Intelligence – September 1968

 

Intelligence

During the month the Battalion participated in two operations, Operation SCOTLAND II (1-17 Sept) and Operation SCOTLAND TROUSDALE NORTH (17-30 Sept).  In the first two weeks, Co. B and a small Command Group were lifted into the vicinity of XD 854473 to find a north-south infiltration route.  In the last half of this month, the entire Battalion was helo-lifted into the vicinity of XD 946687 to operate to the south and east of the Ben Hai River, within the DMZ.

  1. Enemy.
  2. The beginning of the month was characterized by very little to no enemy activity.  In the last twenty days, however, activity increased, and was concentrated in two distinct areas: around Khe Sahn and Lang Vei, especially in the vicinity of XD 8738.  There, numerous Reconnaissance inserts were extracted due to contact with the enemy.  The other area was to the north of the Rockpile, where significant activity and some contact was indicated, especially in the Cam Lo River Valley.  It was thought that the enemy was operating in and to the north of that area, and that Marine activities had disclosed their operations by a large enemy force.  The result of this, it was thought, was that the enemy was making a retrograde movement.  Our unit was displaced from VCB to the Ben Hai River, vicinity of XD 946687 to sweep and block.  Our effect was to surprise and explicit the unit in the area by denying them the freedom of movement they had enjoyed, and by uncovering large caches of enemy equipment, ordinance and armament.
  3. At no time did we receive incoming from heavy direct and indirect enemy weapons.  However, in the first three days of Operation SCOTLAND TROUSDALE NORTH, the Battalion captured one NVA, killed one NVA, observed one Chieu Hoi and the overall impression, indicated by freshly used trails, fully equipped packs recently abandon, large caches and every recent road building activity, was that the enemy had been surprised and had dispersed into hiding.  The prisoner and Chieu Hoi also indicated that because of our prep fires, a large number of their troops in the 19th Battalion of the 320th NVA Division had been wounded or killed.  Vehicular traffic was audibly detected but units checking the suspected areas after artillery fire missions had negative findings.
  4. On 3 September, Co B found a large east-west trail in the vicinity of XD 876469, showing heavy foot usage and a capacity for vehicular traffic in most places.  Co. B also had contact with enemy on 1 Sept which lasted 15 minutes resulting in 2 NVA KIA and one NVA POW.  The prisoner was from K5 Company and his mission was trail security as well as to attack Marine positions on Hill 950 or 1015.  He indicated that enemy morale was low because of significant losses to malaria, friendly artillery and air strikes, and poor food re-supply.  The POW stated that two companies are in the vicinity of XD 8147.  The infiltration route is well concealed from the air.  There is an excellent, well camouflaged water point in the vicinity of XD 876469.
  5. The period following this was one of almost no enemy activity.  But because of the indicated buildup of the 320th NVA Division to the north of the Rockpile, this Battalion, on 17 September, was helo-lifted to the Ben Hai River in the vicinity of XD 946687.  The results of our activities over a two-week period, especially during the period 18-23 September was the capture of a POW, a Chieu Hoi, one NVA killed and a myriad of enemy trails, roads and several training and bivouac areas, all yielding enemy equipment, armament and ordinance.  The most significant indication from this was that well-constructed routes of advance, taking advantage of cover and concealment, with periodic rest, re-supply and training areas were being constructed in an atmosphere of relative safety in the DMZ.  The prisoners were well indoctrinated, informed, equipped and in good health.  We learned from them that the enemy planned to move after the beginning of the monsoon on objectives to the south:  Cam Lo, Quang Tri and Dong Ha.  At the same time, they confirmed road activity to expedite re-supply to Laos and Cambodia, and that there was a large tank capability poised for an offensive.  There was comm. Wire and solid construction of bunkers and training areas, indicating a permanence which had not been indicated before.  We denied them this area and we received marginal enemy harassment.
  6. Weather.  The month of September began with generally clear weather.  But within the first seven days of the month there was 20.7 inches of rain at VCB.  Following this were alternating days clear-cloudy and cloudy to precipitation.  During the last two weeks, while on Operation SCOTLAND TROUSDALE NORTH, the Battalion experienced no rain on the 17th, 18th, and 19th rain from the 20th to 24th and no rain or intermittent rain from the 27th to 30th.   The rainstorms during the month were characterized by heavy precipitation and high winds.  The days without rain were characterized by high temperatures and slight winds.
  7. Terrain.  During the SCOTLAND II activities in the first half of the month, the terrain in the vicinity of XD 876369 was characterized by large hills, ranging from 450-600 meters steep, with rapidly flowing stream beds.   The terrain in Operation SCOTLAND TROUSDALE NORTH, covering XD 9269 to XD 9665, was characterized by sharply sloping hills and brief valleys.  The altitudes ranged from 60 meters at the Ben Hai River to 430 meters at Dong Khi, vicinity of XD 924653.  Specifically, the slope was from 30 degrees to as much as 70 degrees, and the foliage from very thick 10-foot elephant grass and vines near the Ben Hai River, vicinity of XD 9468 to triple canopy 60 foot high near Dong Khi and in the Hill 247, vicinity of XD 962666.  Generally, the foliage was very thick and the Battalion remained on established trails.  The streams were located in the valleys and were clear and flowed rapidly, and water points not located on the map were submitted for future operations.
  8. Enemy Equipment Captured or Destroyed
  9. Small Arms Ammunition
  10. Chi-com type 56 cartridges – 391,791
  11. .50 caliber cartridge – 73,500
  12. Shotgun shells – 16
  13. Weapons
  14. Chi-com 7.62mm assault type 56 (AK-47) – 9
  15. Chi-com 7.62mm carbine type 56 (AK-44) – 6
  16. Soviet 7.62mm rifle M-1891/30 – 320
  17. Soviet PPSM M-1941 (light submachine gun) – 3
  18. 7.62mm Gun RP-46, with spare barrel – 1
  19. Soviet 7.62mm semi-automatic carbine SKS – 4
  20. Spare barrel, Chi-com 12.7mm heavy MG type 54 – 2
  21. Mortar, Recoilless Rifle and Rocket Ammunition
  22. 60mm mortar rounds – 80
  23. 82mm mortar rounds – 1,011
  24. 81mm mortar rounds – 360
  25. 75mm Recoilless Rifle rounds – 395
  26. 122mm Rocket Warheads – 126
  27. Soviet Anti-tank Grenade Launcher (RPG) – 16
  28. Mines, Demolitions and Explosives
  29. Anti-tank mines – 208
  30. Claymore mines – 288
  31. TNT – 200 pounds
  32. Blasting caps – 310
  33. Chi-Com grenades – 21
  34. Equipment
  35. Chi-Com grenade belts – 1,000
  36. Bandoleers – 5,000
  37. Rifle slings – 3,000
  38. Rice – 700 pounds
  39. Shovels, picks, hoes, crowbars – 65
  40. Packs with equipment – 20

This page last corrected 3 September 2011