, buildings and roadside ditches.  Natural concealment was sparse along each side of the river.

(3)               Avenues of Approach.  These included the Cam Lo River, the Cam Lo River Valley, National Route #9, and Inter-Province Route #88.

1. Weather.  See para-B. 1. c. above.
2. Dong Ha Defense Perimeter.
3. Enemy.  Most of the activity in and around the Dong Ha Defense Perimeter occurred in the area of operations of CAC-2.  Intelligence sources located the following units.

2 Squads VC at YD 278581 – 4 April

1 Bn NVA at YD 2762 – 12 April

1 VC Co at YD 2761, 2760, 2859 – 10 April

Mine incidents were many, principally along National Routes #1 and #9.

The area bounded by coordinates YD 2653, 2650, 2953, 2950, as well as the village at Ai Tu (YD 295545) was VC influenced.  1 Main Force VC Bn was reported to be working in this area.  Persistent intelligence reports stated the possibility of an attack upon the Dong Ha Combat Base, specifically one report (rated F-3) stating that the 812^th NVA Regiment was to centralize around Dong Ha on 15 April; this report was followed by a report (rated C-3) that Dong Ha would be attacked in conjunction with simultaneous assaults by the enemy on Quang Tri, Cam Lo, and Trieu Phong.

1. Terrain.

(1)              Critical Terrain Features.  Key terrain features in the area included ridges on YD 243611 and at YD 276577.  The City-Military Complex at Dong Ha controlled traffic on Route #1 and #9 and river traffic on the Cua Viet-Hieu Giang-Thach Han River System.

(2)              Cover and Concealment.  Concealment in the area 2-5 km south of Dong Ha was in the nature of thick undergrowth, elephant grass, and man-high foliage along trails.  Cover for S/A fire was available by road embankments along Route #1 and #9 and the abandoned Railway paralleling Route #1.

(3)               Avenues of Approach.  Avenues of Approach lead to Dong Ha from all directions; from the east, the Cua Viet-Hieu Giang River; from the north and south, National Route #1 and the parallel railway embankment; from the west National Route #9.

1. Summary of Enemy Losses.
2.                                                          Prairie III          Prairie IV

                                                                                    (2-9 April)    (19-30 April)

                         VC KIA (conf)                                          2                    2

                         VC KIA (prob)                                         9                    0

                         NVA KIA (conf)                                     10                  20

                         NVA KIA (prob)                                       5                    2

                         Detainees                                                 10                    0

                        VCC                                                                2                    0

                        ChiCom Gren Captured                        18                   2

                        AT Mines Detonated/Destroyed       18                   1

                        AP Mines Detonated/Destroyed         6                   1

                        Bunkers destroyed                                    8                   8

                        Weapons captured                                    1                    5

                        Mortar positions destroyed                  3                   0

                        82mm dud rds destroyed                       4                 68

1. Items of Significant Interest.
2. On 24 April, Company A uncovered 48 graves containing 2 NVA bodies each, and 2 graves containing 4 each (Total; 104).  All graves appeared approximately three weeks old.  Some graves had markers, which indicated the bodies were from the 5^th, 6^th, 7^th, and 8^th companies of the 2^nd Bn, 31^st NVA Regiment.  These 104 enemy dead were added to the total of confirmed enemy dead count for the Battalion from Operation Beacon Hill I; the adjusted total to read 455 NVA KIA (conf), 515 NVA KIA (prob) vice 351 NVA KIA (conf), 619 NVA KIA (prob).

  This page last corrected 26 August 2011