First Battalion Fourth Marines
Battalion Command
010001 to 302400
June 1966

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First Battalion Fourth Marines
After Action Reports
010001 to 312400
January 1966

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First Battalion Fourth Marines
Battalion Command
010001 to 312400
May 1966

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30 December 1965

BATTALION BULLETIN 1500

From:       Commanding Officer

To:            Distribution List

Subj:         60mm Mortar Training

Ref:     (a)       FM 23-85

(b)              BnO 3591.7D

1. Purpose.  To promulgate instructions for additional training with the 60mm Mortar, M-19.
2. Background.  With the reintroduction of the 60mm Mortar to the Marine Corps weapons family, immediate on-the-job training was conducted to familiarize Marines with the characteristics, procedures, and tactical employment of the mortar.  This training consisted primarily of lectures and demonstrations; practical application was limited because of low availability of ammunition.
3. General.  Recent availability, in limited quantities, of M50A2 practice ammunition now permits resumption of practical application in the form of live firing exercises.
4. Action.
5. Company Commanders:

(1)               Conduct intensified training to ensure tactical proficiency, on a continuing basis, with the Mortar, 60mm M-19, using reference (a) as the basic text.

(2)               Conduct maximum live firing exercises contingent upon availability of M50A2 practice ammunition.

(3)               Request use of the direct fire range for firing exercises in accordance with reference (b).

1. Battalion S-4 Officer make available a maximum of forty rounds of M50A2 practice ammunition to each rifle company for firing exercises.
2. Self-cancellation.  1 June 1966.

This page last corrected 18 September 2011

1. J. PERRICH

First Battalion Fourth Marines  
Intelligence Reports 
010001 to 312400 
December 1965  

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Fire Support Coordination,

Naval Gunfire

1. Artillery.

1                   Significant Events.  In order to support the operations of this Battalion, Battery G, 3^rd Bn, 12^th Marines displaced to a forward position at (BT 486072), as Battery H, 3^rd Bn, 12^th Marines was on an extended operation.  Two tubes of Battery H remained at Battery G, rear position.

2                   Statistical Summary.

(a)               Number of missions fired in support:  997

(b)               Types of Missions.

(1)   Unobserved missions.

(a)   H&I fires 813

(2)   Observed missions.

(a)   Targets of opportunity – 142

(b)   Registrations – 17

(c)   Prep fires – 1

(d)   Fires for effect – 19

(e)   Defensive concentrations – 5

(3)   Rounds Expenditures.

(a)   105 Howitzer 5332

(b)   107 Howitzer 311

(c)   155 Howitzer 356

(d)   155 Guns 12

(e)   8” Howitzer 4

1. Naval Gunfire.  None.

This page last updated 21 August 2011

First Battalion Fourth Marines
Operation Summary
010001 to 282400
February 1966

Click On Report To Go There

First Battalion Fourth Marines
After Action Reports
010001 to 312400
January 1966

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First Battalion Fourth Marines
Intelligence Reports
010001 to 312400
December 1965

Click On Report To Go There

30 December 1965

From: ‘B’ Company, 1st Bn, 4th Marines (-) (rein)

To: S-2, 1st Bn, 4th Marines (-) (rein)

AFTER ACTION REPORT

A. 36 MEN AND 2 Officers – total included: FO Team from Arty, 81’s FO Team, One squad from weapons, one sniper, one Interpreter, one radioman and the Third Platoon.

B. To locate and destroy the enemy and to destroy tunnels, trenches and bunkers.

C. TOD: 230445H

D. TOR: 231445H

E. See attached overlay

F. Departed Kahuku, moved across Waimanalo, no difficulties. Water was approx six feet deep at crossing, had difficulty getting across. Troops panicked and several yelling. Seized high ground at Maui (BT 459147), it had a trench line dug, approximately 40 meters in from beach and extending inland and up around the high ground for about 150 meters. Did not destroy because it was getting light and wanted to move inland. Moved in about 300 meters and set in. Requested from Bravo-6 a return to original plan of action. When received new instructions we moved out. After moving about 400 meters, we were taken under fire from left front and left flank. Fire was returned. Sent squad to investigate. Negative results picked up one VCS who said he did not hear firing and yet was right where it come from. Moved on to check point Kailua (BT 445151), no contact. Set-in for one hour and observed Hill 10 & 11 with binoculars and sniper scope. Negative results. Moved SW from this position and had moved about 200 meters when hit from front by S/A fire. Returned fire. Firing ceased. Sighted three armed men just moving into trace on left flank, 200 meters away, running in same direction we were moving. Moved out after them, encountered barbed wire fence from (BT 440153) to (BT 438152). It encircled one side of a group of houses. The part I saw was about 300 meters long. Tried to find a way through. One of my men found a gate partially open, with just one strand holding it shut. Removed the one strand and pushed the gate open and set off booby trap. It was not too loud, seemed to explode straight up, very little, if any shrapnel. Man was thrown backwards. Sent Corpsmen up, assisted the man back. Man was all right, small nick in right ear. Moved around fence at about (BT 438152) and moved through hamlet at (BT 438152). Picked up one VCS, said he gave his ID card to a friend who in turn lost it. Moved down peninsula, no further contact. Crossed over at (BT 457142), water 6 ft. deep. Lost three rifles when some troops panicked. Stayed and found all weapons and gear. Returned across Waimanalo to Kahuku.

G. Spotted only three-armed VC and was only a glimpse by one of the men on the left flank. They were moving in a direction that would have put them in front of us as we moved but did not make contact with them. The first contact was made at about 0700H at (BT 451149). The second contact was made at about 1015H at (BT 439155). First contact was 2 or 3 semi-automatic weapons, fired 20-30 rounds. Second was 1 or 2 weapons fired about 20 rounds.

H. Hill located at (BT 460146), does not show on map.

1. Foxholes dug about every 50 meters alongside trail running from (BT 459147) to (BT 440155). Kicked sand into them (old holes).

2. No young males on island.

3. Firing came from deep in trees, never once saw who was firing.

4. River crossings dangerous, day or night. Training night help.

5. People kept signaling ahead, I feel, warning those ahead of us.

6. Huey fired some rockets while we were at Lanai. Looked like they were firing at Hill 10.

I. Negative results in encounter with the enemy.

J. Patrol extremely tired, but feel it was due to river crossings plus all movement SE on return route down peninsula was through rice paddies, which were up too knee deep in water. One man with nick in ear from booby trap, one man with small scratch from punji stake.

1. The patrol was somewhat of a failure because of our losing the element of surprise or secrecy at the start.

2. Recommend a larger operation, using a blocking force to prevent those moving to the front from escaping.

3. Recommend a safer and quicker means be found to cross over to the island, such as rubber boats or junks.

This page last corrected 18 September 2011