Fire Support – December 1968

 

Fire Support

  1. Each Forward Observer Team entered December with experienced enlisted men and experienced Officers at their lead.  Three of the four teams have performed adequately while Co. C’s FO team had shown to be lacking in technique.
  2. Through the month there was an acute radio shortage, making it difficult to split FO teams between Companies CP’s and patrols.  However, the last week of December the battery sent enough radios to the field to substantially reduce the problem.  More radios are expected.
  3. Timely fire support was seldom achieved because of lengthy clearances.  This occurred in two separate settings.  The first was when the Battalion operated in its own AO out of Fire Support Bases Alpine and Neville.  For a typical five-day period, the elapsed time between Battalion clearance and artillery first rounds averaged 57 minutes.  Slow Sav-a-Plane clearance was the prime reason for the delay.  Untimely fire support was demonstrated in the second half of December when the Battalion was operating in the Task Force Bravo AO.  Firing on a confirmed enemy OP with direct fire of tanks, 37 minutes elapsed between Bn clearance, and the higher clearance needed.  By the time fire was received the enemy was gone.

The continuing problem of untimely fire support is rooted in the lack of clearing authority at the Battalion level, which is the closest to the tactical situation.  It is recommended that the Battalion have the final responsibility for clearance of direct fire missions.  Every effort should be made to ensure that the AO boundaries will not run close to operating units, because fires across AO boundaries cause additional clearing delays.  Also, the Battalion should be given the responsibility to by-pass Sav-a-Plane clearance in tactical situations warranting it.  The Battalion can coordinate between the artillery liaison officer and the Forward Air Controller.

  1. A tactical danger was discovered at Alpine.  Night defensive fires had been adjusted in using the customary ‘platoon one’; a battery fire for effect in daylight had not been observed.  After three days Btry India/3/12 sheaf was observed as 800meters to 1000meters wide.  This was too radical for close fire support.  Btry I took corrective action, and the Battalion now requires sheaf checks on all supporting batteries.
  2. Missions fired in support of 1st Battalion 4th Marines.
  3. H&S – 394
  4. Illumination – 11
  5. Adjusted – 73
  6. Prep Fires (observed) – 16

This page last corrected 30 August 2011