10 December 1967

From:        Commanding Officer

To:            Commanding General, 3^rd Marine Division (Rein), FMF

Via:           Commanding Officer, 4^th Marines

Subj:        After Action Report

          Ref:     (a)       Maps: Viet Nam, 1:50,000 AMS Series L7014, Sheets 6442 II and 6441 L

1. Code Name.  Operation Neosho
2. Dates of Operation.            061700H November 1967-172400H November1967 and 221000H November –251000H November 1967.
3. Location.  Thua Thien Province, Phong Dien District, RVN.
4. Task Organization.

            1^st Bn 4^th Marines (rein)               LtCol            E.A.            Deptula

            H&S Company                                   Capt              R.G.            Nunnally

            Company A (rein)                            Capt             A.K.            Thompson

            Company B (rein)                            Capt             R.F.            Wirsching

            Company C (rein)                            Capt            O.B.            Renfro

            Company D (rein)                           Capt            R.D.            Weede

            Det, HQ Co, 4^th Marines (sniper Team)

            Det, Co B, 3^rd Engr Bn (Demo Team) (9-10 November)

            Det, 3^rd Recon Bn (Scuba Team) (9-10 November)

5. Supporting Forces.
6. General.  Artillery and Air were the primary supporting forces utilized in Operation Neosho.  Air was used mainly in a resupply and med-evac role, although helicopters were utilized to lift the Battalion into our OA during the first part of the operation and to extract Company B from the Co Bi Thanh Tan Valley.  The Battalion Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) continued to operate in accordance with current doctrine.  Artillery support was responsive and effective.
7. Artillery.  The 1^st Battalion, Fourth Marines engaged in Operation Neosho from 6 November to 17 November, received general artillery support from G Battery and H Battery, 3^rd Battalion 12^th Marines and P Battery and T Battery, 4^th Battalion 12^th Marines.  No problems were encountered in any phase of fire support during this period.

The following missions were fired in support of the 1^st Battalion 4^th Marines during Operation Neosho.

                                                   Observed                 Unobserved

        Targets of opportunity   26            H&I         325

        Illumination                          3            FFE             7

                  FFE                                  0

1. Air Support.    During Operation Neosho the Air Team provided a FAC capability for convoys, participated in all Company size or larger operations, scheduled liaison and C&C flights and coordinated three troop lifts.  On 9 November, 3 Companies and a Command Group were helilifted into the Song Bo River Valley to conduct a one-day search and destroy operation.  With only 24 hours advance notice, planning and liaison were completed between the Battalion and HMM 263, the supporting squadron.  The lift commenced at 0740 from a loading zone near Highway One adjacent to the Camp Evans access road.  At 0815 the last elements of the Battalion were landed on two sand bars along the river.  On 10 November, during a steady rain with limited visibility and a low ceiling, the Battalion was flown back to Camp Evans.  On 14 November, Company B was extracted from a rice paddy area, swollen by heavy rainfall.  Two H-34’s shuttled Company B four miles from the loading zone to the landing zone at Camp Evans.  The lift took a total of 90 minutes.  No major problems were encountered during Operation Neosho.
2. Intelligence.

(1)              Enemy.  The enemy encountered during Operation Neosho was local force VC.  Enemy tactics consistently included use of snipers and booby traps.  These were no major engagements.

(2)              Terrain.  Terrain consisted of rolling type hills covered with waist high brush.  Numerous streams and rice paddies were found throughout the OA.

(a)               Terrain Features.  Key terrain features in the OA included the Song O Lau River which flows from the Southwest to the Northeast portion of the OA and Route #1 which runs in a Northwest to Southeast direction in the north of the OA.  At the southern portion of the OA, generally running East to West is a steep ridgeline, which controls the entire Co Bi Thanh Tan Valley.

(3)              Observation and fields of fire.  These are considered good to excellent in the Camp Evans area.

(4)              Cover and concealment.  Concealment in the area is considered fair to good due to the waist high vegetation; however, cover is limited.

(5)              Obstacles.  The primary obstacle in the area is water.  The rivers, streams, now swollen with the monsoon season, are formidable obstacles to all movement.

(6)              Avenues of Approach.  The principal avenues of approach are the Rach My Chanh River, Song O Lau River and the Co Bi Thanh Tan Valley.

(7)              Weather.  Temperatures ranged from the high 80’s to the low 70’s during the first part of November.  An increase in rainfall was noted as the monsoon season drew near.

7. Mission.  4^th Marines Frag Order 51-67 directed the 1^st Battalion 4^th Marines to conduct search and destroy operations in the OA, to conduct patrol and ambush operations to interdict enemy lines of communications in the OA and to be prepared, on order, to assume any of the missions assigned to the 3^rd Bn (-) 26^th Marines.
8. Concept of Operations.  The 1^st Battalion 4^th Marines with four rifle companies conduct search and destroy operations in the OA, conduct patrol and ambush operations to interdict enemy lines of communications in OA and be prepared to assume any of the missions assigned to the 3^rd Battalion 26^th Marines, on order.
9. Execution.  In accordance with 4^th Marines Frag Order 51-67, the 1^st Battalion 4^th Marines with Companies A, B, C and D conducted aggressive search and destroy operations, ambushes, patrols and small unit activities in the Camp Evans area.

            November

6           At 1700H, commenced Operation Neosho.

8          Company C provided security for Forward Artillery position at coordinates YD 636250 in accordance with Frag order 19-67.

9           At 0740H, commenced helicopter lift IAW Frag order 19-67.

At 0815H, Co A landed in LZ Pelican and B and D Co’s landed in LZ Crane.  Negative contact.

At 1500H, recon insert (Jawbreaker) spotted approximately 20 VC at coordinates YD 587187.  They requested Co A to assist them.  Request was granted.  Negative contact.

Co A found and destroyed 16 sampans throughout the day’s activities.  No significant contact was made with the enemy.

10               Co’s A, B, D and Command group returned to Camp Evans.

11               At 0125H, Company C received approximately 15 rounds of 82mm mortar fire.  Returned fire with 35 rounds of 60mm and 6 rounds of 81mm, results were unknown.  The enemy fire came from Grid Square 6624.

At 1145h, Company B departed Camp Evans IAW Frag order 20-67.

At 1230H, Company D departed Camp Evans IAW Frag order 20-67.

At 1345H, Company C returned to Camp Evans from the forward artillery position.

At 1600H, Company B at coordinates YD 527274 found three bunkers.  The bunkers were covered with dirt.  Estimated 45 VC had been in area.  The bunkers were approximately 6 months old; all were destroyed by demo.

At 1800H, Company B at coordinates YD 542258 found one AP mine blew in place.

At 1930H, at coordinates YD 549250 Company D Starlight scope personnel spotted three figures in the vicinity of YD 556250.  Also heard 3 rounds of S/A fire.  Called an artillery mission and fired 60mm mortars with unknown results.

12               At 0940H, Company D at coordinates YD 556254 found four bunkers reinforced with concrete and two 5½ ‘x 20’ dirt bunkers.  Also found approximately 100 pounds of rice in various types of containers, none of which were commercial. Also found two small animal traps made of bamboo and one wooden toolbox with tools.

At 1255H, Company D at coordinates YD 556252 found one lantern, one tea kettle, assorted garden tools, twelve bunkers reinforced with concrete, VC propaganda sheets hung on walls, 175 pounds of rice, 200 rounds of 7.62mm, linked, 100 rounds of 30 caliber, 1 block of ChiCom C-4 with blasting caps and 60 rounds of AK-47 ammo.

At 1450, Company D at coordinates YD 567254 found one 55 gallon drum of rice imbedded in the ground, a small number of H-30’s, one 81mm mortar round, four U.S. ammo cans filled with rice, one Vietnamese mess kit, two U.S. canteen cups, one U.S. canteen, one ash can with bamboo shoots, one metal box with hammer and other small tools, cooking pots and pans, one insect sprayer, one weaving wheel for making fish nets, two tea kettles and one fish net and assorted small items.  Returned samples of rice and equipment to S-2 and destroyed the rest.

13               At 0910H, Company B at coordinates YD 567248 found three 8’x10’ dirt and log bunkers, one CS grenade, one 3.5 WP round, and 50 pounds of rice.  Destroyed the bunkers and at 0945H permission to destroy the rice was granted by the Regimental S-2.

At 1210H, Company B received approximately 4-5 rounds of sniper fire from an estimated one VC; returned fire with four M-79, approximately 50 rounds of small arms, and 20 rounds of M-60 machinegun.  The VC was estimated to be 400 meters east of Company B’s position.  Searched area with negative results.

At 1600H, the First Platoon, Company D spotted two VC at coordinates YD 519264, wearing ponchos and grass hats and no weapons.  The VC fled in a NE direction after Company D took them under fire.

14               At 0745H, the First Platoon, Company D at coordinates YD 513274 tripped a booby trap while heading west on a trail.  The booby trap was an M-26 grenade in a C-ration can with a tripping device.  1 Friendly WIA.

At 0945H, Company B at coordinates YD 578247, while trying to find a stream crossing, received approximately 50 rounds of A/W fire from the tree line at coordinates YD 578248 and YD 579247 from an estimated 6-7 VC.  Company B returned fire with S/A, A/W, M-79 and M-60; also called artillery mission.  Searched area with negative results.

At 1007H, Company D returned to Camp Evans.

At 1316H, the extraction of Company B by helicopter began.

At 1535H, the last element of Company B arrived at Camp Evans.

15               At 1430H, Company A departed Camp Evans enroute to blocking positions in the vicinity of YD 457358 and YD 468347, in accordance with Frag order 22-67.  Company D provided convoy security for Company A.

At 2030H, Company A reported all units in blocking positions.

16               At 1150H, Company A terminated Frag order 22-67.

At 1543H, all of Company A returned to Camp Evans.

17               Operation Neosho was suspended for the 1^st Battalion 4^th Marines in order to prepare for Operation Cove.

24        Companies A and C and the Alfa Command Group returned to the Camp Evans area to establish blocking position in the My Chanh area.

25        Companies A and C and the Alfa Command Group terminated the blocking positions and commenced movement to Dong Ha Combat Base.

10. Results.
11.          Friendly Losses

(1)               The following is a recapitulation of friendly casualties sustained by the Battalion during Operation Neosho covering the period 7 November to 17 November and 22 November to 25 November 1967.

                                                                          USMC            USN

                                                                        Off/Enl            Off/Enl

                                                KIA                     0/0                   0/0

                                                WIA                    0/3                   0/0

                                                MIA                    0/0                   0/0

                                                DOW                 0/0                   0/0

1. Enemy Losses

VC/NVA/KIA (conf)       0

VC/NVA/KIA (prob)      0

VC (C)                                  0

Bunkers destroyed      33

Sampans destroyed    16

11. Administrative Matters.  While the Battalion was home based at Camp Evans, administrative and logistic support was provided for Platoon and Company size operations conducted in operating areas assigned by the fourth Marines.
12. Supply.  Classes I, III, IV and V were drawn from the LSA at Camp Evans.  Class II was provided by the Battalion Supply located at Phu Bai.  Supplies were adequate throughout this period.  All personnel carried a basic allowance of Class V.  Resupply was normally affected by vehicular convoy; however, on some occasions, helicopters were utilized.
13. Maintenance.  Maintenance was performed on a routine basis.  Second echelon maintenance was accomplished at Camp Evans and third echelon at FLSG-A.
14. Treatment of Casualties, Evacuation and Hospitalization.  First echelon medical care was performed in the field by corpsmen attached to the line companies.  Those patients who required further treatment, but not hospitalization, were treated by a contingency of the BAS in the field consisting of three Hospital Corpsmen.  Those in need of more intensive care and/or hospitalization were evacuated by helicopter to A Med, 3^rd Medical Battalion at Phu Bai.

There were 343 patients seen at the Battalion Aid station during this period.  The following is a breakdown of the casualties for the period:

            KIA             0

            WIA            3 Marine Enlisted

            NBC         12 Marine Enlisted

Difficulty with respect to adequate and immediate medical care was minimal during Operation Neosho.  Evacuations of casualties were prompt and reliable.

1. Transportation.  Transportation was satisfactory during this period with two household trucks provided daily from the platoon of 3^rd Motors attached to the 4^th Marines.  Additional support as required also came from attached Motor Transport Platoon.
2. Communications.  Communications by radio was satisfactory during the period covered.  During the two-day sweep of the Song Bo, RC-292’s was utilized to maintain contact with the rear.  Wire was utilized for CP security during the sweep of the Song Bo River area and proved satisfactory.  KAC-PX and KAC-QX sheets were issued prior to the operation.  Due to the short duration of the operation, resupply was not necessary.
3. Special Equipment and Techniques.
4. Scuba Teams:  During the search and destroy operation along the Song Bo on 9 and 10 November, scuba teams were assigned to each of the 3 participating companies.  The teams checked the riverbanks for caves with underwater entrances while the companies searched from the banks outboard and provided security for the teams.  The companies also had one scout dog team each assigned to them for searching the banks, which were covered with extremely thick undergrowth.
5. Commander’s Analysis
6. General.  With the exception of a two-day search and destroy operation along the Song Bo, Operation Neosho consisted of Company size search and destroy or blocking operations.  The aviation support rendered during the Song Bo operation was considered outstanding.  This was particularly true during the withdrawal phase when the 3 Companies and the Command Group were lifted from the Operating Area under extremely marginal weather conditions.
7. Lessons Learned.   Liaison between the Commanders and Staff of the helicopter unit and the Battalion prior to the Song Bo operation resulted in a smooth helilift into and out of the operating area.  The rapport established between the units resulted in a mutual understanding of capabilities and limitations.

This page last corrected 29 August 2011