Fire Support

1. The 1^st Battalion 4^th Marines entered November with a full-strength Forward Observer Team for each Company.  Their state of training was characterized by experience among the enlisted FO’s and inexperience in the Officer FO’s.  The movements out of FSB Argonne in the second week of November provided the initial field operations for each FO Team leader.  This inexperience of FO team leaders accounted for the rough edges in technique they exemplified the first few days in the field.

These initial problems were compounded by difficulties with communication.  Only Company C’s FO team has more than one PRC-25.  This created problems when a team was split between perimeter security and patrol fire support.  Also, this posed the danger of the one good radio failing.  The Artillery Liaison Officer had been unable to obtain a functioning radio from Battery G/3/12.  It has had to borrow radios from this Battalion.

The greatest problem had been procuring timely fire support; in too many cases artillery support has been ineffective due to the long delays involved in clearance.  This has been exemplified in every type of mission; illumination, active enemy troops, counter-mortar, prep fires and suspected enemy positions.

Two steps were taken to remedy the situation.  For illumination missions the canister impact clearance has been disregarded as a formal matter and left up to the discretion of the Artillery Liaison Officer.  The first Counter-Mortar Fire in November took 40 minutes; when Plan Tiger and Alpine were installed 1^st Battalion 4^th Marines received Counter-Mortar Support in less than five minutes. This quick response was largely due to skipping 4^th Marines Savor-Plane clearance; air safety was coordinated on the Battalion level between the Artillery Liaison Officer and the Forward Air Control with good results.

Yet, as the Battalion enters December the problem of untimely Fire Support is not resolved.  Tactically dangerous delays remain, due to slow Regimental Air Clearance, even when the Battalion Artillery and Air Liaison Officers are in coordination.  The most notorious examples of this have been when the supporting arm of artillery was held in check fire by supporting air – when it fact the Battalion was attempting to coordinate the two for a single mission.

My first suggestion for better Artillery Support is for a speed up on 4^th Regiment Saver-Plane Clearance on all missions.  Similarly, an improvement in Artillery Support would be achieved if more authority for Artillery-Air coordination was given to the Air Liaison Officer and Artillery Liaison Officer at Battalion level, where the sense of urgency is greatest.

1. Missions fired during the month of November are as follows:
2. H&I’s – 996
3. Observed Fires – 297
4. Unobserved Fires – 42
5. Illumination – 18
6. The observed fire missions fell into the following categories: confirmed and suspected enemy positions, night defensive fires and preparatory fires.

Due to heavy and dense foliage, surveillance was limited.

This page last corrected 2 September 2011