6 June 1967

From:        Commanding Officer

To:             Commanding Officer, 9^th Marines

Subj:          Combat After Action Report (Operation Hickory)

 Ref:    (a)        Maps. Viet Nam, AMS Series L7014, 1:50,ooo; Sheets 6442 IV, III, 6342 I, II.

             (b)        9^th Marines MSG 290810Z May 1967

            (c)         3^rd Mar DivO 3100.1C

1. Operation Hickory.  Search and Destroy.
2. Dates of Operation.
3. 170001H May to 282400H May 1967.  Terminated Hickory and continued Prairie IV.
4. Location.  Gio Linh District, Cam Lo District, Quang Tri Province, Republic of South Viet Nam.
5. Task Organization.

1^st Battalion 4^th Marines          Maj            R.C.            Bell

Company A                                   2^ndLt.         D.J.             Campbell (17-21)

                                                           Capt           G.A.            Stern (21-28)

Company B                                   Capt           K.R.            Ramsey

Company C                                   Capt           J.E.             Edwards

Company D                                 1^stLt.          H.L.             Dreston (8-26)

                                                         Capt          A.B.             Crosby (26-29)

Company H&S                           Capt          D.K.             Rumsey

Direct Support Units

                                    3^rd Plt (rein) Co A (rein) 3^rd Tk Bn

                                    4^th Plt, Co B, 1^st AmTrac Bn

                                    Co D, 11^th Eng Bn

                                    Det, Battery B, 1^st Bn 44^th Arty (USA)

                                    Det, 104^th ARVN Engr Bn

5. Supporting Forces.  From 17 May 1967 to 28 May 1967 (Operation Hickory) D Battery, 2^nd Battalion 12^th Marines was in direct support of 1^st Battalion 4^th Marines.  Reinforcing fires were delivered by the 175mm Guns of the U.S. Army 94^th Field Artillery Battalion and Battery K, 4^th Battalion 12^th Marines.  These Batteries were very responsive to the fire requests sent by the forward observers with the companies.  Counter mortar fires were delivered very quickly with results of three NVA Artillery pieces knocked out.  Air observers were controlled directly by the Battalion FSCC and proved to be quite effective in spotting enemy gun positions and troop concentrations.  All supporting fires were requested and controlled by Battalion FSCC.
6. Air Support.  The majority of fixed wing aircraft missions were used in fire suppression of Artillery positions and other suspected positions.  TPQ’s were utilized in this role also, in addition to staging and assembly areas.  The use of TACA proved invaluable for reconnaissance.  Numerous med-evac missions were called as well as resupply missions when the tactical situation permitted.  Support was provided by the First Marine Aircraft Wing.
7. Intelligence.
8. No enemy contact with enemy infantry units was made during the duration of the operation.  Enemy activity consisted of artillery, mortar, and recoilless rifle attacks upon the Battalion Defensive positions at Con Thien (YD 114700).

Crater and fragmentation analysis determined that the enemy fire was of varied caliber, i.e. 82mm mortar, 76mm gun, 82mm RR, and 100mm gun (all of Soviet design) and came from scattered positions in and across the DMZ.

1. Terrain.

(1)       Critical Terrain Features.  These included the high ground at Con Thien, strong point for friendly forces, Hill 56 (YD 114734) used by the enemy and Hill 48 also used by the enemy for mortar and RR attacks upon Con Thien.

(2)        Cover and Concealment.  Thick undergrowth, heavy shrubbery, knee-high to man-high, and elephant grass offered good concealment.  Underground cover and sandbag bunkers were necessary due to lack of natural cover.

(3)        Avenues of Approach.  The main avenue of approach was a 10-kilometer dirt road from Cam Lo to Con Thien.  Others were the firebreak from Con Thien to Gio Linh, and footpaths and trails interlocked in the area to the immediate south of the DMZ.

1. Weather.  The start of the dry season influenced the weather in the operating area.  Rising temperatures with humidity averaging 80%, were the norm for the reporting period.  Visibility was good, with the exception of 3 or 4 days of haze.  Cumulative rainfall was slight, though heavy rain of 1- or 2-hours duration occurred in the mid-afternoon.
2. Mission.  The mission of 1^st Battalion 4^th Marines was to continue providing security for the Engineers clearing a 300-meter strip around Con Thien to open a road to Rt 561 vic YD 137674 and reinforce 1^st Bn 9^th Marines on order.
3. Concept of Operation.  Companies A, C and Alpha Command Group provide security for Engineer operations around Con Thien and provide security for Engineer equipment building the road from Con Thien to Rt 561.  Be prepared and on order to provide reinforcements for 1/9.  Company B remained OPCON to 12^th Marines at Gio Linh Artillery complex.  Company D remained at Dong Ha and provided Sparrow Hawk and 1 platoon to reinforce Company B at Gio Linh.  A rear COC was activated at Dong Ha to control the CAC units and assist in perimeter defense.
4. Execution.  9^th Marines Operation Order 5-67 was issued, and Operation Hickory officially began at 170001H.  On 17 May Company A provided security for Engineer elements cutting the road from Con Thien to Rt 561.  Little progress was made due to the close proximity of 1/9 elements moving toward Con Thien.  1/9 was heavily engaged in the area 2000-3000 meters south of Con Thien and receiving fire from the area between themselves and Company A.  Therefore, Company A pulled back to Con Thien to allow supporting arms to fire in front of 1/9 element.  Con Thien itself received 70-75 round of artillery and mortar fire resulting in 2 FR/WIA.  Non-evac.

On 18 May another attempt was made to continue building the road to Rt 561.  One M-42 struck a mine and had to be towed back to Con Thien.  6 WIA’s were sustained, 2 of which were med-evaced.  After some delay the road was completed to Rt 561 and a link-up was made at YD 137674 at approx 1600 with Engineers and 1/9 element repairing the road from the south.  A battery of artillery then moved to Con Thien to further support operation Hickory.  No enemy artillery fire was received at Con Thien outpost on 18 May.

On 19 May Con Thien outpost received 28 rounds of enemy artillery fire from Vic GS 1178 to 1278 throughout the day.  Fire was returned at the enemy position with Artillery and Air Strikes.  AO reports indicated 2 possible gun positions, were gun positions, and were destroyed by counter Arty fire.  No friendly casualties resulted from enemy fire.

On 20 May Con Thien outpost received 10-12 rounds artillery and varied fire.  Counter battery fire was fired on suspected enemy gun positions.  No friendly casualties were sustained from enemy fire.  The Battalion FSCC assisted in supporting 2/26 moving north across the cleared strip.  Battalion 81mm mortar and attached tanks were used extensively as supporting and counter mortar fire for 2/26.  9^th Marine Frag Order #4 was received directing 1/9 to relieve 1/4 on 21 May.  1/4 would move by convoy to 9th Marine FWD CP (vic YD 144617), assume OPCON of E/2/4, provide security for 9^th Marine CP complex and become Division reserve.

On 21 May preparations were made to comply with 9th Marine Frag Order #4.  Some delay was experienced in the process of relief and was not affected until 1300.  Approximately 10 rounds of mortar fire were received while effecting the relief resulting in 2 FR/WIA, 1 med-evac.  Just prior to the convoy departing 10-12 round artillery fire was receive from the west resulting in 9 FR/WIA’s.  The convoy departed for 9^th Marines CP at 1400H arriving approximately 1500H and assumed OPCON E/2/4.  Companies A and C and Command Group Alpha tied in with E/2/4 and extended the present perimeter 600 meters to the west to include high ground at that location.

The Battalion (-) remained in defensive position around the 9^th Marines CP complex until operation Hickory terminated at 282400H.  E/2/4 chopped OPCON to 2/4 250800H and the Battalion (-) moved inside the original perimeter.  Companies established night ambushes, LP’s and conducted day patrols around the perimeter.  Daily requirements for road sweep security and convoy escort to Con Thien outpost was also accomplished.  Operation Hickory ended at 282400H May and operation Prairie IV continued.

10. Results.
11.         Friendly Losses.

(1)        The following is a recapitulation of friendly casualties incurred by 1^st Battalion 4^th Marines (rein) during Operation Hickory covering the period 17 May 1967 through 28 May 1967.

                                                                         USMC             USN

                                                                      Off/Enl            Off/Enl

                                                KIA                     0/1                   0/1

                                                WIA                    3/32                 0/0

                                                MIA                     0/0                   0/0

                                                DOW                  0/1                   0/0

1. Supply techniques, Combat loads, ammunitions and weapons used by assault troops.

(1)       From 17 May until 22 May 1967 the Battalion was operating on the Gio Lin-Con Thien barrier strip.  All resupply was delivered by air to that location.  On 22 May Companies A and C plus the Command group was deployed at the Cam Lo area.  Resupply to the Cam Lo area was delivered by overland convoy.  No problems were encountered during this period.

(2)       From 17 May until 22 May POL requirements comprised the bulk of weight lifted on resupply.  POL resupply averaged 14,000 pounds per day and was delivered by helicopter.  On 22 May the Battalion moved its operating units to Cam Lo and the POL requirement was deleted.

(3)       All units carried the B/A of ammunition, and no emergency resupply was needed during this period.

1. Treatment of Casualties and Evacuations and Hospitalization.

(1)       First echelon medical care was performed in the field by hospital corpsmen attached to the various line companies.  Following field first aid, those patients requiring further care were evacuated via helicopter to the nearest available medical facility.  The definitive treatment centers being Delta Company, 3^rd Medical Battalion in Dong Ha; Alpha Company, 3^rd Medical Battalion in Phu Bai; Naval Support activity in Da Nang; the USS Sanctuary AH-1 Hospital Ship and the USS Repose AH-16 Hospital Ship.  In addition, the Battalion Aid Station was utilized along with a ‘Forward BAS’ for caring for patients with minor wounds.

(2)       All casualties for this period were processed through definitive treatment centers.  The Battalion Aid Station was not notified of the dispositions, treatment of conditions of the casualties’ med-evaced to commands other than this command.

(3)       There was one Marine killed, five died of wounds, and thirty-five wounded in action from hostile fire reported.  There were an additional five patients admitted to the Battalion Aid Station Ward for non-combat treatment.

(4)       The Battalion Aid Station Ward having 10 beds was utilized for patients not requiring intensive care.  Those patients released from the various medical facilities were treated daily at the Battalion Aid Station and returned to duty as soon as possible.

(5)       There were 344 patients seen at sick call.  Twelve (12) non-combat injuries; two (2) combat injuries were evaced to BAS during this period.  There was one patient from Golf Battery 3/12 and one patient from the U.S. Army treated during this period.

(6)               Significant medical entities encountered were limited to:

Bronchitis                                                2

Diarrhea, Acute                                      12

Influenza                                                   2

Respiratory Infections, Acute          2

Heat Exhaustions                                  1

                                    Gastroenteritis                              3

                                    Fungal Infections                         14

                                    Cellulites                                          17

                                    FUO                                                     3

                                    Fractures                                          1

                                    Sprains                                             24

                                    Perforated Ear Drums                9

                                    Hemorrhoids                                 2

                        Consults were sent to the following facilities:

                                    Company D, 3^rd Medical Battalion           22

                                    Company A, 3^rd Medical Battalion           2

                                    Naval Support Activity, Da Nang             6

                                    USS Sanctuary (AH-17)                                4

                                    USS Repose (AH-16)                                      1

(7)               There were no cases of malaria, scrub typhus or other significant infectious encountered.

363. Transportation.  Transportation was provided by Ninth Motor Transport Battalion and HMM 363.  Transportation requirements were satisfactory throughout the entire period.
364. Communications.  Communications were generally satisfactory throughout operation Hickory.  There was some slight unintentional interference in the late afternoon on FM nets.  KY-8 operations remained continuous.

(1)        Two radio nets remained activated during Hickory.  Battalion TAC #2, provided internal radio communications and Regimental TAC #1, linked the Battalion with Regiment.

(2)        External wire communications provided continuous operations into the 3^rd Marine Division/III MAF telephone system.  Internal wire communications were established at all CP locations.

11. Special Equipment and Techniques.

During the operation an AN/TPS-21 was placed on high ground at the Con Thien outpost.  A sandbag emplacement was built high around the antenna leaving adequate room to operate and still furnish maximum protection from enemy artillery and mortar fragments.  The operators were placed a short distance away in a Conex box, dug into the ground and heavily sand bagged.

On several occasions the AN/TPS-21 detected enemy movement along the cleared strip east of Con Thien outpost.  81mm mortar and artillery fire was immediately brought to bear on the enemy resulting in possible casualties.  In all cases, the screen indicated no further detection or the enemy moving out of the area.  The AN/TPS-21 proved invaluable during this period.

12. Commanders Analysis
13. On 12 May the Battalion rear was required to relieve 1/9 of perimeter defense responsibility and take control of the CAC units and the platoon at the Cam Lo Bridge.  This requirement necessitated opening another COC in the rear and manning four more radio nets. This placed a heavy burden on radios and other comm equipment.  In addition, the rear COC was responsible for coordinating two ambushes in one sector of the perimeter.  All other activities in the perimeter were coordinated by the 9^th Marine COC.
14. The splitting of responsibility for activities outside the base perimeter created a coordination problem involving those activities.
15. The fact that the rear COC had no FSCC or air team available caused undue delay in requesting supporting fires for the CAC units, because of the many agencies these requests had to be routed through before approval.  (i.e. 45 minutes for illumination)
16. Recommendation:
17. The control and coordination of a base defense be centralized.  Due to its very nature, the many units involved, and the coordination requested, the base defense role should be controlled by only one agency.
18. The small size of forces occupying CAC compounds requires instant supporting fires.  Appropriate communications equipment should be made available to such units to enable direct contact with their supporting arms agency or control agency with the capability of clearing and assigning a supporting element.

This page last corrected 28 August 2011