29 November 1967

From:        Commanding Officer

To:            Commanding General, 3^rd Marine Division (Rein), FMF

Via:           Commanding Officer 4^th Marines

Ref:          (a)      Maps: Viet Nam, 1:50,000, AMS series L7014, Sheets 6541 I and 6541 II.

1. Code Name.  Operation Cove
2. Dates of Operation.  180845H – 211800H Nov 67.
3. Location:  Thua Thien Province, Phu Loc District, RVN
4. Task Organization.

                        1^st Bn (-)(rein) 4^th Mar        LtCol E.A. Deptula

                        H&S Company (-)                  1^st Lt Fagersten

                        Company A (rein)                  Capt Thompson

                        Company B (rein)                  Capt Wirsching

                        Company D (rein)                 Capt Weede

                        1^st Tm, Co A, 3rd SP Bn

                        Det, HQ Co, 4^th Marines (Sniper Teams)

Direct Support Units

                        Det, Co B, 3^rd Engr Bn

5. Supporting Forces.
6. General.  Artillery and Air were the primary supporting forces utilized in Operation Cove.  Air was used in a resupply and med evac role.  Movement into the operating area was by helicopter.  The Battalion Fire Support Coordination Center (FDCC) continued to operate in accordance with current doctrine.  Artillery support was responsive and effective.
7. Artillery.  Direct fire support for the 1^st Battalion 4^th Marines on Operation Cove was provided by G Battery, 3^rd Battalion 12^th Marines.  Three sections of the 1^st Battalion 4^th Marines 81mm mortar platoon was also employed in direct support.  Both artillery and mortar support were responsive and accurate throughout the operation.

(1)               The following missions were fired in support of the 1^st Battalion 4^th Marines on Operation Cove.

(a)            Observed               81mm          G Btry

                  FFE                               18                  7

                  Illum                              2                 1

(b)               Unobserved

FFE                                7                12

H&S                             38                49

Registration              0                  0

1. Air.  During the principal portion of the operation, mountainous terrain, with a high canopy, prevented the establishment of LZ’s.

Med-evacs were accomplished by external lift from a hover.  All the requests were filled, with a total of four emergency, three priority and seven routines accomplished by this method.  Additionally, two routines were evacuated from a landing zone on the low ground at the completion of the operation.

Resupply was accomplished in drop zones and in one LZ.  Four exceptional night resupply sorties were accomplished in answer to an emergency request, old shell holes, which were numerous throughout the area, were used for these zones.

Only one air strike was called, this being controlled by a TACP, resulting in ten sampans destroyed.  The air strike consisted of UH-1E gun ships and given a BDA of 80%/85%.

1. Communications.  Communications were satisfactory throughout the entire operation.  On 17 November a MRC-109 with two operators was dispatched to Hill 130 in the Phu Loc area to establish a relay site for communications with the rear at Phu Bai.  This net was utilized primarily to pass admin traffic.  However, on the 20^th of November, due to unit separation and difficult terrain, the relay station passed traffic between our units in the field.  This proved most satisfactory to maintain contact between units.  We experienced some mutual interference between the Artillery COF and the Battalion TAC nets, but this problem was resolved by placing the radios a greater distance apart.

Wire communications were provided on the first and second nights for internal and external security.  Due to the close proximity of the Battalion CP and the Company CP, there were no problems encountered.  On the third night, wire was strung between the Battalion CP and the Company B CP, a distance of about 300 meters.  The TA-1, as in the past, proved very unreliable at this distance.

Five days supply of KAK-PX and KAK-QX sheets were issued initially.  One message center man brought an extra five days supply in the event they were needed.  Due to the operation securing earlier than anticipated, resupply of these sheets was not necessary.

6. Intelligence
7. Enemy Situation.  Agent reports and sightings by recon inserts during November indicated that a buildup of enemy forces was in progress in the OA.  The forces were believed to be well armed and well-disciplined and were further believed to be main force VC.  Later reports, just prior to the start of the operation, placed the headquarters elements and four companies of the 2^nd NVA Battalion in the OA.  In spite of the reports, it was expected that enemy forces encountered during the operation would not exceed platoon size and that he would not fight decisive combat but would limit his action to small unit harassing tactics.

The enemy encountered during Operation Cove is believed to be main force VC.  There was no identification made of enemy units during the operation.  Contacts with the enemy consisted of meeting engagements with from two to six men.  The enemy utilized individual weapons and crew served RPD light machine guns.  On one occasion 60mm mortars were used against a friendly patrol.  During one meeting engagement the enemy employed an RPG, but due to the dense canopy the effect was negligible.

1. Cover and Concealment.  Concealment in the OA was excellent due to the dense undergrowth and the high canopy.  Cover was considered good with the many trees and large rocks providing adequate protection.
2. Observation and Fields of fire.  Observation and fields of fire were limited throughout the OA and at best, could be considered fair.  The dense growth and canopy hampered both observation and fields of fire for distances in excess of 10 to 15 meters.
3. Obstacles.  The natural steepness of the terrain and the dense vegetation are obstacles themselves and impede troop movement greatly.  Rate of movement was between 300 and 500 meters per hour.
4. Avenues of approach.  These include the large valley running southeast into the mountains from GS ZC 0799 to GS ZC 0895 and the low paddy lands in the southern part of the OA, ending in GS ZC 1397.
5. Weather.  Temperatures averaged from the low 80’s to the high 60’s.  Humidity averaged to 90% and the visibility was five miles.  Rain occurred nightly in the form of moderate showers and winds were mild throughout the operation.
6. Mission. 1^st Battalion (-) 4^th Marines commencing L-hour, D-day will conduct search and destroy operations in assigned operating area in the vicinity of Phu Loc, to capture/destroy enemy logistic caches, installations and materials, obtain intelligence, and kill or capture enemy personnel.
7. Concept of Operations. The 1^st Battalion (-) (rein) 4^th Marines, moves by truck convoy to the staging area in the vicinity of the Phu Bai Airfield.  At L-hour on D-day the 1^st Bn (-) (rein) 4^th Marines lands three companies in LZ Falcon by helicopter.  After securing LZ, two Companies and Command Group conduct search and destroy operations toward Regimental Objective A and one Company conducts search and destroy operations toward Regimental Objective C.  On order, sweep NW toward blocking positions D and E.  Be prepared to continue Phase II on order.
8. Execution. Companies A, B and D and Command Group departed Camp Evans at 171400H November 1967 and moved by truck convoy to the Phu Bai Staging area, arriving at approximately 171630H November 1967.

            November

18        At 0845H, the helicopter lift commenced.  The first wave touched down at 0918H in LZ Falcon.  The lift was completed at 1048H.

                        At 1530H, Company B arrived at Objective 2.  No contact.

19       Company A, at coordinates ZC 120968, found five huts with bunkers built underneath the huts.  All were fairly old and did not appear to have been used recently.  They checked the huts and bunkers with negative results.  Company D engineers destroyed it at 1222H.

            Company A, at 0935H at coordinates ZC 118972, received approximately 10-15 rounds of S/A fire and one grenade from an estimated two VC.  Returned fire with S/A, A/W, M-79 and artillery mission.  Results were two friendly WIA (non-evac).

            At coordinates ZC 118972, Company A found three bunkers four feet long, three feet wide and three feet deep.  They appeared to be old but were still in good condition.  Destroyed in place.

            At 1400H, Company A received five rounds A/W fire at coordinates ZC 119971.  An artillery mission was called in and the results are unknown.

            At 1420H, Company A received approximately 15 rounds A/W fire from an estimated two VC at Coordinates ZC 116971.  Fire was returned with S/A, A/W and an artillery mission.  Results were unknown.

            At 1430H, Company B reached Regimental Objective C.

            The 2^nd Platoon, Company A at 1525H, at coordinates ZC 116971 received approximately 15 rounds of S/A fire from an estimated two VC.  Returned fire with S/A and an artillery mission, results unknown.

            At 1645H, Company A secured Regimental Objective A.

            At 1652H, Company B returned to Objective #2.

20. At 1042H, forward elements of Company D reached Objective A.

At 1045H, the 1^st and 2^nd platoons of Company D at coordinates ZC 118972, received approximately 25 rounds of S/A fire and 10 rounds of 60mm mortar fire from an undetermined number of VC at coordinates ZC 118966.  Returned fire with S/A and artillery mission and checked area with negative results.  The contact resulted in 11 friendly WIA.

At 1130H, Company A found one bunker and one dud 105mm round in the vicinity of coordinates ZC 115976.  Attached engineers destroyed them in place.

At 1245H the 1^st Platoon, Company D received approximately 60 rounds of S/A fire from an estimated two VC at coordinates ZC 119966.  They returned fire with approximately 150 rounds of S/A and 4 rounds of M-79.  The enemy broke contact.  Our units checked the area with negative results.

At 1300H, Company B reached Battalion Objective 3.

At 1500H, Company B reached Objective A.

21               At 0825H, Company D med-evacs were completed.

At 1220H, Company B received approximately 30-40 rounds of A/W fire from an estimated 3-4 VC with two RPD LMG’s at coordinates ZC 097783.  They returned fire with 300 rounds M-60, 20 rounds M-79, 250 rounds S/A and an artillery mission.  The action resulted in one friendly KIA and 2 WIA.

At 1300H, Company A found 10 fighting holes at coordinates ZC 097983.  They were approximately 1-2 weeks old.  No action was taken.

At 1450H, John Brown 6 visited Southern 6 to deliver CG 3^rd Mar Div message 201615Z Nov 67 canceling Phase II of Operation Cove.

At 1500H, Company C chopped opcon from 2/26 to 1/4

At 1630H, 1^st Platoon, Company C, provided security for a truck convoy to pick up Company A and the Alfa Command Group.

At 1800H, Companies B and D and the Bravo Command Group chopped opcon to the 3^rd MarDiv.  Operation Cove terminated as of 1800H.

At 1830H, Company A and the Alfa Command Group arrived at Phu Bai.

10. Results.
11. Friendly Losses.

(1)               The following is a recapitulation of friendly casualties sustained by the 1^st Battalion 4^th Marines during Operation Cove covering the period 18 November 1967 to 21 November 1967.

                                                                                      USMC             USN

                                                                                    Off/Enl            Off/Enl

                                                KIA                                0/1                   0/1

                                                WIA                               1/13                0/1

                                                MIA                               0/0                   0/0

                                                DOW                            0/0                   0/0

1. Enemy Losses

VC/NVA/KIA (C)             0

VC/NVA/KIA (P)             0

VC (C)                                 0

Bunkers destroyed           14

Sampans destroyed         10

11. Administrative Matters. The Battalion was assembled at Phu Bai prior to Operation Cove.  Initial supply was drawn at the LSA at Camp Evans.  Two DOS was the prescribed load.  An LSA was established at Phu Bai to Support Operation Cove.
12. Resupply requests were channeled through the S-4 to the LSA via the HST.  Classes I and V were provided at the LSA.  Class II was drawn at the Battalion supply and delivered to the LSA for transportation to the Operational Area.  All aspects of supply and resupply were very good.
13. Maintenance was adequate and 3^rd Echelon maintenance was performed by FLSG-A.
14. Treatment of Casualties, Evacuation and Hospitalization.

(1)               First echelon medical care was performed in the field by corpsmen attached to the line companies.  Those patients who required further treatment, but not hospitalization was treated by a portion of the BAS in the Field, consisting of the Battalion Surgeon and six Corpsmen.  Those in need of further care and/or hospitalization were evacuated by helicopter to A Med, 3^rd Medical Battalion at Phu Bai.

(2)               There were 96 patients seen at the Battalion Aid Station during this period.

The following is a breakdown of the casualties for the period.

            KIA              1             Marine enlisted

            WIA             1             Marine Officer

                                 1              Navy Enlisted

                               13             Marine Enlisted

(3)               Medical Evaluation.  Difficulty with respect to adequate and immediate medical care was minimal during Operation Cove.  Evacuation of casualties was prompt and reliable.  Medical resupply presented no significant difficulty.

1. Transportation was adequate.  Helicopter (UH-34) transportation was utilized during the operation.  The only vehicular transportation that was used was to pick up Company A and the Alfa Command Group at the conclusion of the operation.
2. Special Equipment and Techniques. No special equipment or new techniques were used during Operation Cove.
3. Commanders Analysis.
4. General.  Operation Cove was characterized by slow movement through low to medium canopy with dense undergrowth.  Enemy activity consisted of harassing attacks with small arms, automatic weapons and mortars.  The heavy undergrowth restricted observation to such an extent that flankers had difficulty in maintaining visual contact and consequently had to be kept relatively near to the main body.  This resulted in a significant advantage to the enemy who could hear the companies as they cut their way through the undergrowth toward the assigned objectives.  The VC were able to choose positions near the established trails from where they could conduct harassing attacks on the moving units and quickly withdraw.   Despite this advantage, however, the movement of companies through the undergrowth rather than on trial networks undoubtedly saved Marine lives as the trails were covered by well-constructed fighting holes and bunkers.
5. Lessons Learned.  Prior to D-day, personal liaison was affected between the Commanders and Staff of the Battalion and HMM-362, the unit providing helicopter support for the lift into LZ Falcon.  This pre-D-day liaison included a walkthrough of the selected staging area and ready circles as well as agreement on possible alternate LZ’s.  The result of the liaison was a smooth, efficient lift into LZ Falcon.
6. CA/PSY Ops Activities.  No civic action was conducted as the Battalion’s OA was in an unpopulated area.  Psy Ops for Operation Cove were conducted at Regimental level.
7. Recommendations. Whenever possible, prior to helicopter borne operation, close liaison should be conducted between the helicopter unit and the supported unit.  A mutual exchange of views and a discussion of the details of the lift will minimize confusion and enhance the success of the operation.

This page last corrected 29 August 2011