Narrative Summary
The Battalion continued to participate in Operation KENTUCKY between 1-27 May.
The Battalion’s normal deployment was with Co.’s A and D at A-4, Co. B at Yankee Station and Co. C at C-2 Bridge. On 27 May, the Battalion moved into the Operation LANCASTER II OA, OPCON to 4th Marines.
Numerous platoon and squad size combat patrols, ambushes, OP’s and security and screening activities were conducted both day and night during May. Several Co. and Co. (-) size operations were conducted and late in the month the Battalion was able to exploit enemy contacts with up to three Companies reinforced each time with tanks from A-4.
On 15 May, Co. A was chopped to 9th Marines and then to 1st Bn 26th Marines to participate in an operation west of C-2.
Frequent contacts with the enemy characterized this reporting period. The most significant of these contacts began around noon on 22 May when Co. B departed Yankee Station aboard tanks east along southern edge of the trace to exploit contact made by 3/3 earlier in the day. Co. B moved down to the North-South Road 2000 meters east of A-4. Co. A moved to approximately YD 145709 and set up in an East-West posture. The CP group positioned itself at approximately YD 138707. Co. B commenced the attack east at 1610H. They soon came under heavy a/w fire, RPG’s and Chicom grenades from NVA in fortified bunkers at YD 145705. The lead elements were pinned down. Capt. R. E. Harris, the Company Commander, was killed. Co. A began to move down to assist Co. B and also received heavy fire. Co. A and the CP group began to receive incoming 82mm mortars. Approximately 35 rounds impacted in the Bn position. Early in the evening Co. B still had two squads pinned down but Co. A was closing to extract them. By 1930H, the contact had been broken and the Battalion elements moved back with their casualties to YD 138707. The Battalion consolidated a defensive position and set in for the night. All casualties were med-evaced with the exception of a few KIA’s. The Battalion sustained the following casualties and loss of equipment: Co. A, two KIA, 7 WIA (evac). Co. B, 12 KIA (six bodies not recovered at this time), 19 WIA (evac) and 2 MIA. Co. D, one NBC (evac). Co. B lost two AN/PRC-25 radios, compromising the Battalion and Company frequencies, shackle sheets for unknown dates and one map with Regiment Thrust Points.
Debrief of personnel in field revealed following details of the contact: Co. B had 52 NVA KIA confirmed and destroyed one heavy machinegun. Co. D had one NVA KIA (confirmed) and captured one Russian carbine.
At 0800H on 23 May, Co. A began to attack southeast in the vicinity of a stream bed at YD 153714. The area was prepped by arty and air. Almost immediately Co. A began to receive sniper fire from the tree line along stream bed. More arty missions and air strikes were called on enemy positions. Groups of NVA began to break out of tree line and flee north toward the trace. Co. A took them under fire with s/a, a/w and tanks. Arty missions were called. Three arty batteries were fired simultaneously along with 60mm mortars from Co. A. NVA became confused and panicked, running into one impact area after another. Tanks fired canister and beehive rounds. Approximately 150 tried to run across the trace. Battalion elements observed two 82mm mortar positions. Tanks took mortars under fire and destroyed them. AO on station began calling air strikes on enemy in trace, killing them. Supporting fires by arty and air were timely, accurate and significantly contributed to the success of this enemy defeat. They are to be highly complimented. Arty and air destroyed heavily fortified area in tree line along a stream bed.
Company A found one bunker containing thirty-five 82mm mortar rounds, four RPG rounds, and 100 pounds of rice. All were destroyed. Co. A began to move into the area of Co. B’s contact of 22 May and recovered bodies of MIA’s and Marines previously killed but not retrieved the night before. All missing equipment was found with the exception of one PRC-25. Resulting casualties of contact were: five USMC WIA (evac) and 142 NVA KIA (estimate). Company A had 32 NVA KIA, 40 NVA KIA by air, 50 NVA KIA killed by arty, 20 killed by tanks. Area could not be completely swept due to direction of contact and open area of the trace. Battalion consolidated the area, evaced remaining dead and wounded and began to move southwest toward the night position (YD 143692). No further contact with the enemy was made during this action. The afternoon of 24 May, Co. B returned to Yankee Station and on 25 May, Co. A, D and the Battalion Command Group returned to A-4.
While the Battalion had its Companies in the field, Hotel/2/26 was chopped to 1/4 to fill in the lines at A-4. ‘Forty-two men from the Battalion rear at Dong Ha were dispatched to A-4 to further assist in its defense. Hotel Company 2/26 remained at A-4 while 1/4 began its move into the 4th Marines OA at Camp Carroll.
On 25 May, Co. B chopped to 4th Marines and departed Yankee Station for Camp Carroll. On 26 May, Co.’s D and A (-) were transported to the Rockpile area. One platoon of Co. A was chopped to Co. B, 1/4 at Camp Carroll. On 27 May the Battalion Command Group and Co. C chopped to 4th Marines and assumed the defense of Camp Carroll while 2/26 assumed the defense of A-4. Until 30 May, the Battalion was deployed with Co. B reinforced with one platoon from Co. A and the Battalion Command Group at Camp Carroll. Co. C occupied four positions along Rt #9 within the OA. Co.’s D and A (-) were OPCON to 4th Marines at the Rockpile. The evening of 30 May the Battalion’s Bravo Command Group chopped to 4th Marines and trucked to the Rockpile where it assumed OPCON of Co.’s D and A (-) and the responsibility for the defense to that portion of the 4th Marines OA.
This page last corrected 2 September 2011