19 December 1965

From:       Commanding Officer

To:            Commanding Officer, 1^st Battalion, 4^th Marines (rein)

Subj:         Combat After Action Report

Ref:  (a)           RegtO 3120.3

Encl:    (1)            Overlay of the Operation

1. Search and Clear Operation of Company C.
2. Duration of operation from 0800 to 1700 on 18 December 1965.
3. Location.  Hoa Xuan Island, Ly Tin District, Quang Tin Province.
4. Command Headquarters.  1^st Battalion, 4^th Marines (-)(rein).
5. Reporting Officer.  Company Commander, Capt John C. Gillman 065255 U.S. Marine Corps.
6. Task Organization.

Company C (-) (rein)

Artillery FO Team

FAC Team

Interpreter

PF Squad (From Ky Ha Village)

Det, 106mm RR Platoon

Det, 81mm Mortar Platoon

Det, Company B, 3^rd Engr Bn.

Det, H&S Company (Sniper Team).

7. Supporting Forces.

Coastal Defense Fleet 15

Battery H, 3^rd Bn, 12^th Marines

2^nd Platoon, Company A, 1^st AmTrac Bn

8. Intelligence.
9. Anticipated enemy strength at the objective was a Local Force Platoon of 20 men.
10. Actual enemy strength is unknown.  The only contact was occasional harassing fire.  The following evidence of enemy activity was observed.

(1)               BT 436162 – A right angle trench, both legs 20 meters long and 1 meter deep.

(2)               BT 435162 – A T-shaped trench.  The leg of the T ran east west, was 80 meters long and 1.5 meters deep.  The top of the T ran north south was 40 meters long and 1 meter deep.

(3)               BT 425158 – In this vicinity a fence with a strip of punji stakes was observed running east west for about 300 meters. The fence was made of branches from thorn bushes and the strip of stakes was at the widest 1 meter in width.  It was a very flimsy obstacle.

(4)               BT 422155 – A high sand ridge at this location.  The ridge was U-shaped, the closed end pointing northeast.  A fighting trench ran along the E ridge for 35 meters.  It was 2 feet wide and averaged one meter in depth.  The northern leg of the U had fighting holes.  A series of man traps ran along the outer edge of the fighting positions.  The holes were 1x1x1 meter with two-foot punji stakes inside the hole camouflaged with a bamboo lacing covered by sand.  The mantraps were slightly depressed by the heavy rain and therefore visible if one was looking for mantraps.  The position had 800 meters of grazing fire to the north and 1500 meters to the east.  Signs indicated two men had occupied the position the morning of the 18^th.

(5)               BT 428147 – A trench line running northwest southeast on hill, 200 meters long and 1 meter deep.  It offered excellent observation and fields of fire to the north and northeast.  There were several one man fighting holes forward of the trench.

(6)               BT 427139 – BT 428138 – A trench one meter deep.  On northeast edge of trench obstacle consisting of two thorn bush fences with a one-meter strip of punji stakes between them.

(7)               BT 433144 – BT 437153 – A trench had been constructed by digging out the trace of the trail to a depth of about 2 feet and throwing all the dirt on the southeast side to form a parapet.  There were numerous firing positions on the parapet and on or adjacent to the northwest side of the trench.

(8)               Mission.  Company C (-) (rein) commencing at H-hour on D-Day moves to objective area, Hoa Xuan Island, lands and conducts search and clear operations along the village complex of Hoa Xuan (1).

(9)               Concept of Operation.

(a).          One platoon moved by Coastal Defense Fleet 15 to vicinity (BT 407155) debarked and established blocking position vicinity (BT 415158).

(b).         Company C (-) (rein) moved by LVT to vicinity (BT 438163), landed and conducted a search and clear operation along the Hoa Xuan (1) village complex.

(10)          Execution.

(a)         13 December – Received Battalion Operation Order 226-65.

(b)                 18 December

  (1)        0800 – blocking force and sweep force landed at assigned locations and moved inland.  Sweeping force occupied high ground at BT 436161 and BT 437157.

  (2)        0900 – Blocking force in position at (BT 415158).  Sweep commenced.

  (3)         1100 – Sweeping force reached (BT 425158) and set up block.  Original blocking force commenced sweeping east.

(4)        1215 – Sweeping force and blocking force linked up.

(5)       1230 – Commenced 2 platoon sweep to south using 2 axes of advance (See encl.1).  CP group with 1^st Platoon on left.

(6)       1245 – 1^st Platoon reached hill at (BT 428147).  Took one round of harassing fire from vicinity (BT 427141).  Caught glimpse of one man running away.  Immediate investigation revealed 2 sets of tracks, which disappeared in water filled paddy.

(7)       1315 – 1^st Platoon and CP group reached (BT 427139).  No radio contact with other platoons.

(8)       1345 – 2^nd Platoon blew up mantraps at (BT 422155).

(9)       1430 – 1^st Platoon commenced sweep to northeast.  CP group remained at (BT 427139) to await 2^nd Platoon.

(10)     1445 – CP group received several rounds harassing fire from (BT 425139).  Returned fire but remained in position in expectation of 2^nd Platoon arriving in rear of shooters however they disappeared just prior to arrival of 2^nd Platoon.

(11)     1455 – 2^nd Platoon arrived at position of CP group.

(12)      1510 – 2^nd Platoon and CP group moved out to northeast.

(13)      1600 – Company consolidated at (BT 437157).

(14)      1700 – Commenced return to Battalion area via LVT.

(c)                 Company Corpsmen were prepared to conduct limited MEDCAP, but no persons were encountered who were in need of treatment.

(d)                 Platoons distributed copies of PSY War leaflets 10-65 and 15-65 to all civilians encountered, and left copies in each house searched.  Approximately 500 of each were handed out.

(11)          Results.  Seven VCS were brought back and turned in.

(12)          Administration Matters.  No comments.

(13)          Special Techniques.  No comments.

(14)          Commanders Analysis.

(a)                    No major problems were encountered.

(b)                    No new lessons learned.  As on other occasions inaccurate harassing fire was received from 500-800 meters.  Enemy fired only one of two rounds so that their position could not be located.

(c)                     Prisoners were evacuated to a Central Processing Point and the interpreter was left at that position.

(15)          Recommendations.

(a)                     In future operations in the same area recommend using more and smaller units.  In view of the lack of enemy contact, squad size units would be most appropriate.

 

This page last corrected 18 September 2011