Intelligence

 

1. General.  Between 4 and 15 March, the Battalion was involved in a phase of replenishment and transfer of supplies and equipment.  The Battalion Headquarters was located at the SLF Camp, NAS Subic Point, P.I.

On 16 March, the Battalion embarked aboard the USS Princeton (LPH-5).

From 17 to 19 March, the Intelligence Section was engaged in writing the Intelligence Annex to Operation Order 3-67 (Beacon Hill 1). The Battalion commenced Operation Beacon Hill I on 20 March and terminated the Operation on 1 April.

1. Recapitulation of enemy activity for Beacon Hill I (20 March-1 April)
2. NVA initiated 35
3. USMC initiated 39
4. Total incidents 74
5. VC/NVA KIA (conf) 351
6. VC/NVA KIA (prob) 619
7. VCC 0
8. VCS 9
9. Weapons captured or destroyed 51
10. Supplies destroyed 0
11. Fortifications destroyed (including bunkers) 22
12. Feet of trenches destroyed 550
13. NVA pack captured or destroyed 43
14. AT mines destroy 22
15. 81mm Mortar tubes, base plate, with 3rds ammo 1
16. ChiCom grenades destroyed 106
17. After-action Report to Operation Beacon Hill I.
18. Enemy Situation and Capabilities – Prior to Operation Beacon Hill I.
19. Enemy Situation. Enemy ground units in the objective area were identified as the 5^th and 6^th Battalion, 812^th Regiment; 7^th and 8^th Battalions, 90^th Regiment; and the 1^st Battalion, 31^st Regiment (All NVA). In addition there was also a guerrilla force of approximately 2000 men operating independently throughout Quang Tri Province.
20. Enemy Capabilities. It was anticipated that the enemy could attack isolated units and outposts with up to Battalion strength, delay friendly forces and defend the operating area with forces locally available, and attack our HLZ’s with mines and AW/SA fire.
21. Enemy Situation and Tactics –During Operation Beacon Hill I.
22. Enemy Situation. From the first contact with the enemy it was apparent that he was regular NVA, armed with heavy caliber mortars; 82mm and 120mm.

Captured weapons and equipment revealed that the enemy was also supplied with a standardized small arms weapons system (AK-47’s, RPD’s*, SKS’s); wear a definite recognizable uniform, and carried combat field gear (packs, cartridge belts, gas masks, etc) in good condition; all of which were of North Vietnamese origin.

Captured documents definitely identified two of the enemy units; one as the 18^th Company 812^th Regiment, 324B NVA Division, and the other as K-9/3^rd Company, 9^th Battalion.

1. Enemy Tactics. The enemy displayed those tactics usually ascribed to a well-trained regular force. Enemy mortar attacks were conducted from varied and widely separated firing positions, sometime slowing an immediate concentration of friendly fire upon the enemy’s positions.

Defensive positions constructed by the enemy were well-built and reinforced, suggesting that the enemy had been in the area for some time or had unlimited facilities and personnel to use in fortifying his positions.

Offensively the enemy employed the use of initial mortar attacks followed by small arms and automatic weapons fire against friendly companies on the move.

In conclusion it can be said that the enemy was well armed, well equipped and trained to a point well above that of the VC guerilla. He used conventional tactics modified to the point where he attempted to avoid massing his troops, thereby exposing them to concentrated friendly firepower.

3. Terrain and Weather.
   1. Critical terrain features, Cover and Concealment.

(1)       Critical Terrain Features. Two important terrain features were observed within the BLT’s AOA. There were two ridge lines; one running from east to west from YD219746 to YD 197747, and one ridge line running southwest to northeast from YD 161731 to YD 188747. Both ridgelines were used by the enemy as hidden mortar positions for enfilade fire upon the BLT CP and outlying companies.

In the objective area friendly units encountered dense, thick undergrowth which made movement slow and observation poor through the heavy foliage.

In one instance the height of the trees reduced the capability of helicopters to a minimum, subjecting them to intensive enemy fire while maneuvering into the HLZ.

National Route #1 ran through the BLT AOA offering an all-weather vehicle route for resupply, and providing an alternate system of transportation when weather hampered air operations.

(2)        Cover and Concealment. Concealment throughout the Battalion AOA was fair to excellent. Excellent concealment was available in the form of thick, sub-tropical evergreen forest and spacious stands of 8 foot-high elephant grass. Concealment was naturally lessened in the formerly cultivated open areas.

Underground cover was the most feasible protection from mortar attack; however, the dense, continuous foliage offered some protection from small arms.

1. Observation.

(1)        Air Observation. Aerial observation of built-up and adjacent areas was excellent when not hindered by the poor weather conditions, (See para b). Good observation in the outlying areas was marginal in that the thick foliage was a source of natural camouflage.

(2)        Ground Observation. Ground observation was again hindered by weather during the first 3 days of the operation. During periods of clear skies the areas of Objective 3 (YD 172722), Objective 4 (YD 140733), and Objective 5 (YD 133712) were excellent vantage points for observation in all directions.

The denseness of the foliage also had an adverse effect upon ground observation, causing one friendly ground unit difficulty in ascertaining its location while in contact with the enemy.

1. Avenues of Approach. National Route #1, open and trafficable from the DMZ to Dong Ha, was a prime avenue of approach. Other avenues of approach included two loose surface, dry-weather roads, one winding east to west from (YD 095704) to (YD 214727) and connecting with National Route #1; the other winding north to south from YD 158740) at the DMZ to (YD 147603) at the Cam Lo River.

In addition to the roads mentioned above the terrain of the AOA was crisscrossed with many footpaths and trails, of specific importance were those trails running south from the DMZ into the AOA.

1. Weather. From the morning of 21 March to late evening of 24 March, continuous low ceiling and heavy early morning and late evening fog hampered air operations seriously. Air observation was poor, Close Air Support missions were reduced to a minimum, and helicopter operations concerning resupply and especially med-evacs were hampered to the point where some WIA’s became DOWs. The execution of daily search and destroy operations by ground units was delayed until late morning due to lack of air supply and being burdened with WIA’s, not lifted out by helicopters.

From 25 March until the termination of the operation, the weather was — for friendly operations with visibility for 7 to 10 miles with — fog in early morning and evening.

Rainfall during the operation was very slight; temperatures ranged from a 70 degrees minimum to a maximum of 95 degrees. Humidity averaged 80%.

Rainfall and temperature had no adverse effect upon friendly operations.

 

This page last corrected 28 August 2011