Intelligence Report – February 1967

 

Intelligence

  1. General. During the reporting period the Battalion was the Landing Force Element of the amphibious ready Group/Special Landing Force, with Headquarters embarked aboard the USS Iwo Jima.

Between 4 and 6 February, the BLT took part in Exercise Mud Puppy III. During this period all personnel in the S-2 section participated in the training exercise.

On 13 February, the S-2 section began preparation of the Intelligence Annex to Operation Order 2-67 (Deckhouse VI).

On 16 February, the Battalion Landing Team commenced ‘Operation Deckhouse VI – Phase I’, in Duc Pho District, Quang Ngai Province, Southern I Corps. On 26 February, at approximately 1200, ‘Deckhouse VI – Phase I’ terminated.

  1. Recapitulation of enemy activity for ‘Deckhouse VI Phase I and II (Feb 27-28)
  2. VC initiated                                    62                             21
  3. USMC initiated                              56                             11
  4. Total incidents                              118                             32
  5. VC KIA (conf)                               204                             77
  6. VC KIA (prob)                              395                            113
  7. VCC                                                 1                               0
  8. VCS                                               50                              20
  9. Weapons captured or destroyed               12                         2
  10. Supplies destroyed                                    20 (Tons)             5 (Tons)
  11. Fortifications destroyed (incl bunkers)      167             145
  12. Nest or tunnels destroyed                         201                 0
  13. Punji traps destroyed                                33                   0
  14. Booby traps destroyed                              84                 14
  15. Caves destroyed                                       10                   0
  1. ChiCom grenades destroyed                    68                  11

On 27 February, at approximately 0200 hours, the Battalion Landing Team commenced Operation ‘Deckhouse VI – Phase II’, approximately 10 kilometers north of Phase I operating area. The Battalion Landing Team was still actively engaged in Phase II of ‘Deckhouse VI’ at the end of the reporting period.

  1. After-action Report to Operation ‘Deckhouse VI – Phase I’.
  2. Enemy Strength and Situation – Prior to Phase I.
    1. Enemy Situation. The area of operations was classified as a major resupply and rest area for the VC. Insurgent forces committed in the area of operation for Phase I were identified as follows:
      • (1) 7th Bn, 22nd NVA Regt, 3rd NVA Div strength – 350
      • (2) 8th Bn, 22 NVA Regt, 3rd NVA Div. strength – 250
      • (3) Elements of the 409th Sapper Bn strength – unknown
    2. Enemy Capabilities. It was anticipated that the enemy would avoid heavy contact, making maximum use of darkness to exfiltrate the area. He was expected to mine landing zones and avenues of approach in and near his installations and facilities. It was determined that it would be unlikely that he would defend or attack in any strength because to do so he would have to mass and move his troops, exposing them to friendly supporting arms and aerial observation.
  3. Enemy Strength and Situation. During Phase I. During the first phase of the operation, Local Force units up to platoon level were encountered. Heavy sniper fire was received by Marines throughout Phase I. The enemy appeared to be deployed in delaying or defensive positions and would expend numerous rounds of small arms and automatic weapons when contact with Marines was inevitable. There were no incidents where Marines received enemy fire from crew served weapons during the first phase of the operation.

Several enemy documents were captured, but there were no units identified in any of the captured documents or from any other intelligence sources.

There were two significant items of intelligence value gained during Phase I. One, throughout the operation the enemy continually displayed the tactic of immediate removal of weapons from his casualties thereby limiting the number of captured weapons to a misappropriate number in comparison to the casualties he suffered. Two, on many occasions Marines encountered primitive and hastily constructed punji pits, surprise firing devices, and mines. On one occasion several tail fin assemblies were located, and it was determined that these fin assemblies were possibly crude mortar tubes. In conclusion the enemy was considered poorly equipped and utilized ‘homemade’ armament.

  1. Topography and Climate.
    1. Terrain, Cover and Concealment.
      • (1) The terrain encountered consisted of populated hamlets, rice paddies, moderately dense jungle in rugged hills, with intermittent streams throughout.
      • (2) Cover and Concealment. Cover and concealment was afforded the enemy in populated areas, not only by the use of man-made objects, but also by intermingling with the local populace. Cover and concealment was predominant in the rugged hills as provided by dense undergrowth.
    2. Obstacles and Critical Terrain Features.
      • (1) The principal obstacles to foot and vehicular movement were the rugged hills, vegetation, and numerous streams.
      • (2) Critical Terrain Features.
        • (a) Phase I. Objectives 1, 3 and 5 were critical terrain features during Phase I. Objectives 1 and 3 overlooked avenues of approach and suspected enemy routes of infiltration/exfiltration. Objectives 1 and 3 offered good observation and added to the successful utilization of supporting arms. Objective 5 was occupied during Phase I because it afforded good observation of Green Beach. In addition Hills #49 (BS 893294) and 25 (BS 898306) provided good observation and vantage points for the use of supporting arms. Hill #25 was of particular importance as it provided excellent observation and security for both the BLT CP and adjacent Landing Zones/beach.
        • (b) There were no critical terrain features encountered during Phase II within the Battalion TAOR.
  1. Observation and Avenues of Approach.
    • (1) Coastal plain. Observation and fields of fire in rice paddies was good to poor. Restrictions on observation included tree stands, ditches, and the height of the rice plant. Avenues of approach included National Highway #1 and small trafficable streams.
    • (2) For the most part, the vegetation on the hills was discontinuous canopied forest with dense undergrowth, which afforded observation, which was at best 5 meters. The scattered areas of continuous canopied forests, with light to moderate undergrowth, offered observation up to a maximum of 30 meters.
  2. Weather.
    • (1) Scattered light rain showers, mostly in the early morning and late afternoon, occurred during the time period of the operations.
    • (2) Visibility was unrestricted except during the periods of early morning fog and rain showers when it was reduced to approximately 3 to 5 miles.
    • (3) Temperatures in the operating area ranged from a 60 degrees minimum to an 85 degrees maximum.

 

This page last corrected 27 August 2011