Operations/Training
- Mission.
During July the First Battalion, Fourth Marines continued Operation Cumberland in accordance with 4th Marines Frag Orders 28-67 and 30-67. The Battalion’s mission included providing the following security: engineer upgrading of Route 547 in the Cumberland AO, the Forward Fire Support Base (FFSB) YD 620095, the bridge/ferry site YD 755134, and the MCB-3 Rock Crusher YD 735134. Also included in this mission was the requirement to employ aggressive small unit patrolling throughout the Cumberland AO to locate and destroy enemy forces therein. Operations and/or activities of note during this period were:
July
1-6 The Battalion continued Operation Cumberland.
7-13 At 070950H, the Battalion received verbal orders from CO, 4th Marines to move the Battalion (a command group and three rifle companies) to Phu Bai for an airlift to Dong Ha. The Battalion reported OPCON to CG, 3rd Marine Division as division reserve and a Dong Ha Base Defense Force.
13 Chopped OPCON to 9th Marines at 1200H for Operation Buffalo.
14-16 Under direction of 9th Marines, participated in Operation Hickory II.
17-31 Returned to the Nam Hoa area and resumed Operation Cumberland.
- Summary of Activities.
The first of July found the battalion continuing Operation Cumberland and located as follows: Companies A and D at YD 777094 and YD 770080 respectively; participated in a combined ARVN/USMC search and destroy Operation; Company C was being utilized for the security of the Battalion operating base (YD 717106) where the Battalion CP, Battery G, 3/12 and elements of Company C, 11th Engineers were located; and Company B was providing security for the engineer improvement of the FFSB. On 1 July the Engineers had opened a Class-30 Road along the trace of Route 547 between the ferry/bridge site and the FFSB to include bridges, bypasses, and culverts.
On 4 July Company A returned to the Battalion-operating base and on the following day moved to the FFSB. Company D relieved Company C of the security to the Battalion operating base and the ferry site on 5 July. That evening Company C moved out on a search and destroy operation in the vicinity of Hill 433, YD 713135.
On 7 July the Battalion received verbal orders from the Commanding Officer, 4th Marines to move a Command Group and three rifle companies to the Phu Bai airfield for transportation to Dong Ha Combat Base (via fixed wing aircraft). Due to the Battalion’s departure all engineer equipment and personnel were consolidated at the Battalion-operating base thus suspending engineering work in the Cumberland AO. The Battalion executive officer assumed command of Operation Cumberland and remaining forces consisting of Company A, engineers, artillery, and tanks.
Commencing at 1300H on 7 July, the Battalion moved to Dong Ha with all elements arriving by 1900H. From 7 to 13 July the Battalion was under the operational control of the 3rd Marine Division and was the division reserve. Also, during this period, the Battalion relieved 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines of responsibility of three CAC units in the Dong Ha area.
At 1200H on 13 July the Battalion chopped OPCON to the 9th Marines in accordance with 9th Marines Operation Order 11-67 to participate in Operation Hickory II. Hickory II involved six infantry Battalions under control of the 9th Marines to search for and destroy enemy forces and installations in that area of Quang Tri Province between the Cam Lo River and Con Thien.
At 1300H on 13 July the Battalion Commander gathered his staff and unit commanders to issue verbal orders. The specific mission of the Battalion was to sweep south from Con Thien to the 62 east-west grid lines in the area bounded by north and south grid lines 09 and 12. Within this zone of action Company C was assigned the western sector between grid lines 08 to 10, while Co D was given the eastern sector from grid line 10 to 12. The Command Group was to move behind Company D with Company B following in trace as battalion reserve. 0900H on 14 July 1967 was designated as H-hour and D-day respectfully.
At H-hour on D-day, the Battalion moved out as planned, having spent the previous night without incident in defensive positions. No enemy contact was made during the course of the three-day operation. On the 14th, Company D discovered a recently used VC base camp containing one Chinese Communist Light Machine Gun, Type-56, two Chinese Communist 7.62mm Carbines Type-56, several Chinese Communist grenades, personal equipment and documents. On 15 July, Company B replaced Company D in the sweep in the eastern half. Company C encountered AP mines in their zone of action resulting in the following friendly casualties; 1 KIA and 17 WIA.
On 170800H July 1967 the operation terminated, and the Battalion having accomplished its mission, was returned to operational control of the 4th Marines at 161916H. The Battalion moved to Dong Ha on the 16th and returned to Camp Evans via truck convoy and CH-53A helicopters. On 17 July, Companies B, D and the Battalion Command Group rejoined Company A in the Nam Hoa area to resume Operation Cumberland. Company C was placed under OPCON of the 2nd Battalion 4th Marines to participate in Operation Fremont – a combined ARVN/USMC search and destroy operation in the vicinity of My Chanh and the Song Thac Na Valley.
On 18 July 1967 Company B and Company, A (-) were ordered to the FFSS to provide security for the engineering operations there. These two units were also given responsibility for the security of that portion of Route 547 between the FFSB and the Fort (YD 686093), plus the responsibility of conducting patrols in the area of operations west from the trace of the Rao Binh Dien and Song Huu Trach Rivers. Captain R.A. Ross was appointed to coordinate the activities of Companies A and B. Company D assumed responsibility for security of the Battalion operating base, that portion of Route 547 between the Fort and the bridge/ferry site, and the Cumberland area of operations east of the Rao Binh Dien and Song Huu Trach Rivers. Utilizing the Third Platoon, Company A, Company D also assumed responsibility for the security of the bridge/ferry site.
The first contact with the enemy was on the morning of 19 July 1967. A two truck, resupply convoy traveling west on Route 547 was ambushed at YD 641094 at 0930H. The lead vehicle carrying the 60mm mortar section from Company A, was hit by a Chinese Communist Anti-tank rocket Type-56 causing 3 KIA’s, 8 WIA, and destroyed the truck. The 2nd Platoon, Company B (located westward of the ambush site) along with the security squad that accompanied the convoy made a search of the ambush area with negative results. Artillery fires and air strikes were also directed into the suspected enemy positions. Later during the afternoon of the 19th, a second convoy escorted by two tanks moving west on Route 547 was also ambushed by an undetermined enemy force at YD 645096. The lead M-48A3 tank was hit by a ChiCom Anti-tank rocket type 56 in the forward, upper-left, side of the tank turret. Following the firing of the AT rocket, the enemy withdrew under a cover of small arms fire. Immediate action was undertaken by the convoy security force with the tanks firing beehive and HE rounds, followed by air and artillery missions. Elements of Company B swept the area and found several fresh foxholes and a booby-trapped ChiCom grenade on the south side of the road. The convoy continued on to the FFSB and returned that evening with no further encounters.
The Battalion continued its mission of providing security and conducting aggressive patrolling in the Cumberland AO. Occasional sightings of small groups of VC and encounters with mines, booby traps, and snipers were the only other contacts with the enemy during the period 19-22 July.
On 23 July another convoy was ambushed in the same pattern as previously experienced: the enemy firing an anti-tank rocket at one of the lead vehicles then rapidly withdrawing behind small arms fire. In this case the second tank was hit by an anti-tank round in 90mm gun tube and two-crew members were wounded. Despite the hole in the gun tube and wounded crewmembers the tank valiantly returned fire along with its companion M-48, and an artillery mission was called in on the suspected enemy escape route.
Following these three ambush incidents the battalion commander assessed the situation to determine what action his forces had taken, what procedures could be implemented, and what was required in the way of added support from higher headquarters. It was requested that regiment return Company C to Battalion control and that flame tanks be added to the attached tank platoon. Further it was planned to employ increased artillery prep fires and limited defoliation in order to prevent further ambush incidents. Each convoy traveling the MSR between the Battalion Pperating Base and the FFSB was provided a forward observer, additional radios, a larger security force, and its movement was closely controlled by the Battalion Combat Operations Center.
Reconnaissance teams from 3rd Recon Battalion were employed throughout the Cumberland area with few results of contacts made. On 26 July at 0900H one reconnaissance team encountered a small enemy force at YD 678083 but contact was soon broken. Elements of Company D searched the area afterwards and found several bunkers, which they demolished. Again, artillery fires were directed on likely enemy avenues of exit with unknown results.
Company C was released from participation in Operation Fremont on 27 July and the company returned to the Cumberland AO. Company C relieved Company D at the operating base and Company D was assigned the control sector of the Cumberland area grid lines 65 to 70.
Towards the end of July, the number and size of convoys increased considerably as more artillery and engineer personnel, equipment, and supplies were moved forward to the FFSB. On 30 July Battery A, 2nd Battalion 94th Artillery (USA) moved the first increment of 175mm guns into the FFSB in preparation of interdicting the Ashau Valley on 1 August.
On 31 July an unknown enemy force command detonated a mine behind a truck, which was part of a four-vehicle convoy traveling west on Route 547 in the vicinity of YD 655094. No casualties or damage to the vehicle was sustained and a subsequent search of the area revealed a recently occupied position south of the road.
- Training.
Due to constant operational commitments, there was little formal training. Company level training for squad leaders was conducted by artillery and mortar forward observers in techniques of adjusting fires. Classes were conducted by the Battalion armorer on care and cleaning of the M-16 rifle, followed by FAM firing of 250 rounds per individual. Indoctrination and weapons familiarization classes were also conducted for replacement personnel.
- Training Problems Encountered.
Due to the battalion being constantly committed to various missions, there was little time allowed for formal training.
This page last corrected 27 August 2011