Air Support/Defense
Section VIII
- Air Support – During the month of December, air support requirements consisted almost entirely of helicopter resupply. Approximately 50% of all helicopter requests were not fulfilled. Aircraft availability and weather conditions were the primary factors contributing to the lack of support. All emergency evacuation requests were fulfilled.
- Air support requests
- resupply – missions requested-87, missions completed-42
- evacuation – missions requested-1, missions completed-1
- tactical (recon) – missions requested-3, missions completed-2
- Fixed Wing Transport – none
- Air Strikes
- Mission’s requests – 2, missions completed-1 (CAP)
- Air Defense – Air defense measures employed by the Battalion are passive. No organic weapons are available for active air defense.
- Problem Areas
- The centralized control exercised by III MAF does not expedite the allocation of aircraft. Higher Headquarters requires all air requests be submitted at least 48 hours prior to any operation. However, Wing does not release its Frag Order indicating allocation of aircraft until between 1000-2400 of the evening prior to the operation. This highly impractical, in as much as the Troop Commander is unable to rely on Air Support during his operation. During Operation Trident (27 December 1965) initial troop mount out was scheduled for 0500-0530. Not until 0130H of that same morning was the air support request confirmed.
- It is recommended that consideration be given to the feasibility of aircraft located within the Chu Lai Enclave being controlled by the ADC. Supporting arms controlled by a Headquarters relatively far removed for the Operating Enclave does not seem to be the most practical or Operationally Efficient method.
This page last corrected 18 September 2011