1 January 1965

From:          Commanding Officer

To:               Commanding Officer, 4^th Marines (-) rein)

Subj:            Combat After Action Report (Operation TRIDENT)

Ref:     (a)            RegtO 3120.3

Encl:    (1)            Overlay of the Operation

               (2)           Intelligence Recapitulation

1. Type of Operation.  The operation consisted of searching, clearing and destroying the Viet Cong, his supplies and installations.
2. Duration. The duration of the operation was from H-hour 270730H to R-hour 271630H.
3. Location. The operation was conducted on Hoa Xuan Island, centered (BT 4315), in Ly Tin District, Quang Tin Province, South Viet Nam.
4. Command Headquarters. 1^st Battalion (-) (rein), 4^th Marines (-) (rein), 3^rd Marine Division (rein), FMF
5. Reporting Officer. Lieutenant Colonel     R. J. PERRICH
6. Subordinate Unit Commanders.

(1)               1^st Lieutenant J. J. CLANCY III, Company A (-)(rein)

(2)               Capt R. B. ALEXANDER, Company B (-)(rein)

(3)               Capt J. R. SPENCE, Company C (-)(rein)

6. Task Organization.

            1^st Battalion (-)(rein)                                      Lt Col             PERRICH

                        H&S Company (-)

                                    Det, Med Plat

                                    Det, Comm Plat

                                    Det, Intell Sect

                        Arty Ln Team, H Btry, 3^rd Bn, 12^th Mar

                        Det, 7^th CIT

            Company A (-) (rein)                                    1^st Lt. CLANCY

                        Company A (-)

                        Det, H&S Co.

                                    FO Team, 81mm Mort Plat

                                    Det, Med Plat

                                    Det, Intell Sect

                                    Det, Comm Plat

                        Det, H Btry, 3^rd Bn, 12^th Mar

                        Interpreter

            Company B (-)(rein)                                     Capt             ALEXANDER

                        Company B (-)

                        Det, H&S Co.

                                    FO Team, 81mm Mort Plat

                                    Det, Med Plat

                                    Det, Intell Sect

                                    Det, Comm Plat

                        Det, H Brty, 3^rd Bn, 12^th Mar

                        Interpreter

                        FAC Team

            Company C (-) (rein)                                                Capt             SPENCE

                        Company C (-)(rein)

                        Det, H&S Co.

                                    FO Team, 81mm Mort Plat

                                    Det, Med Plat

                                    Det, Comm Plat

                        Det, H Btry, 3^rd Bn, 12^th Mar

                        Interpreter

FAC Team

Det, 81mm Mort Plat                          Sgt           CARRILLO

Det, 106mm RR Plat                            Sgt            EVEY

Det, Flame Section                               Sgt             MIDDLETON

Battalion Reserve                                 Capt           LO PRESTI

            Company D (rein)

            Plat (rein)

            Det, H&S Co

                        Det, Med Plat

                        Det, Comm Plat

7. Supporting Forces
8. Marine Air Group 12
9. Marine Air Group 36
10. Battalion Artillery Group, Btry H, 3^rd Battalion, 12^th Marines
11. Company A (-), 1^st AmTrac Battalion
12. Company B (-), 3^rd Anti-Tank Battalion
13. Company B (-), 3^rd Engineer Battalion
14. Company C (-), 3^rd Motor Transportation Battalion
15. Counterintelligence Team #7
16. Popular Force Squads from Ky Hoa and Ky Ha
17. Vietnamese Interpreters
18. Intelligence.  See enclosure (2).
19. Mission.  1^st Battalion (-) (rein), 4^th Marines (-) (rein) landed at H-hour on D-day with three rifle companies (-) (rein) on Hoa Xuan Island (BT 4315) and conducted clearing operations on order to destroy/apprehend all VC/VCS, confiscate all VC supplies, and destroy VC installations and defenses located therein.
20. Concept of Operations.
21. See enclosure (1).
22. At H-hour on D-day three rifle companies (1) (rein) landed as follows: one company moved overland and crossed to the objective island at (BT 460146) and (BT 456140): one company moved overland via truck, crossed the Song Cho River via local boats and landed at (BT 420123): one company moved to and landed via LVT at vicinity of (BT 438165).  Companies conducted clearing operations, and thorough, detailed search of terrain for tunnels, caves, caches and weapons within assigned zones of action and along designated axis of advance to their limit of advance.  Upon completion of the operation, and on order, the companies retracted via LVT from vicinity (BT 438165) and returned to the MLR and/or patrol base positions.
23. Attached units as shown in paragraph six above moved with the individual assault companies.  The 81mm Mortar Section initially moved with Company A, however, upon establishment of their firing position, vicinity (BT 438158) they were controlled by the FSCC Forward.  Artillery Forward Observers moved with Companies B and C as did Forward Air Controller Teams.
24. Supporting units operated as follows.

(1)               MAG-12 maintained aircraft on strip alert during the first two and last two hours of the operation. The remaining time aircraft was available on call.

(2)               MAG-36 (VMO-6) provided a TAC(A) during the first and last two hours of the operation and provided a Command helicopter from 0645 to 1100.

(3)               Battery H, 3^rd Battalion, 12^th Marines displaced to its Forward Firing Area vicinity (BT 477077) and rendered artillery support as requested.

(4)               Company A, 1^st AmTrac Battalion provided eight LVTP-5’s and one LVT-1E to transport Company A.  The LVT-1E was utilized to clear the landing area of suspected mines.  Later in the day it was utilized to destroy the VC trench systems and mantraps located on the island.

(5)               Company B, 3^rd AT Battalion provided one platoon of Ontos as convoy escort for the combined motor march of Company C and the Battery H, 3^rd Battalion, 12^th Marines.  A heavy section remained with the Battery throughout the day and escorted them back to the enclave upon cessation of the operation.  The light section continued as convoy escort for Company C.

(6)               Company B, 3^rd Engineer Battalion provided an engineer squad to each rifle company and a mine detector team with Battery H, 3^rd Battalion, 12^th Marines.  Additionally, the company furnished three M-51 dump trucks loaded with sand and gravel to be used to fill cuts in National Route #1 if any were encountered while in route to the objective.

(7)               Company C, 7^th Motor Transportation Battalion provided the necessary trucks for the motor convoy for Company C.

(8)               One Popular Force Squad was assigned to each rifle company to assist in the search and clearing operations throughout the hamlets on the island.  Two squads from Ky Ha and one squad from Ky Hoa were used.

11. Execution.  Operation Order 227-65 was published on 240800H December 1965, with planned D-day for the 26^th of December.  However, due to the observance of the Viet Cong cease fire which lasted in excess of thirty hours, D-day was set back to 27 December 1965.

The first element of move on D-day was Company B.  The Company departed its CP at 0230H and moved overland under cover of darkness to the vicinity of (BT 475143).  Crossing of the Truang Giang River commenced at 0415H utilizing local boats.  At 0530H, Company C entrucked and departed from their CP.  The convoy linked up with elements from Battery H, 3^rd Battalion, 12^th Marines and one platoon of Ontos at the junction of National Route #1 and the MSR and proceeded north of Company A and the Battalion Command Group proceeded to the Splash Point (BT 573123) at 0530H and 0600H respectively.  The units embarked and departed by LVT at 0635H.  Company C by this time had reached Ly Tin District Headquarters and picked up the District Advisor, who was to render assistance in obtaining the local boats, at the Ky Chanh marketplace (BT 420122), in which Company C would cross to the island objective.  By 0706H Company A and the Command Group passed Company B which by this time was located on Hoa Xuan Island at (BT 461147 and 466143).  The Company was awaiting H-hour, to commence their northwesterly sweep to the limit of advance.

Company A landed at 0737H and Company C at 0742H.  At the same time, 0742H, the elements of Battery H were in position and commencing precision registration on Rt #21 at (BT 43991301).  Upon completion of the registration the Battery was available for on call artillery support.  However, as events transpired supporting arms were not needed during the operation.  By now all three companies began their slow methodical search along their respective axis of advance.  Company A, between 0745H and 0800H, was the only unit to receive hostile fire during the initial landing phase of the operation.  The firing originated from the undulating sand dunes to the west of Hill 10 (BT 436157), from the vicinity of (BT 433156).  Fire was quickly returned, and the Company deployed.  The VC, however, broke contact the minute the Marine elements commenced their maneuvers against them. This was the only enemy fire directed against the Company during the operation.  The company did, however, apprehend a total of twenty-six VCS all of which were taken to the Battalion Collection Point for interrogation by the attached Counterintelligence Team.

Company B, proceeding northwest along its dual axis of advance encountered no enemy resistance.  At 0820H, one VCS was apprehended at (BT 455145) when he failed to produce the proper identification.

At 0840H, Company C apprehended one VCS hiding in a thicket at (BT 424124).  Five minutes later, the Company received two rounds of harassing fire from a tree line located at (BT 422125).  Upon dispatch of a fire team to that area, the VC quickly broke contact and could not be located.  Again, at 0850H, the company came four rounds of harassing fire from a tree line at (BT 420125).  Once again, the unit deployed only to have the VC break contact prior to the Marines reaching the enemy’s position.  The Company continued its sweep north and came under harassing fire a third time at 0930H from the vicinity of (BT 427132).  This time, however, when maneuvering to engage the VC, a fire team discovered a VCS hiding in a spider hole.  A second VCS was located in an adjoining hole, and like the first, was apprehended.  Both holes were blown by members from the attached engineer’s squad. As the company continued its search, three additional rounds of harassing fire were received from a VC in a tree line at (BT 420132).  Although the insurgent was immediately taken under fire by the advancing Marines, he managed to elude the searching elements in the heavy brush.

Company A’s last contact of the operation took place as it progressed due west along its axis of advance.  At 0945H, three VCS were apprehended in the vicinity of (BT 427165), two of which were carried on the Battalion’s Blacklist.

Moving slowly northwest, at 1928H, Company B at (BT 453150) encountered an elderly Vietnamese male who was identified by the accompanying PF as the father of two Viet Cong members.  This particular individual had been apprehended on two previous occasions and returned to the Chu Lai Collection Point.  However, on both occasion he was cleared and released.  He was likewise cleared this time by members of the Battalion Intelligence Section.  While conducting the MEDCAP in vicinity (BT 445150), at 1030H, a member of the company observed a VCS hiding in the thick brush. When apprehended he failed to possess the proper identification card and was subsequently turned over the Battalion Collection Point.

Meanwhile continuing the sweep north, Company C encountered three VCS who attempted to escape by locking themselves inside a Vietnamese pagoda.  With little effort, the pagoda was breached; the VCS were apprehended and sent to the Battalion Collection Point.  Noteworthy here, is the fact that at 1230H, the 3^rd Platoon of Company C located 500 lbs. of rice, 300 lbs. of corn, 50 lbs. of sweet potatoes and forty-six eating bowls.  The discovery was made in a house belonging to one of the three VCS who attempted to lock themselves inside the pagoda.  This was the last reported incident by the Company prior to the cessation of the operation.

The last action of the operation, involved as Company B was searching the Hamlet of Phu Vinh (BT 436152).  As the company moved into the Hamlet two Vietnamese informed them that just prior to their arrival, two VC had moved in a southwesterly direction.  As the Company searched the area, a VC sprang from a hedgerow and leveled a rifle on the advancing Marines.  He was immediately taken under fire and killed.  His weapon, a Mossin Nagant M-53, and one M-26 grenade were captured.

The Companies commenced retraction at 1600H with Companies A, C and Command Group retracting by LVT, while Company B reswept the northeast finger of the island and crossed back to Ky Hoa via local boats.  Return trip to their CP from Hill 12 was made by LVT.  All units were back in their defensive positions by 2000H.

Enemy contacts during the sweep lasted no longer than a minute or two.  Harassing fire, received throughout the day was sporadic and inaccurate.

12. Results.

Friends Casualties – None.

                  Enemy Casualties:

1        VC KIA

35     VCS apprehended

10     VCS returned to the Chu Lai Collection Point.

1        Chinese Mossin Nagant, Model 53 captured.

1        M-26 Fragmentation Grenade captured.

      Numerous fighting holes, trenches, tunnels, spider holes and punji traps were discovered and destroyed.

13. Administrative Matters.  No major administrative problems were encountered Communications with the AN/PRC-25 were excellent.  However, communications with the AN/PRC-6’s and 10’s were marginal, bordering on unsatisfactory.
14. Special Techniques.  None.
15. Commanders Analysis.
16. The Battalion employed a mobile FSCC in the Command Group.  The FSCC consisted of the ALO, Arty FO, and an 81mm mortar FO.  Communications consisted of an AN/PRC-10/41 for the ALO as the TACP local and HD/AD nets respectively.  AN/PRC-9 for the Artillery Liaison Officer and an AN/PRC-10 for the 81mm conduct of fire net.  In effect this would have ideally given the Command Group/FSCC on the scene coordination of air, artillery and 81mm Mortar support if required.  The system would have worked; however, it was found to be unnecessary for the short one-day operation, within close proximity of the stabilized Command Post.
17. At the present time, centralized control of aircraft is maintained at MAF level.  Air requests must be submitted a minimum of forty-eight hours prior to any scheduled operation, however, approval is not normally received until a few hours prior to the commencement of the operation.  This is felt to be highly impractical as the Ground Commander is unable to rely on air support during the operation.  In this particular operation, the first elements were scheduled to depart at 0500H.  Not until 0130H the same morning did confirmation of the air request arrive at the Battalion.
18. Once again local forces were requested and used to assist in the sweep and clear operation.  Although unfounded by fact, it seems quite evident that the uses of these forces tend to compromise the operation.  Experience has shown that only isolated cases of enemy contact are met when local forces are made aware of forthcoming operations.  A solution to this problem may lay in last minute notification to these forces of forthcoming operations.  However, the continued use of this tactic could have unfavorable effects on USMC/Vietnamese relations.
19. Air by itself is an ineffective blocking force.  Identification of friend or foe is extremely difficult from higher altitudes. Suspected enemy movement among the civilian populace is undetectable.  However, a solution to this problem might lay with the employment of a helicopter equipped with a loudspeaker system.  The people would be directed what to do, during an operation to ensure their personal safety.  ‘Those not heeding the instructional warnings would be taken under fire.  Emphasis must be placed on protection of the innocent civilians during any offensive operation.
20. The joint usage of a HU-1E aircraft as a Command/AO helicopter during operations is impractical due primarily to the inadequate communication capability of the third seat.  If a Command ship is available, it should be for the Commander along, accordingly the AO should be carried in the escort aircraft.

 

This page last corrected 18 September 2011