Operations/Training

147617. Mission.  During the period 1-31 May 1967 the 1^st Battalion 4^th Marines was OPCON to the 9^th Marine Regiment.  The period 1-20 May the Battalion (-) was located at Con Thien outpost and from 21-29 May 1967 at YD 147617.  Operations and/or activities worth note on the dates indicated.

May

1-16                    The Battalion continued mission of defending Con Thien Outpost with 2 rifle companies and the Alpha Command Group and clearing a 300-meter-wide area around Con Thien.

17-29                9^th Marines Operations Order 5-67 (Operation Hickory) directed the Battalion to continue assigned mission at Con Thien and reinforce 1^st Battalion 9^th Marines on order.

29                         The Battalion was relieved in place by elements of 2^nd Battalion 3^rd Marines at YD 147617 and returned to Dong Ha Combat Base.

1. During the period 1-29 May Company B remained OPCON to the 12^th Marines providing security for the Composite Arty Battalion at Gio Linh.  On 11 May the 3^rd Platoon Company D reinforced Company B IAW* 9^th Marines verbal instructions.
2. On 7 May the Battalion rear relieved 1^st Battalion 9^th Marines as coordinator for ambushes in Sector I of the Dong Ha Base Defense and assumed operational control of CAC 1, 2, 3 and one platoon from D/1/9 at Cam Lo Bridge.  With the additional requirement it became necessary to activate another combat operation center under control of the Bravo Command Group.
3. At 0245H on 8 May Companies A and D with the Alpha Command Group at Con Thien came under an intensive 82mm mortar attack, followed by a ground attack from the east in Company D sector.  Sapper units breached the wire under cover of the mortar barrage with Bangalore torpedoes and moved small units inside the wire.  These small elements were heavily armed with satchel charges and TNT charges and used them to blow bunker and trench lines.  At approximately 0400H, two Battalions of NVA attacked the perimeter through the breach made by the sapper units.  Those NVA units were armed with flamethrowers, RPG rocket launcher and various assortments of small arms, explosive etc.  The attached Engineer platoon was moved to reinforce Company D’s right flank where the attack seemed to be centered.  All 81mm illumination was utilized.  Artillery illumination could not reach Con Thien from their position at Gio Linh.  A flare ship arrived after some delay and provided illumination until daylight.  Company A was directed to send a platoon reaction force to assist Company D as well as escort two LVT’s and an M-42 with ammo resupply.  Enroute to Company D’s right flank these vehicles came under fire and the M-42 and one LVTH was struck by RPG rockets and set afire trapping several personnel inside.  The other LVTH was set afire with a satchel charge.  The penetration was limited and the breach in the perimeter was closed just prior to day light, cutting off the escape route of those enemy elements inside of the wire.  By approximately 0900H all of these elements were either killed or captured.  Tanks and LVTH-6’s firing Beehive and conventional ammo inflicted heavy enemy casualties both during the attack and during the withdrawal.  The enemy was caught in the open crossing the recently cleared strip and provided an excellent target for direct fire weapons.  After the area had been cleared of enemy stragglers and helicopters could land, evacuation of the friendly casualties began.  The Battalion and supporting elements suffered 44 KIA’s and 110 WIA’s as a result of this attack.  During the remainder of the day enemy bodies and equipment were collected. 226 enemy bodies were buried and covered by bulldozer.  8 NVA were captured and returned to Dong Ha.  43 AK-47’s, 19 RPG’s, 2 flame throwers, 1 radio, 400 lbs explosive, and over 100 ChiCom grenades were collected in and around the perimeter.  Company D was relieved in place by Company C late the afternoon of 8 May and returned to Dong Ha and relieved 1/9 of Sparrow Hawk responsibility.
4. During period 9-21 May the units at Con Thien (Now Companies A, C and Alpha Command Group) began receiving artillery fire daily from the north and northeast direction.  Companies A, C and Command Group also received mortar fire from the east and southeast.  Resupply by helicopters drew artillery and mortar fire so heavily the resupply had to be affected by aerial delivery.  Engineer work on the clearing around Con Thien was slowed considerably due to harassing enemy artillery and mortar fire.  The frequency of artillery fire increased almost daily through 17 May.  On 12 May the Battalion Commander was wounded for the third time and evacuated.  The Battalion XO took command of the Battalion.  On 13 May Major R.C. Bell arrived and took command of the Battalion.
5. At 170001H May Operation Hickory began after 1/9 made heavy contact approx 2000 yards south and southeast of Con Thien.  This was a multi-Battalion operation designed to clear the area around Con Thien of NVA elements. The Battalion’s mission was to continue defense of Con Thien, finish the cleared strip around Con Thien outpost and be prepared to reinforce 1/9 on order.
6. At 211200H May the Battalion was relieved in place at Con Thien by 1/9 and moved to vic YD 147617 to provide security for the 9^th Marines Regimental forward CP and Artillery Battalion at that location.
7. On 29 May the Battalion was relieved in place by elements of 2/3 and return to Dong Ha by convoy.  Company B at Gio Linh was relieved in place by F Company 2/9 at 291300H.  2/9 relieved 1/4 (rear) of base defense responsibility of Sparrow Hawk, OPCON of CAC units and the security platoon at Cam Lo Bridge.
8. On 30 May the Battalion chopped OPCON to the 4^th Marine Regiment and began movement to the 4^th Marines operating area vicinity of Phong Dien, RVN.
9. Training.  Due to the tactical commitments during the entire month no formal military training was conducted.  Replacements assignments to the Battalion were briefed by the Battalion Executive Officer drew and FAM fired M-16 rifles and was sent to the field to join their assigned units.
10. Training Problems Encountered.  Due to the immediate need for replacements in the field it is felt that adequate familiarization, care and cleaning, etc. of the M-16 rifle could not be given new replacements prior to joining their assigned units.  Although this training would normally be accomplished prior to new replacements being assigned to units in the field, it was not possible to do so during May because of the immediate need for replacements for Rifle Companies in the field.

This page was last corrected 29 August 2011