Sequential Listing of Significant Events

1. Combat Mission assigned.

(a)              Provide security for the Pontoon Bridge (vicinity YD 756148 and Rock Crusher vicinity YD 736135).

(b)              Provide security for engineers upgrading route 547 from the Pontoon Bridge to the forward Fire Support base (vicinity YD 620095) to include utilization of aggressive small unit activities throughout assigned area of operations.

(c)               Provide security for establishment of a forward Fire Support Base.  (Ref: 4^th Marines Frag Order 30-67 Operation Cumberland).

2. Operations.

            August

1          Brigadier General L. METZGER, ADC 3^RD MarDiv (rein); fired the first 175mm round into the Ashau Valley from the Fire Support base.  The first battery of US Army 175mm guns were in position and continued to fire at preselected targets in the Ashau Valley throughout the month.

3          The battalion received 4th Marines Operation Order 1-67 for Operation Cloud.  Operation Cloud was to be a combined USMC/ARVN combat raid into the Ashau Valley on 4 August.  This battalion was assigned the mission of providing two rifle companies and a command group as a reserve element.  The operation was cancelled by Task Force Headquarters on 4 August 1967.

9          One of the two batteries of 175mm guns was deployed to Dong Ha as a result of the cancellation of Operation Cloud.  Extensive security was provided by the battalion for the battery until it reached the Nam Hoa Bridge, where security responsibility was released to units from Phu Bai for the remainder of the trip to the Hue ramp.

10        A mining incident occurred at the eastern sector of Route 547 near the Royal Tombs/Rock Crusher area.  Four mines were detonated along Route 547 between Grid Lines 74 and 75 causing extensive damages to three 2½-ton trucks and one wrecker.  The area had been swept by visual means prior to the vehicles using the road.  The mines were determined to be M1A1 ChiCom mines wrapped in plastic.  Engineer assistance was procured to provide two mine detectors for a daily deliberate sweep in this general area.  In addition, greater emphasis was placed on ambushes and night patrols to prevent mining incidents along the length of Route 547 from the Nam Hoa Bridge to the Fire Support Base.

17        The 1^st platoon, Company A was moved from the Fire Support Base to the Rock Crusher as relief for MCB-3 security personnel who were detached on 18 August.  The Rock Crusher and Nam Hoa Bridge complex were placed under a coordinator and designated the ZULU Area, which encompassed the area 1000 meters west of the Rock Crusher and to the eastern boundary of the Cumberland OA.

            At 0935H, a 2½-ton truck detonated a mine at YD 784122 after several trucks and tanks had passed over an area previously swept by engineers using mine detectors.

            At 2215H, a Company B patrol engaged four VC while enroute to ambush site along Route 547, approximately 1000 meters southwest of the Fire Support Base, killing one VC and capturing an AK-47 automatic weapon.

18        The 1^st Platoon, Company A (Rock Crusher) provided a blocking force vicinity YD 747126 for a PF/RF sweep of a village area on the east side of the river opposite the Royal Tomb (Vicinity YD 748134).  No contact was made by the PF/RF units and the operation was secure at 1100H.

19        Visual sweep teams and the convoy received sporadic small arms and anti-tank rocket fire along Route 547 between Grid Lines 63 and 67.  In order to more effectively prevent these incidents, the Commanding Officer Battery G, 3^rd Bn 12^th Marines proposed a plan of supporting fires to protect the convoy while on the move.  Instead of calling for individual concentration of artillery, the convoy’s forward observers had series of concentrations plotted ahead of the convoy’s route, which he could request.

            U.S. Army AO working for the Nam Hoa Sub Sector advisor spotted numerous VC dressed in black clothing preparing emplacements at YD 750105.  Air strikes and artillery fires were called in on the positions resulting in four VC/KIA confirmed.  Company D was alerted that afternoon to be prepared to sweep the area the following morning.

20        Company D crossed the Song Huu Trach River and proceeded by foot to the area of the previous day’s air strike.  After searching the area with negative results, Company D continued to vicinity of YD 760125 where the ARVN elements from Nam Hoa sub-Sector provided small boats to cross the Song Ta Trach River.  The company returned to the CP by truck convoy.

            At 1700, Company D received enemy 82mm mortar fire.  Counter mortar plans were immediately fired and were successful in silencing the enemy fire.

22        At 0615H, the FSB received 82mm mortar fire.  The enemy mortar position was within 500 meters of the perimeter, and immediately taken under fire.  A search of the enemy position revealed blood trails and numerous bandages.

25-26 The battalion participated in a combined operation with ARVN and Popular Forces units, along the east and west banks of the Song Ta Trach River in the vicinity of Nam Hoa.  Planning for this operation had been initiated earlier at 4^th Marines Headquarters and liaison established with the Province and District Chiefs.  A combined control headquarters was co-located at the battalion command post, consisting of liaison and communications personnel from 1^st ARVN Division and Thua Thien Province Headquarters.  On the morning of 25 August, Company C reinforced by a platoon of local Popular Forces, were lifted by helicopter to a landing zone south of the zone of Action. (See Tab C) Subsequently, the Black Panther (Hoc Dao) Company, 1^st ARVN Division was heli-lifted into a LZ east of the Song Ta Trach River.  During the day both units swept north along the trace of the Song Ta Trach River, with Company C searching two villages and one Royal Tomb with negative results.  Three (3) 1000 lb bombs were found near the wreckage of an F-8 fighter.  Engineers destroyed these bombs after friendly units had cleared the area.  The following morning Company C searched the final objective, another Royal Tomb, crossed the Song Huu River by small boats, and returned to the Cumberland Area. To assist Company C in searching this area, a PF platoon and contingent of local police officials, Kit Carson and S-2 Scouts, scout sniper and scout dog teams were attached.

            Especially noteworthy was the excellent working relationship established between the combined control headquarters, and the ARVN and USMC units participating in the operation.

29        The Battalion Commander attended a conference at Headquarters; Fourth Marines to discuss plans for the withdrawal from Cumberland Area.  A five day phase out period was tentatively established, all units would displace on a time schedule, destroying fortifications and remove as much of Class IV material as possible between the 15^th and 20^th of September.

30        Another operation was conducted with Popular Forces in the Royal Tomb (YD 748122) searching for enemy forces or installations.  Prior to daybreak a rifle platoon from Company A cordoned off the Royal Tombs and later a platoon of Popular Forces entered and searched the tomb with negative results.  Popular Forces were also utilized during August to provide security to various groups of local Buddhists celebrating religious festival within the northeastern portion of the Cumberland Area.

            Frag Order 2-67 was issued for a two company (-) sweep by Company B and D along the sides of the MSR from Grid Line 63 to 68 to be conducted on 1 September 1967.  Two recon teams arrived at the Battalion CP and were inserted by foot north and south of the MSR by late afternoon in order to be in position to provide screening and surveillance for Company B and D on 1 September.

Sniper teams were used in the eastern portion of the OA in the vicinity of the Bridge and Rock Crusher sites, where observation and field of fire were best.  Sniper teams occupied OP’s during the daylight hours and employed the Starlight Scope during darkness.  One three-day patrol was conducted north and west of the Bridge Site from 29-31 August, utilizing seven snipers, one interpreter in addition to a fire team for security.  The Starlight scope was also utilized on patrols, ambushes and in perimeter defense.

From three to seven scout dogs were employed in the OA during this reporting period.  These dogs were used on ambushes, patrols and with the convoy reaction squad.  During periods of extreme hot weather, scout dog activities were reduced because of the dogs’ ineffectiveness during this period.

Increased friendly patrol activity north of the Pontoon Bridge/Rock Crusher complex, uncovered numerous caches of documents, arms, equipment, and approximately 4000 pounds of rice.  In the vicinity of the Fire Support Base, squad and platoon sized patrols discovered evidence of enemy activity and movement throughout the area, to include the location of bunkers, OP’s encampments, equipment and booby traps.

3. Training.  Training during the reporting period consisted of classes in map reading, compass, counter ambush immediate action drills, M-16 rifle, mines and booby traps, scouting and patrolling, individual weapon safety instruction, personal response, and fortification construction, M-16 rifle, M-60 machine guns and M-79 grenade launchers were continually FAM fired throughout the month.

Difficulty is experienced in providing time for training, due to the tactical commitment of the battalion.  Efforts will be continued to improve training procedures and methodology during the coming months.  In most instances, training was conducted on the Squad or Fire Team level.  Operational commitments certainly provide many opportunities for concurrent training in all phases of general subjects.

4. Casualties inflicted on the Enemy.

                        NVA/VC KIA (conf)               6

                        NVA/VC KIA (prob)              4

5. Friendly casualties sustained.

                        KIA                                        0

                        WIA                                        18

                        Non-Hostile deaths        0

                        Died of wounds                  1

6. New techniques employed.  See discussion in the following paragraphs.

                        Paragraph 2               Operations

                        Paragraph 14             Air Support

                        Paragraph 15             Fire Support

7. Equipment.  The following is a report of major items of equipment readiness.
8. Motor Transport.

M422 to 3^rd Echelon                    4

M274A1 code X                              15

1. Communication.  Equipment at Third echelon or higher maintenance that has not been returned

                                    Radar Set AN/TPS-2                      1

                                    Radar Set* AN/PRC-47                  1

                                    Control Group AN/GRA-39           1

                                    Signal Converters TH-5                 3

                                    Radio Set AN/PRC-25                      3

The below list of requisitions for major items of equipment, are pending.

                                    Control Group AN/GRA-39          1

                                    Tool Kit AN/USM-15                       1

                                    Multimeter AN/UPM-105             1

                                    Test Set AN/GRM-55                      1

                                    Radio Set AN/PRC-25                     6

8. Logistics.  The Fire Support Base (FSB) was enlarged to include LSA-2 and units of 1^st Field Artillery Group.  For the first five days of the reporting period, the battalion S-4 coordinated all resupply; subsequently LSA-2 provided this service for the remainder of the reporting period.  All units were resupplied by truck during August.

The supply situation for the period was adequate.  The battalion mess served three hot meals at the CP location, two hot meals at FSB, and one hot meal each evening to Company D and the troops at the Pontoon Bridge Site.  During this period the battalion drew 42,000 meals combat individual, 340 sundry packs and 480 cases of assorted juices.

Class II supplies were issued as appropriate; however, the following items were either in short supply or NIS:

            Utilities (small and medium sizes)              M-16 magazines

            Utility covers                                                  Canteens

            Compass, lensatic                                        Towels (green)

            Undershirts                                                    Jungle boots (all sizes)

Interim movement of men and material was handled by four M-35 trucks attached to the battalion from the 3^rd Motor Transport Battalion.  No serious transportation problems existed during this period.  It should be noted that three M-37 trucks are new organics to the battalion yet no increase in T/O for drivers has been approved.

9. Civil Affairs.

On 7 August 1967, the battalion civil affairs officer represented the Battalion Commander at a religious festival held by local Buddhists at a small temple near the Royal Tomb (YD 755133) Upon the request of these Buddhist, local Popular Forces and Marines provided security for the Vietnamese celebrating the Autumn Festival at various temples in the eastern portion of the Cumberland Area.

10. Psychological Warfare.

During the reporting period the battalion’s Psychological Warfare programs consisted of leaflet drops (six), loudspeaker broadcasts both on the land and by air (ten hours).  The broadcasts mainly concerned the Chieu Hoi program and also information of regards program offered for enemy equipment and information.  These efforts resulted in information on four rice caches, one booby trap, location of a VC camp that resulted in one VC/KIA (conf), two VC/WIA’s and one weapon captured.  Additionally aforementioned program contributed to the capture of VC documents and ammunition.

The Psychological Warfare Officer attended the PSYOP’s Conference at III MAF on 29 August 1967.

Future plans include a modified Country Fair at Thon Dhe Bay.

11. Personnel and Administration.  The administrative rear was located at Phu Bai during the reporting period.  The repair and replacement of office machines continues to be a critical problem area.  At the close of the reporting period, each rifle company was averaging approximately 10 men below M/L, which included an average of 15-20 no effectives.  The battalion is presently 8 officers below M/L in MOS 0302.

Personnel losses and gains during the reporting period.

                                                            USMC                     USN

            Losses.                                 Off/Enl                Off/Enl

            Battle                                      0/1 (DOW)           0/0

            Non-battle                           0/0                          0/0

            Admin                                     8/203                      0/4

            Total                                        8/204                      0/4

            Gains                                        0/95                          0/0

The following awards were presented during the reporting period:

            Silver Star Medal                                1

            Bronze Star Medal                              1

            Navy Commendation Medal           1

            Purple Hearts                                        42

The number of disciplinary cases acted upon or pending action is as follows:

            Court Martial

                        Completed – Summary     4

                        Pending – Special                1

                        Article 32 – Forwarded to GCM authority for review

            Non-Judicial Punishment

                        Battalion Commander           5

                        Company Commander            14

Morale is excellent.  The Battalion received R&R quotas to Okinawa, Manila, Tokyo, Hong Kong, Bangkok, Penang, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, Hawaii, and Taipei.  Adequate PX facilities were available to those personnel located at Phu Bai and mobile PX runs were made to the Cumberland Area.  Postal services continue to be satisfactory.

The Battalion Chaplain held Protestant services at the five locations within the Operation Cumberland OA.  Catholic services were provided by Father Hunkins, MCB-3 Chaplain, and Father Filmeyer, 4^th Marines Regimental Chaplain.

12. Intelligence.
13. Enemy.  The enemy avoided large-scale engagements with friendly forces during the reporting period.  Contact was made with small groups of 5 to 10 VC in the form of meeting engagements, which were of short duration.  There were two separate mortar attacks during the reporting period, Company D at YD 686093, and Company A at YD 620093.  Both attacks were in marginal daylight hours, either at dawn or at dusk.

There were several enemy contacts along Route 547.  The enemy took the resupply convoys under fire going to and returning from the Fire Support Base.  The enemy usually employed an anti-tank rocket, RPG-2 (B-40) in addition to small arms fire.  Tanks and trucks in the convoy were the primary targets of the attacks.

While enemy ambushes were employed toward the western end of route 547 within our area of operations, the enemy also employed mines at the eastern end of the MSR in the vicinity of grid squares 7311 and 7412.  M1A1 mines were used, and on one occasion the enemy had RPG-2 rounds in the proximity of these mines for a sympathetic detonation effect.  Enemy sightings consisted of small groups of VC.  Booby traps of the ChiCom type and homemade devices were found in the Battalion OA, but not in significant numbers.

1. Terrain.

(1)               Key Terrain in the battalion AO consists of the bridge site at YD 755144, the CP/Artillery position at YD 717106, the Forward Fire Support Base at YD 620093 and the road (Route 547).  The hills that parallel Route 547, which are not physically occupied, but which can be controlled by the two (2) artillery bases are also considered by terrain features.

(2)               Avenues of Approach.  These include the valley, running east to west along Route 547, approaches along the Song Huu Trach River, running west to east from YD 636090 to YD 755134, and approaches along the Song Ta Trach River running south and north from YD 680050 to YD 686090.

(3)               Cover and Concealment.  The terrain runs from sea level to high mountains and provides a variety of cover and concealment.  In the eastern portion of the Cumberland OA there is medium cover and concealment in the relatively low, sparsely vegetated foothills. To the west, excellent cover and concealment is provided by tall, thick jungle canopy in the high mountains and valleys.  Observation and fields of fire are virtually nonexistent in the jungle canopy.  At the eastern end of Route 547, fields of fire and observation are considered good.

1. Weather.  Temperatures ranged in the high 90’s, with humidity averaging 80% during the entire period.  There was an increase in rainfall during the second half of the reporting period, intermittent showers and three heavy rainfalls.
2. VC Suspects detained and enemy equipment losses.

VCS                                                                     1

AT mines detonated/destroyed              12

Bunkers destroyed                                       21

Rice Captured                                                 9,000 lbs

AP mines detonated/destroyed              3

Ammo Captured (small arms)                300 rds

Weapons Captured (AK-47; MAS-36)        2

ChiCom Grenades destroyed                           8

13. Medical and Dental.
14. The total number of visits to the Battalion Aid Stations during the month of August was 896.
15. Prevalent and significant medical entities encountered during the reporting period.

Diarrhea                                          21                        Headaches                31

Gastro enteritis                            12                         Fractures                  3

Malaria                                             13                        Sprains                       14

Fungal Infections                         40                        Tonsillitis                25

Dermatitis                                        55                        Shrapnel wounds    7

Otitis                                                    29                        Dog bites                    2

Cellulites                                            16                        Scorpion bites           4

FUO (fever unknown origin)     23                        Venereal warts          23

1. Consults were as follows:

Dental                         73

Orthopedic                16

Neuralgic                     2

EENT                            10

Urologic                       16

Venereal                       17

Neuro-Psychiatric    6

1. Consultations were sent as follows:

Company A, 3^rd Medical Battalion       117

Naval Support Activity, Da Nang              2

1. Venereal Disease during period were:

Gonorrhea (new cases)                            4

Non-Specific Urethritis                           2

All suspected and confirmed VD cases were given a Serology Test for Syphilis in accordance with MANMED 22-18 and the results entered in the individual’s Health Record.

1. Malaria prophylaxis was continued with weekly administration of chlorequine, primaquine tablets.  There were thirteen confirmed cases of malaria during the reporting period.
2. Due to the prevalence of malaria and high fever of unknown origin at the Fire Support Base, the Division Surgeon and PMU section held inspections in this area.  Results were essentially negative, with the exception of need for super chlorination of all water trailers and water cans. This has since been accomplished.  At present, a serologic study is underway to determine the origin of FUO’s.  Routine measures for prevention of insect bites being stressed.
3. There isn’t a ward at the Battalion Aid Station at this time. Ten (10) men are on light, limited or no duty at present.
4. Complying with Division Order P6000.4D, for (4) Sanitary Inspections held during this period in the battalion area, and appropriate action initiated to correct the discrepancies.  In addition to providing medical treatment to patients, and combat casualties the Battalion Aid Station personnel were involved in a construction and improvement program for the Battalion Aid Stations in the Cumberland Area.
5. Air Support.  During the reporting period, med-evacs by air accounted for a good percentage of the total usage.  Evacuations were handled efficiently and with dispatch.  Night med-evacs were aided by the use of field expedients for landing zone illumination, with air liaison teams providing terminal control.

Observation of the Cumberland Area improved over previous reporting periods.  In addition to aerial reconnaissance missions, aerial observers were utilized in support of scheduled truck convoys, control of artillery fire missions, and for tactical air strikes.  Air support was also utilized for covering truck convoys, with control provided by a FAC team on the convoy, in addition to an airborne FAC. If fixed wing aircraft are on station when enemy contact is made, the on-station aircraft will drop napalm on the egress routes of the withdrawing enemy forces, while a reaction force from the convoy would pursue, attempting to trap the enemy against the wall of flames.

Aerial reconnaissance missions provided intelligence on enemy positions, trail complexes and in one instance an enemy troop concentration.

Air transportation passengers to Phu Bai, Camp Evans, and other points, were handled by scheduled helicopter.  Helicopters were frequently used for resupply of critical items or when convoys were not available.  One heliborne lift was made during reporting period, which consisted of 240 U.S. and ARVN troops.  The lift went smoothly with one CH-46 unable to complete the mission due to mechanical difficulties.

Total Sorties

                                                TAC (A)                        43 hours

                                                Troop lifts                   1

                                                Med-evacs                   70 (19-night 51 day)

                                                Fixed wing strikes     7

                                                Resupply                        8

                                                C&C                                  13

15. Fire Support.  During the reporting period, the 1^st Battalion 4^th Marines developed and implemented the ‘rolling barrage’ for truck convoy support, determined that Route 547 was as much as 800 meters north of what the map indicates, and prepared comprehensive counter mortar plans for all positions.  Additionally, the 3^rd Marine Division approved the Fire Support plan submitted on the Rock Crusher/Pontoon Bridge complex, to be implemented upon termination of Operation Cumberland.
16. Fire support was required daily for 30 to 40 trucks that usually received small arms and RPG fire along Route 547.  The danger areas were hit with preparation fires immediately before the convoys departed.  As the convoy proceeded, rolling artillery barrages spaced as close as 100 meters apart and fired in series of five or more, were kept approximately 75 meters to the north and south of Route 547.  These fires were controlled by an artillery forward observer assigned to the convoy.
17. Route 547, the main road through the Cumberland Area, was discovered to be in error as much as 800 meters to the north, from its map location in certain areas.  As a result, 800 meters was adopted as the Danger Close standard for all supporting fires in the aforementioned areas. Forward observers were instructed to keep the adjustment rounds even further away than this when using the road as a reference.
18. Two counter-mortar plans were prepared for all defensive positions in the Cumberland Area.  One plan to be used in cases when the direction of the mortar attack was unknown.  It established a series of targets around the entire position (360 degrees) each of which was to be attacked with zone and shifting fires by a single pre-designated artillery or mortar piece.  The second plan was designed to be used when the direction of attack became known.  The area adjacent to each position was divided into eight quadrants with the defensive position at the center.  When the direction of attack become known each artillery and mortar piece would shift to a predetermined target within the quadrant and deliver zone and shifting fires until the attack ceased or the enemy mortar position was located.
19. The 3^rd Marine Division approved the battalion’s plan for a combined USMC/ARVN fire support in defense of the Rock Crusher/Pontoon Bridge.  The two ARVN 105mm howitzers, now located at the Nam Hoa sub–Sector Headquarters, will be supplemented with a USMC artillery liaison team.  USMC will provide the unit with 105mm ammunition, in support of the Rock Crusher/Pontoon Bridge complex.  During the reporting period the 1^st Battalion 4^th Marines received direct artillery support from the six 105mm howitzers of Battery G, 3^rd Bn 12^th Marines, and from two 155mm howitzers of Battery L, 4^th Bn 12^th Marines.  During the period the following missions were fired in support of the 1^st Battalion 4^th Marines.

(1)               Unobserved

(a)               H&I                 1290

(b)               FFE                  141

(2)               Observed.

(a)               Targets of opportunity    75

(b)               Counter mortars                 6

(c)               Illumination                          0

(d)               Registration                           0

(e)               FO school                                 0

16. Communication.   Communications was continuous for the period covered. The FM circuits active during the period were the battalion TAC #2, the Battalion Admin, regimental TAC #1, Artillery COF, and TACP local.  The Regimental Command frequency was tested on several occasions with satisfactory results. During the reporting period, time was divided in support of Operation Cumberland, maintenance of equipment, and training of new personnel.

Internal and external wire communications were satisfactory.  Trunk lines to Division, 4^th Marines and 1^st Bn 4^th Marines rear were operated in conjunction with hot lines from 1^st Bn 4^th Marines COC/FSCC to 4^th Marines COC and Division FSCC through the AN/TRC-27 shot to Hill 180 (Phu Bai).

The battalion message center continued to operate from the Cumberland CP. Teletype communications was superimposed on the 4^th Marines trunk but due to numerous equipment failures courier service became the primary means of traffic delivery.

            Message totals were:

                        Classified Courier                                   Circuit

                         Incoming        457                             Incoming        178

                          Outgoing        2                                  Outgoing        13

                           Unclassified Courier                               Circuit

                                    Incoming        318                             Incoming        63

                                    Outgoing        1                                  Outgoing        5

August

10        The Battalion experienced frequency difficulties utilizing the KY-8 on Regimental TAC #1 primary.  The problem was resolved by switching to the secondary frequency, some 28 megacycles lower than the primary.

12        A long wire local, 2500 meters in length, was installed between Delta Company and the Battalion CP.

15        The new Division COI was introduced with little difficulty experienced on the use of new, double voice call signs.

19        Communications for the Rock Crusher site was established on the Battalion TAC net #2 using the call sign MEEK JANE – Zulu.

22        The Battalion Admin net became the Convoy control net for the Cumberland Area.

23        A long local, 5000 meters, was installed from the Rock Crusher site to the Battalion CP.

25        1^st Battalion 4^th Marines participated in a combined Marines Corps – Vietnamese Army operation in the Nam Hoa area.  A secondary frequency was requested from 4^th Marines for Company C as frequency problems were anticipated on Company C’s TAC.  There was only one tenth of a megacycle difference between Company C TAC and the ARVN Company TAC.  No problems arose and the frequency was not utilized.

            Heavy static and intermittent signals were encountered on Battalion TAC #2.  Relocating antenna sites, switching equipment and replacing remote lines failed to improve the situation.  When the equipment was used on the other frequencies at our disposal.  We had no difficulties.  Additional attempts to use the frequency on 26 August were not successful.  The weather for the operation was hot and humid, with heavy rains the night of 25 August through early morning of 26 August.

Lack of accessories for the new FM series of equipment is hampering effective Operational employments:  Example; this battalion is short 33 H-138 handsets.

1. Major equipment failures evacuated to third echelon or higher maintenance that were repaired during the reporting period.

Items                                                            Quantity

Radio Set AN/PRC-25                                   5

Radio Set AN/TPS-21                                    1

Radio Set AN/MRC-87                                  1

Radio Set AN/PRC-47                                    1

Teletypewriter AN/TGG-14A (V)               1

1. Equipment Repaired Locally:

Radio Set AN/PRC-25                                  10

Radio Set AN/PRC-47                                   1

Radio Set AN/PRC-41                                    1

Teletypewriter AN/TGG-14A                     1

This page last corrected 26 August 2011